The structure of theoretical systems in relation to emergence by Palmer, Kent
THE STRUCTURE OF 
THEORETICAL SYSTEMS IN 
RELATION TO EMERGENCE 
Kent Duane Palmer 
  Ph. D., Sociology 
  London School of Economics 
               1982 
 
Copyright 1982, 2007 KD Palmer      
OCR edition. Has character errors.  
See original at http://archonic.net. 
This version is made available to that 
it can be indexed by the search 
engines. See the original. Corrections 
have been made here and American 
spellings replace English spellings 
and other changes meant to bring 
clarity are made sparingly. 
kent@palmer.name http://think.net 
 
All rights reserved. Not for 
distribution. For Personal study only.
  
ABSTRACT 
A thesis concerning the ontology underlying the 
formation of structural-dialectical systems based on 
the implications of the phenomenon of Emergence is 
presented.  Emergence refers to the unexpected 
appearance of discontinuities which segment on-going 
traditions. The Western philosophical tradition is 
used as an example focusing on motifs introduced in 
the Phaedo, the transition from Hume to Kant, and 
contemporary ontology.  Emergence (as structurally 
coded artificial novelty) is posited to be the 
opposite of the phenomenon of Nihilism (erratic 
change projected by the structural system rendering 
the formal system visible), and both are functions 
of the ideational process.  The ontological basis of 
Emergence is sought by exploring the articulation of 
the form of the ideational process, through which 
structural theoretical systems are produced, called 
the 'ideational template'.  It has three parts: 1) 
SHELL—The expanding wave of logical connections by 
means of triadic formalisms seen on the Nihilistic 
background; 2) CORE-—The unfolding structural-
dialectical underpinning to the formal system in 
which artificial emergences appear; 3) CENTRE OF THE 
CORE—Fragmentation of the concept of 'Being' which 
provides the ontological foundation for the Formal/ 
Structural system.  The ideational template is de-
structured in order to show the feasibility of an 
alternative metaphysical model based on disconnect-
ing opposite qualities instead of focusing on form 
and structure as the ideational process does.  This 
brings attention to the principle of 'No Secondary 
Causation' as a means of tracing back artificial 
emergence within structural systems to a genuine 
emergence of all entities and qualitative opposites 
to a single source (called by Plato 'the Good') 
indicated by the methodology of logical disconnect-
ion rather than syllogistic connection.  The 
alternative to logical ideational connection is 
called the 'logic of disconnection'.  The meta-
physical basis of a qualitative science as distinct 
from quantitative Western science is posited. 
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The Structure of Theoretical Systems 
In Relation to Emergence 
Introduction 
The topic of this essay is the phenomenon of Emer-
gence.1  Emergence means either the appearance of an 
unforeseen phenomenon which alters the conception of 
the whole world radically,2 or the change in the way 
the world is looked at conceptually which allows the 
appearance of hitherto unseen phenomena.3  The 
theoretical perspective4 one has on the world5 is in 
a dynamic relation6 to it. Transformative change7 
may arise from the world and call for an alteration 
in theory or, vice versa, it might arise from the 
reconsideration of theory and result in the 
alteration of the perception of the world.  These 
two directions from which transformative change 
might arise indicate a single phenomenon: 
emergence.8 The politics9 of this phenomenon issues 
from the attempt to hold static 10 the connections 
11 between the parts 12 of the theoretical complex, 
the states of affairs l3 in the world, and the 
relation between the two.  When this proves 
impossible, from the first moment these static 
connections are projected, because of change and 
difference impinging upon 
them; there then occurs a shifting which allows 
change in the theoretical perspective while holding 
static the world; or, which allows change in the 
world and holds static the theoretical perspective. 
The politics of holding one factor constant and 
allowing another to vary as a strategy for con-
fronting the change, and difference, endemic in 
existence gives rise to emergence in quanta.  What 
is meant by emergence in quanta is emergence in 
discrete epochs 14 with specific temporal duration, 
within which there is a unique perceptual-conceptual 
patterning that manifests in a series of 
dialectically related moments.15  Change in the 
world or in theoretical perspective occurs in bursts 
16 rather than as a constant flow.  The burst comes 
from the shifting between holding theory static, to 
holding the world static, and back again to holding 
theory static; and that allows stasis and change to 
be artificially mixed. 17  This produces the 
illusion of continuity l8 while allowing change to 
be filtered through a series of locks, like the 
locks in a canal, where the effects of change are 
mitigated.19  This series of locks is the struc-
tural system.  The phenomenon of emergence is only 
seen by looking at the way the structural system 
mediates20 the shift between theoretical per-
spectives and the world. 
By this phenomenon of emergence, there is a constant 
unfolding of the theoretical perspective set up 
within the western philosophical and scientific 
tradition; and, there is continual transformation of 
what is seen of the world by those within that 
tradition.  For those of us 21 within this tradition 
it is the dynamic between the transforming world, 
and our changing perspective of that transformation, 
that gives us access to aspects of the truth.22  It 
is the truth of what unfolds in the process of 
emergence that must ultimately be considered.23  
This is what gives ontological dimen-sions24 to the 
phenomenon of emergence.  How the truth will be seen 
depends upon the standards of truth set up prior to 
its arrival.25 The process of emergence, and what 
is uncovered in that process, is measured by these 
prior standards.  The truth impinges upon those 
within a tradition in a way that is aligned with how 
they pre-construct the world.26 That is, how they 
set up prototypes27 of what is acceptable 
information concerning the world.  This means that 
man's relation to the truth is such that it comes 
out of (or from the direction of) his own 
descriptions of reality.28  The way description 
takes place predefines the intensity of truth that 
whatever is seen through that description may have. 
Description in this tradition is ideational.29  So 
truth is idealized and is a function of ideation. 
Therefore, it is necessary to understand the 
criteria of idealized truth within the western 
scientific and philosophical tradition in order to 
understand how truth as an object of knowledge could 
manifest itself in that ambiance.  Criteria of truth 
specify what may be called the "ontological 
mould".30  The means of producing descriptions 
within the parameters of those criteria will be 
called the ideational template.31  Artificial 
emergence takes place inside the ontological mould 
which is a series of interrelated standards of 
truth.  The truth of what appears in emergence and 
takes the form of the ontological mould itself is 
the result of a specific application of the idea-
tional means of pre-constructing description.  It is 
this means of producing prototypes, which must be 
changed in order to change the standards of truth in 
the western tradition. 
Heidegger distinguishes between two kinds of 
truth.32  There is correspondence and its veri-
fication as the principal33 standard of truth, and 
there is the manifestation of whatever appears 
between the correspondences which are set up.34 The 
truth of manifestation is the more original in the 
sense that it underlies the correspondence standard 
(beings must occur first for correspondences to be 
set up)35 and in the sense that it was 
the standard which, according to Heidegger, was held 
by the early Greeks.36  The correspondence standard 
of truth sets up retraceable relationships between 
parts of the theoretical complex37 and also between 
that complex and the world.38 This assumes that the 
theoretical complex and the world have already been 
manifested in a certain way.  The manifestation of 
differentiated beings whether as part of the world 
or of the theoretical complex is prior to (i.e., is 
necessary before) the sighting of appearance or 
manifestation itself.  Now, the manifestation is 
more original than the differentiated appearance of 
specific beings, because appearance itself must be 
manifest first in order for anything to be seen at 
all.  However, one sees (notices) specific beings 
before one sees manifestation in general as their 
substratum.  The consideration of the distinction 
between these two types of truth is the best 
starting point for the understanding of the 
phenomenon of emergence. 
The correspondence standard of truth39 is the 
principal standard within the western philosophical 
tradition.40  This is the standard by which all 
scientific descriptions of the world are measured.  A 
linguistic description41 of a state of affairs is 
set up such that the definitions of every term are 
unambiguous, consistently used, and 
precise.  This description is compared to a state of 
affairs in the world.  The different aspects of the 
description must correspond to the state of affairs 
in the world, so that, at any point in time, the 
correspondence may be verified.  If it is possible 
to verify the description by retracing all the links 
among its parts and between the description and the 
state of affairs, then it is considered true.  By 
this standard what is true does not change.  Change 
implies falsification. Either the description 
changes or the state of affairs changes. Once change 
occurs a new set of correspondences must be 
fabricated.  Setting out a description and then 
verifying it takes time.  Change always occurs 
before the process can be completed.42 The elements 
of the description and the state of affairs are in 
diacritical relation43 to each other.  Thus any 
change has vast ramifications.  Verification must 
occur as the construction of correspondences is 
under way.  The structural system44 mediates between 
the theoretical perspective and the world as a means 
of making it possible to verify correspondences in 
the face of endemic change.  The structural system 
holds static the description or the state of affairs 
long enough for the correspondences to be 
constructed and for verification to occur by 
allowing change to affect some other part of the 
system than that part being concentrated on at the 
moment.  In this way the ideal of static descrip-
tion, static world, and a static relation between 
the two is approximated by a mixture of artificial 
stasis and artificially channeled change.  This 
ideal of a frozen world of precise and verifiable 
correspondences has been pursued by the western 
scientific tradition, and philosophy has attempted to 
serve science by making firm ontological and 
epistemological foundations for the realization of 
that ideal.  The search for firm foundations for 
truth, in the form of static correspondences, has 
led to those foundations being    re-laid over and 
over again.45  The philosophies of Descartes, Kant, 
and Husserl testify to the search for these 
foundations. 
Heidegger was the first philosopher of the western 
tradition to step outside this process of continu-
ally re-laying the foundations of the process of 
verification, and point out that the standard of 
truth it represents is extremely limited.  He 
indicated46 the truth of Appearance itself that 
underlies the correspondences between whatever 
appears.  This shift in perspective from the 
relations between what appears to the Appearance 
itself called attention to the conditions that make 
verification possible, and away from the process of 
verification of correspondences.  This shift was, in 
fact, a political move,47 which turned from concern 
for the truth of correspondence which is related to 
the formal system that grows out of isomorphic 
description, to concern with the truth of the 
structural system that mediates between the 
theoretical perspective contained in descriptions 
and the world described.  The structural system 
governs appearance by oscillating between holding 
the world static and holding the theoretical 
perspective static. 
Heidegger identifies Appearance as the manifestation 
of phenomenal beings with the verb "to be" of 
language.48  In this way, language, which is the 
root of descriptions, and Appearance in general, 
which is the root of the world of phenomenal beings, 
are identified so that the structural system,49 and 
its ontology, become the basis of both descriptions 
and states of affairs of phenomenal beings. By 
identifying these two, language 50 annexes the world 
more fundamentally than it ever did through the use 
of the correspondence standard of truth. States of 
affairs in the world are already linguistically 
conditioned 'beings'.  The visibility of 'Being' is 
based on the appearance of these beings. 
Appearance itself is only seen by means of the 
appearance of the appearing entities.  The shift to 
looking at Being of Appearance rather than beings 
(or the appearing entities) sets up another standard 
of truth.  This standard of truth is hermeneutical. 
What is meant by hermeneutical is that the truth of 
something is dependent on the continual unveiling of 
something more about it, the continual deepening of 
one's understanding of it.  When this process stops, 
what one knows immediately becomes untrue because it 
is retrospective.51  Emergence has this kind of 
truth as its basis, but it can only be seen in the 
specific transformations of the correspondences. 
There is no general access to the truth of emerg-
ence, only glimpses in situ.52  That is to say that 
as one builds the set of correspondences, one is 
discovering their possibility and deepening one's 
understanding.  If one stops building the correspon-
dences and begins verifying, reconstructing, then 
one switches back from Appearance as a standard of 
truth to correspondence verification as a standard. 
If one does not cease in the pursuit of ever deeper 
understanding which results in panoplies of 
correspondences, then the continual bursts of 
emergent transformations of the set of correspon-
dences differentiated into panoplies appear. 
Once these two standards of truth have been out-
lined, the shift back and forth between them must be 
considered.  The politics of coping with change by 
setting up variable and constant elements so that 
something is always kept constant, but what it is 
changes from time to time, appears more fundamen-
tally as the shift between these two standards of 
truth.  As the set of correspondences first appears 
in its basic outlines, then the hermeneutical or 
teleonomic aspect of the structural system is 
emphasized.  At a certain point one must either set 
about reconstructing the relations between the 
correspondences or let go of them completely and 
attempt to grasp a new set of correspondences.  The 
process of reconstruction makes the process of the 
unfolding of new sets of correspondences visible and 
vice versa.  One may only look forward to the realm 
of possibilities and its actualization into specific 
sets of correspondence for a certain length of time 
before one must turn and face the task of 
consolidating what one has grasped.  Then it is 
possible to turn toward the next phase of realizing 
possibilities on the basis of reconstruction.  By 
this oscillation between modes of truth the 
tradition is constantly transformed.  Every time one 
turns to reconstruction and away from the cutting 
edge of the tradition where its possibilities appear 
just before realization, one sees the landscape of 
past reconstructions in a new light. 
When these two standards of truth have been dis-
tinguished53 then another distinction follows 
naturally in the historical and logical development 
of ontology.  This is the distinction between man-
ifestation or Appearance (Being) and what M. Henry 
calls 'the Essence of Manifestation'54.  Appearance 
itself must appear.  The appearance of Appearance is 
called its Essence.  This is to say that the 
appearance of entities and the appearance of 
Appearance, in which the entities are seen, have 
different natures.  Being has as its antinomic1 
opposite, Nothingness.55  As Merleau-Ponty recog-
nised these two ontological concepts are opposites 
and cancel each other out.56  Their cancellation he 
called Hyper-Being.  Heidegger called it Being 
(‘Being’ crossed out).57 Appearance appears out of 
the mirroring58 of cancellation.59.  Entities in 
antinomic opposition 60 appear within that 
Appearance.  The Essence of manifestation may be 
considered as the source of the appearing of 
Appearance that lies beyond cancellation, or it may 
be considered as the timing or unfolding from 
cancellation, of the Appearance bursting forth, if 
one assumes that Appearance comes from itself61, 
rather than from something other than it.  In this 
way, although emergence is seen as the temporal 
                         
1 Definition of antinomic: 1. Contradiction or opposition, 
especially between two laws or rules. 2. A contradiction 
between principles or conclusions that seem equally necessary 
and reasonable; a paradox. 
 
 
transformation of correspondences in Appearance, its 
standard of truth is the same as Appearance itself. 
Emergence is the result of the continual unfolding 
of understanding.  But this standard of truth arises 
from cancellation, which is the limit of conceptual 
understanding.62  The phenomenon of emergence takes 
us to that limit 63, and it is there we must begin 
any genuine study of the phenomenon.  The standard 
of truth related to the Essence is cancellation.  
The Essence never appears.  Emergences, as glimpses 
of the truth of Appearance, arise between these two 
extremes; between the stasis of correspondence and 
the non-appearing of the Essence, which may be 
interpreted as pure transformation. Merleau-Ponty 
postulates beyond cancellation that there is a 
fourth kind of Being which he calls "Wild Being".64 
wild Being is the clarification 65 of the 
perceptual world after the process of cancellation 
is completed. 
The form of the mould of ontology is very clear.  It 
is made up of a shell, a core, and the centre of the 
core.66 The mould of ontology is the fruit of 
conceptualization which splits the motion of thought 
from the world, and then begins attempting to hold 
one static in relation to the other.  The shell of 
the mould of ontology is the appearance of beings in 
the world and the correspondences between them.  It 
is differentiated appearances.  The core of the 
mould of ontology is Appearance, which allows the 
phenomena ????? to be seen.  It is the 
antinomic opposition between temporalized 
Being(Being in Process) and Nothingness67 which are 
its two descriptions.  The centre of the core is the 
Essence of manifestation 
 Being (crossed out) or undifferentiated, and 
pure, Appearance which is never seen.68  What 
M. Henry points out,69 is that there are two 
possible approaches to the relation between the core 
and its centre.  One may either take the stance of 
'ontological monism', the primary assumption of 
western metaphysics, that transcendence (Appearance) 
is grounded in itself.70  That point of view states 
that Being is its own origin.  Or, one may take the 
opposite stance of 'ontological dualism' which 
posits that Appearance appears from an unknown 
origin: 'X'.71  Both of these stances72 have the 
same effect, however, of placing a discontinuity73 
of cancellation as the origin of the arising of dif-
ference,74 either between Being and Itself 75 as a 
point of Nothingness, or between Being and the 
Essence.  Ontological monism and ontological dualism 
are merely a rearrangement of terms.  They are 
antinomic opposites which cancel, leaving no net 
result.76  As a consequence 77 of this empty, 
abstract reasoning, the mould of ontology remains 
bland and undifferentiated.  Beyond distinguishing 
its three layers and projecting either the assump-
tion of ontological monism or ontological dualism 
 
upon it, little more can be said within the scope of 
modern ontology.  One has left behind the particular 
appearance for the most universal, which is Appear-
ance itself.78  That universal either appears from 
itself or from an unknown.  The emergence of Appear-
ance and the emergence as a phenomenon related to 
beings and their correspondences in appearance, are 
irrevocably counter-posed in the form of ontology. 
The mould of ontology is a quantal burst of the 
Appearance of truth to ideation.  The quantum moves 
from pure undifferentiated Appearance, which is 
never seen, to completely differentiated appearance 
of particular beings which obscures Appearance as a 
universal that mediates between these two 
extremes.79 This quantum of the bursting forth of 
Appearance is undifferentiated in itself80 from the 
point of view of modern ontology, because 
oncologists move to the universal and do not look at 
its dialectical relation with the particular.81  The 
emergent phenomenon which occurs as the transfor-
mation of beings is also quantal in nature.82  By 
looking at the quantal nature of emergence,83 the 
quanta of the bursting of Appearance, from 
undifferentiation to differentiation, may itself be 
differentiated transversally.84
By this is meant that the internal articulation85 
of the mould of ontology may be seen by studying 
closely the phenomenon of emergence.  Thus, by 
studying emergence, it is possible to push the 
limits of ontology much deeper 86, because the 
mould of ontology is quantal and emergence is our 
access to the comprehension of quantal phenomena. 
The mould of ontology, which is blank without 
internal articulation, when articulated, may be 
called the ideational template.87  The ideational 
template controls quantization of conceptual pro-
cesses.88 The transformation of the ontological 
mould into the ideational template depends com-
pletely on the study of emergence.  By studying 
the emergence of discrete  panoplies of correspon-
dences in the process of hermeneutical unveiling 
to understanding, it is possible to understand the 
mechanism which emits appearance as a discrete 
burst from undifferentiation to differentiation.  
The mould of ontology lays down the basis upon 
which anything might appear; whereas the 
ideational template defines the inherent temporal 
structuring of the process of Appearance.  By the 
ideational template's internal articulation of the 
mould of ontology, it is possible to explore the 
nature of the Essence of manifestation.  The shell 
of the ideational template is the connection 
between beings, and the universal by which their 
connection 
is sustained.89  The Core of the ideational template 
is the structural articulation of all appearance.90  
The Centre of the Core is the four states of 
Being91, which describe the fragmentation of the 
Essence of manifestation, and the attempt to find a 
deep continuity to counteract that fragmentation. 
Emergence phenomena, whether they are the emergence 
of panoplies of correspondences in discrete bursts, 
or the emergence of the discrete burst in the 
appearing of Appearance, point to cancellation.  The 
articulation of the mould of ontology by the 
ideational template is based on the process of 
cancellation being worked out.92 Antinomic 
opposites -— the most general of which are Being 
and Nothingness 93— arise out of the mirroring of 
cancellation and the return to it.  The difference 
between that arising and return94 is the period of 
the emergent burst.  Therefore all emergent pheno-
mena, whether ontic95 or ontological, take us to an 
understanding of cancellation.  This is the basic 
philosophical experience96:  the collapse of the 
antinomic mirroring of pure reason.  When one has 
arrived at this experience, what does one do? Going 
beyond cancellation experience depends on seeking 
out its root.  Its root is the use of the ideational 
template as a mode of connection of beings.  In this 
essay, a presentation of a specific example of 
cancellation experience will be used in order to 
present the articulation of the mould of ontology 
into the ideational template, and then to show how 
cancellation experience may be avoided by the 
correct use of the ideational template.  In this way 
cancellation experience will be left behind for 
another mode of intellection which does not result 
in cancellation. 
Since this essay is about emergence and the access 
to a deep understanding of the ontological signifi-
cance of that phenomenon through the experience of 
cancellation, it will begin with the experience of 
cancellation.  If emergence is merely spoken about 
as a concept, then the discourse itself will be 
empty.97 Nothing would have welled up inside the 
concepts to fill them with meaning.  It is only if 
emergence occurs in, and is recorded by, the dis-
course that it can have any real meaning.  The 
standard of truth applied here is that of the 
Heideggerian hermeneutic 98, which recognizes 
meaning only if the understanding is advanced in the 
process of writing the study.  If emergence itself 
did not occur within the discourse, then fundamen-
tally no comprehension of the phenomenon being 
spoken about by manipulation of concept alone could 
be transmitted.  This essay begins on the basis of 
the cancellation of antinomic arguments experienced 
by the author.  This is the kind of truth associated 
with the Essence of manifestation: the deepest kind 
of truth known in the western tradition.  From this 
experience as a foundation there is a move towards 
the confrontation, on an ontological level, of the 
dilemma which causes cancellation to occur in the 
first place. 
In this essay a movement99 of thought will be 
presented, not a concrete position achieved once and 
been experienced by the author and it is displayed 
in order that it might be instructive for others. 
Thought is a movement of the self-form 100 of the 
one who thinks it and no one else can do it for you. 
Either one undertakes thinking 101 oneself and 
thereby comes to know it by experience, or one 
accepts the thoughts of others 102 as if they were 
one's own and misses thereby the experience of 
thinking.  The thinking of another may only serve as 
guide for one's own, not even as a model.  For, each 
person being different, they will each end up in 
different places, even if they worked from the same 
material on the same topic.  The path of thought 
shows up the self-form of the thinker as it unfolds 
into existence.  This unfolding, like that of 
individual things and of language, points toward the 
unfolding of all existence.  By seeing how the 
self-form of an author unfolds in his thought, one 
may be given clues as to how one's own unfolding of 
one's own self-form occurs.  What is poignant in 
each man's existence is different, and how he 
renders that thought-provoking will also be dif-
ferent. The best thing one can learn from another is 
to address the real issues of life and confront them 
in one's thought, then to say and do what is 
necessary to put into action what one finds out in 
that process of self discovery. 
This essay began as a study in the sociology of 
creativity seven years ago.  Noticing that there 
were only psychological explanations of creativity, 
an attempt was made to formulate a sociological 
explanation.  This led into a long study of con-
temporary philosophy, beginning with the 
phenomenological problem of inter-subjectivity.  
Once one enters the study of the western 
philosophical tradition, then one is confronted with 
a series of authors whose works are all interlinked, 
so that the whole tradition must be dealt with in 
order to understand anyone within it.  Having spent 
several years studying philosophy intensely, a 
unified picture of the tradition finally jelled, and 
so I was able to begin to set down my understanding 
of the phenomenon of emergence in a way that came 
out of a confrontation with the western 
philosophical  
tradition's understanding of the phenomenon.  For 
what I found was that emergence was a key issue 
which was submerged in the works of all those 
authors who participated in the tradition, and that 
they all addressed it in one way or another.  That, 
in fact, they had a unified perspective with regard 
to it.103  For me, the whole set of issues which 
were involved was best exemplified by those who 
presented them in terms of the topicalization of 
Nihilism.104  Therefore, I began an exegesis of this 
topicalization of the issues, and left behind the 
terminology that concerned emergence.  Then, after 
developing my argument in terms of the topic of 
Nihilism, as I began my final draft, my advisor 
asked me why I used the term Nihilism when the term 
emergence was what was in my title.  I replied that 
they were the positive and negative aspects of the 
same things  So, Professor Rickman advised me to use 
the positive instead of the negative terminology. 
When I began to put this into practice, something 
happened that I had not expected.  This was that the 
argument I had so carefully worked out vanished.105 
It vanished in a way that made me realize that the 
argument concerning the nature of Nihilism and the 
argument concerning the nature of emergence were 
antinomic 106 opposites.  This is to say that they 
are the same argument turned upside down or 
inverted. When these two views of the same 
argument are brought into confrontation the whole 
thing vanishes. Seeing this, there arose the 
realization that there was something else 107, 
underlying the whole scenario of conceptualization, 
in which these two views of the same argument 
appear, that was covered over by their being 
manifest, and which became obvious when they 
disappeared.  This something else is not an argu-
ment, but more like a principle.108  It is, in fact, 
expressed by Plato as the principle of 'no secondary 
causation'.  This is the principle that there is a 
single condition underlying all multiple 
causation.109  It is this movement of thought, from 
multiplicity to affirmation of oneness, that will be 
shown in this essay.  The essay is about emergence 
and will express this emergence of the necessity of 
indicating oneness, in the face of multiplicity, 
that occurred within the line of thought that 
produced this paper.  In this way, the topic, and 
how it is spoken about, will be harmonized. 
Concepts are intrinsically empty 110 because their 
truth value is based on stasis, which does not allow 
for the change endemic in existence.111  It is only 
when they transform themselves, and are finally 
exploded 112, that anything of the truth can be 
seen.  That is, as far as Appearance and the Essence 
as standards of truth are concerned.  Any conceptual 
system only limits and fixes what is seen arising in 
existence.113  It limits the arising, the opening 
out, by applying a single primary distinction at a 
time to whatever is seen, generating secondary 
distinctions from this one application.  It fixes 
existence by stabilizing the relation between the 
application of the primary distinction and the net 
of secondary distinctions.114 Concepts become 
meaningful only when they are shattered by the 
coming out of that which they cover over (that to 
which the primary distinction was applied), which 
was glimpsed in the process of transformation of the 
net of secondary distinctions, but not grasped in 
that transformation.  The principle that there is no 
secondary causation is a means of breaking concep-
tual patterning.  It breaks conceptual patterning by 
de-structuring the template that sets up that 
patterning.  For the term 'causation' one could read 
'emergence'.115 Causation is seen as either 
operating between beings or as 'first cause'.116 
'First cause' is the application of a primary 
distinction to what is hitherto undistinguished. The 
progressive bisection 117 of secondary conditions, 
and the unconditioned origin of the progressive 
bisection, are claimed, by Kant, to be 
equivalent.118  This may be translated by saying 
that all of the secondary causes and secondary 
distinctions are equal to the first cause or the 
application of the first primary distinction.  Both 
the application of the primary distinction (the 
first cause) and the whole set of secondary 
distinctions are balanced and equal.  The latter is 
merely the working out of the implications and 
articulations of the former.119 The primary 
distinction which is applied may change and the 
articulation of secondary distinctions may change. 
Thus both the first cause and subsidiary causes may 
each be transformed.  Dialecticsl20 implies the 
application of the politics of maintaining stasis in 
the face of these transformations by oscillating 
between variables and constants.121  However, all 
this depends on the Appearance of the distinctions 
being applied and transformed.  It is this Appear-
ance which is glimpsed in the transformation of the 
first cause and the subsidiary causes.  Everything 
that emerges in that system of first cause 
(unconditioned), subsidiary causes (conditioned), 
and their dialectic is a secondary, or artificial, 
emergence, whose standard of truth is Appearance. 
There is no secondary kind of emergence.  There is 
only the genuine emergence from the single source, 
which is beyond the power of containment of the de-
scriptive system of first and subsidiary causes and 
their artificial emergent transformations. 
This means that everything that comes into existence 
is from a single source.122  Specifically, what 
comes into existence by the hand of man, the realm 
of first and subsidiary causation and its trans-
formation, is no different in essence from the 
becoming of existence itself.  The difference that 
appears to be there is completely illusory.  Both 
the argument concerning nihilism and that concerning 
emergence posited a special realm in which what came 
from man was distinguished from the becoming of 
existence.  The principle of a single source for the 
unfolding of all that appears into existence "breaks 
any initial dichotomy" that a conceptual system 
would posit.  Every conceptual system must posit an 
initial distinction of some sort.  By that act of 
positing one initial distinction as primordial, 
there is an attempt to fix existence by focusing on 
only one of its myriad aspects.  The principle of a 
single source squarely confronts whatever initial 
distinction is posited and denies it, saying: not 
two, one.  The principle is not a concept, but is 
instead a point of view which renders conceptual 
systems meaningful by continually breaking them 
open, so that their meaning becomes clear. 
Conceptual systems become empty almost the very 
moment they are posited.  The freshness they have 
when they are first posited,123 when they first 
emerge, is balanced by this emptiness 124, which . 
quickly follows, as spoken of under the rubric of 
Nihilism.  By confronting the conceptual system with 
the point of view that sees no secondary emergence, 
it is realized that this situation only occurs 
because one holds on to the conceptual system after 
it has manifested, instead of looking to what comes 
next in the unfolding of manifestation into exist-
ence.  By holding on, one's attention is riveted to 
the breakdown of the conceptual system that one is 
holding on to.  One sees this process of breaking 
down as some other kind of change from the initial 
welling-up which produced the conceptual system in 
the first place.  This primordial unfolding has not 
stopped, but the one who holds on to his first 
conceptualization only sees its effects at second 
hand in the break down of the concepts he is holding 
on to.  The secondary change that becomes so obses-
sively watched with an alternation of exhilaration 
and anxiety, so that it takes on the aspects of 
emergence and nihilism comes to be all that is seen. 
The principle of a single source of all emergences 
into existence is a reminder that breaks the 
obsessive gaze of the enchanted.  It is like 
suddenly opening the curtains on a darkened firelit 
room, so that the morning sun shines in.  Plato's 
allegory of the cave 125 is precisely to the point 
in this respect. 
Properly speaking, one may not discuss the principle 
of no secondary causation within the same realm of 
discourse as that which speaks of secondary causes. 
If one even so much as discusses secondary causes 
they become effective, because, by discussing them, 
they are then taken into account as if they are 
something different from the single source, or 
condition, that makes all things appear possible. It 
is not that there is a distinction between a sort of 
primary and secondary causation, for this would be 
making the very primary distinction that must be 
avoided.  Instead, one either sees that there is 
only a single source, or one discusses causation. 
The only thing that the point of view that sees only 
a single source has to say about causation is a 
denial of its effectiveness.  When one begins to 
speak about causation, this point of view dis-
appears; and, when one takes up this point of view 
all discussion of causation ceases.  This is why the 
denial of causation is a principle and not an 
argument.  It is the measure that, when applied to 
any argument, destructures it.  It blows the 
argument apart; and, in so doing, allows the meaning 
to appear as a welling up from within the conceptual 
system, replacing its empty categorization with a 
fullness of a return to the single source, from 
which myriads of conceptual systems appear. 
Focusing on the appearance of conceptual systems 
from this source is already an extreme narrowing of 
vision, for everything appears from it. 
It is necessary, therefore, to inaugurate separate 
domains of discourse.  One is either speaking in the 
domain of discourse, in which the point of view that 
will only recognize a single condition for all of 
existence is being used, or  one is speaking in terms 
of effective secondary causation and artificial 
emergence.  The principle of no secondary emergence 
only has meaning because we live in a world where 
that which appears from the hand of man seems more 
real than that which occurs in existence without 
man's intervention; where man cuts himself off from 
the rest of existence and sees himself as different 
in kind from it.  Thus the endlessness of speeches 
about causation in contrast to the brevity of the 
statement that there is no such thing as effective 
secondary causation.  Within the domain in which a 
single source is spoken of, one may speak of the 
arising of the illusory break that sets up the dif-
ference between genuine, and artificial, emergence 
only as an example of the arising in non-relation 
to/from that source that is common to all things. 
Within the domain in which this distinction between 
artificial and genuine emergence is designated-as-
real,126 one may state the principle of no 
secondary causation in order to emphasize the 
unreality of effective secondary causes.  In this 
way a confrontation between the contents of the two 
domains appears within each, although there is no 
relation between them and they cannot even be viewed 
side by side. 
This clear splitting or separating of the domains of 
discourse concerning oneness and multiplicity is a 
destructuring of the template of ideation that mixes 
the idea of oneness, and the idea of multiplicity, 
because it is based on the seeing of both domains at 
once.127 The point of view of ideation would have 
it that one could relate the principle of a single 
condition underlying all existence to speech about 
causality; and that one could discuss emergence and 
its opposite, nihilism, in the same context, passing 
from one to the other freely.128  The 
operationalizing of the concept of no secondary 
causation in discourse is to deny these 
relationships.  If these relationships are put out 
of play in discourse, just as the causal 
relationships that are topicalized in discourse are 
put out of play, then the process of ideation is 
broken up.  Ideation is the source of the illusory 
connections, which make the realm in which 
artificial emergence appears hold together. Without 
ideation, the illusion falls apart.  It is the 
arising of ideation which opens up the difference 
between the realm of discourse, in which only one 
source is recognized, and the realm of discourse 
concerned with secondary causation.  Without this 
non-existent difference then, the truth of no 
secondary causation would never have been 
recognized.  There is, then, a point to the opening 
up of the difference between the two realms of 
discourse, which is an emergent event like any 
other. It has as its source the same condition that 
underlies the emerging of the rest of existence.  
The point is that it allows the singleness of the 
source to be known by contrast. 
What is true of the two domains of discourse 129 is 
also true of the two sub-domains within the realm of 
discourse concerning causation.  They are completely 
distinct, and one is either in one or the other.  If 
one is apparent then the other is hidden, and vice 
versa.  The sub-domains are two views of the same 
thing.  In this case, there is an argument concern-
ing emergence, and another argument concerning 
nihilism.  The two arguments are in some way 
completely independent, because they are referenced 
to different features of existence.  However, a 
close scrutiny reveals that they are the same thing, 
seen in two different lights.  This duplication 
within the discursive realm of secondary causation, 
where that which is the same is presented as 
different from itself as if it were two different 
things, is the proof of its illusory nature con-
tained within it.  The illusion is of difference, 
when there is none.  This is the opposite of the 
basis for ideation, which is making them the same 
when there is difference.  Because the difference 
between nihilism and emergence is just a matter of 
perspective on the same thing, then it follows that 
the two domains of discourse are also two views of 
the same thing.130 These perspectives are two views 
within the domain of discourse about causality, 
whereas the two domains of discourse are somehow not 
captured by either of them.  Speaking in this way, 
suggests that there is an overview of the phenomenon 
which allows one to speak of the two domains of 
discourse, or the two perspectives within the domain 
of discourse that posits causality as real.  This 
overview is precisely what is denied by the 
principle of no secondary causation.  Speaking this 
way is merely a description.  It is a using of 
ideation against itself.131  This is only possible 
if there is a constant reminder of the meaning of 
the principle of no secondary causation within the 
discourse itself.  This reminder makes the discourse 
poignant at each and every point. 
Hitherto, causation and emergence have been used as 
interchangeable terms.  The only reason that the 
term causation has been introduced at all is because 
this is the rubric under which these issues are 
usually discussed.  The terminology of causation may 
well be used, but it is awkward and suggests ideas 
that are unnecessary, just because of the history of 
this terminology.  The terminology that speaks of 
emergence is more to the point because the term 
causation suggests a causal chain from the first, 
whereas emergence does not suggest this.  Causation 
is merely a certain mechanistic way of conceptual-
izing emergences.  Patterns of events arise together 
in certain orders.  A focus on the primacy of the 
ordering gives a causal view of that arising. If, 
instead of focusing on the order and pattern, one 
focuses on the surprises which show up by 
concentrating on the breaches in the ordering that 
appear, we then speak about emergence instead of 
causation.  The patterning is never wholly ordered, 
nor completely disordered.  One sees in it what one 
is drawn to by one's inclinations.  In this essay it 
is the patterning of disorder, viewed positively or 
negatively that will be emphasized, simply because 
it is order that is so often emphasized, as in 
causal descriptions.  However, one must be 
continuously aware that the whole argument could be 
represented in terms of the terminology of causation 
if one wished. 
The most sophisticated arguments, whether couched in 
a terminology of causation or emergence/nihilism, 
arise from a consideration of the order in the 
disorder.  This is to say that since the pattern of 
the arising of events synchronically and diachronic-
ally (i.e. together and through time)132 is never 
wholly ordered, nor yet wholly disordered; it is the 
attempt to find an underlying order in the disorder 
and the underlying disorder in the order which leads 
to the deepest probings of the phenomenon in 
question.  The order in the disorder is the 
structure, which underlies apparent disorder, and 
the disorder in the order, fundamental 
disconnections, emergent events, which appear with 
no possible explanation.  The confrontation of 
structure with these fundamental disconnections is 
the source of any real considerations of the nature 
of time. 
Whatever terminology one uses, it is, of course, the 
nature of time that is in question.  Time is one 
name that the single source might be called. 
Time.133 What is it that this word indicates? When 
one looks deeply into the matter one cannot help but 
have a sense of awe.  But to express anything of 
what one may grasp of the vibrance of time, one must 
begin by making a distinction.  Otherwise one must 
remain declarative in one's discourse. Time! or 
Time: expansive/contracted (all 
 encompassing, and the moment).  Once a dichotomy has 
been introduced, then the basis of a conceptual 
system has been laid.  But this is only one view of 
time.  One might say instead: Time - continuous/ 
discontinuous (going on and on, and in quanta)134 or 
one might say: Time - spacetime/timespace 135 or 
again:  Time - filled/empty.136 Each of these 
dichotomies gives a different slant to the grasping 
of the nature of time.137 All the different 
perspectives on Time are true and in some sense one 
must confront the concept of Time with different 
dichotomies in order really to get a taste of what 
it is about.  Yet the dichotomies that one uses to 
probe the meaning of time somehow do not capture, 
either separately or together, what Time itself 
suggests.138  Thus, what held for the discourse 
about the principle of 'no secondary causation' and 
the discourse concerning causation, which was the 
necessity of separated domains of discourse, also 
holds for the discussion of Time and the dichotomies 
that are brought forward in order to unlock its 
meaning.  There is a disconnection between Time and 
these dichotomies, that is clear, distinct and 
complete.  In truth, what is said about Time in 
terms of the dichotomies must be continuously 
confronted with the reality of Time itself, which is 
only glimpsed but, goes far beyond what any 
descriptive device may portray of it. 
Once one or more descriptive dichotomies are brought 
into play then the danger lies in getting stuck with 
the picture they reveal and not looking beyond that 
picture.  Even more dangerous is becoming involved 
with the workings of the means of making the 
picture, i.e. the formal and structural relation-
ships between the various dichotomies.  The concep-
tual system arises from this getting-lost-in-the-
means-of-picturing.  One forgets that the different 
dichotomies are fundamentally disconnected from one 
another, and that even the two sides of the dichot-
omy are disconnected.  Confronting the conceptual 
system, that grows up around these falsely inter-
related dichotomies with what is indicated by the 
word Time itself, breaks open the system of concepts 
so that the real meaning may burst forth.  By real 
meaning is meant the indications of the singleness 
of the source beyond multiplicity.  Remembering 
disconnection in the face of the omnipresence of 
connection of the conceptual system, and connection 
when disconnection is asserted over and over, is the 
process by which the conceptual system's grip on one 
is loosened so that one comes to taste the meaning 
of Time itself beyond all the descriptions of it.139 
The generation of descriptions and even their 
systematic interrelation are necessary stages in 
this process.  In fact, it is the modeling of 
this process that the arguments which speak in terms 
of Nihilism and Emergence are concerned with.  The 
process by which something singular is confronted by 
a plurality, so that a new singleness which 
encompasses a multiplicity may arise and how this 
new singleness points toward the inner core of the 
singular original in a way that was impossible 
before this confrontation, is what will be modeled 
under the rubric of Nihilism and then again in terms 
of Emergence.140  This is ideation, and the process 
itself must be broken up by the assertion of 
disconnection.  Ideation is unbounded connecting of 
everything together into a total conceptual system. 
It must be actively resisted by asserting discon-
nection in the face of overwhelming connection.  The 
core of the core of the singular is gained by this 
active resistance to the process of ideation that 
gives access to its core.  The core of the core of 
Time is Timing, which is giving each thing its 
proper due, at the right instant and in the best 
possible manner.  Its core is the many aspects of 
Time shown up by the conceptual systems arising out 
of the different dichotomies, applied to the 
ineffable quality of Time itself. 
In this way it is seen that the conceptual system 
must undergo temporalization.  It must become sub-
jected to Time and broken by Time.  When this has 
occurred then it may be said to exemplify or 
indicate, the nature of Time.  Until it is broken, 
it only succeeds in showing itself in the guise of 
the exemplification of its topic of conceptual-
ization.  This is the crux of the question of 
discourse being unified in terms of what it is 
speaking about and how it says it.  The form of 
discourse itself — rhetoric — or the form of 
ideation in most speech, dominates what is being 
said and has not been broken in order to serve what 
is being said.  Before it is broken-in, which is 
just like the breaking-in of a horse for riding, 
only the form of discourse or ideation may be seen, 
regardless of the subject  matter.141  These forms 
when not broken do not serve the speakers, but 
enslave them.  Speech becomes action when it 
exemplifies the process by which the form of 
discourse and ideation is broken in.  Before that, 
the action of speech is to say something other than 
what was intended.142  When this breaking of the 
form of discourse or ideation  is understood in 
terms of words, then it may also be applied to 
action.  Words that are to the point must break 
through the form of speech in some way. 
Otherwise the form of discourse and ideation has 
become an idol.  Language as speaking confers Being 
to beings.  It confers the connectedness.  This is 
 true as far as it goes, but one must not stop with 
language and its intimate connection to the world. 
Break the form of discourse, break the connection by 
which Being is conferred on the world.  Confer Being 
only on the single source from which the beings and 
language arise.  Language is not that source - it 
appears in the world as one being among others.  The 
'is' of connection by which one says, 'this is that' 
must be confronted with the 'is' of declaration by 
which one says 'such and such a matter is'.  For 
anything which the 'is' of connection is used, the 
'is' that declares its existence must not be used. 
In this way, only one matter may be declared to 
exist.  That is the Single Source.  That is Time 
timing existences unfolding in all its aspects. That 
is Life living through all living things. Plato 
called it the Good.143  S'ui identified Time, Life, 
and Chi in his book Chi.  These are some of the 
attributes of the Single Source. 
When the conceptual system is not itself 
temporalized, but instead displays its own endemic 
temporality, as isolated from Time itself as if it 
were an isolated subfunction operating independently 
out of harmony, then emergence and nihilism appear 
as sui generis.  It is only after the conceptual 
system has become closed off, after having held onto 
one or a set of distinctions and made them the 
basis of a conceptual system, that these concepts 
become empty.  This is the nihilistic aspect, and it 
is in this way that concepts begin to change, 
despite the attempt to fix the system in order to 
make it stable, which is the aspect of emergence. 
Thus, nihilism and emergence 144 are the result of a 
refusal to let go of a conceptual system even after 
it begins to deteriorate.  This makes artificial 
emergence and nihilism a tertiary phenomenon.  That 
means that it appears as an epi-phenomenon of the 
conceptual system, which is itself an epiphenomenon 
of ideation, that occurs because thought does not 
confront itself radically with the principle of no 
secondary causation.  When one begins with the 
epiphenomenon of an epiphenomenon and attempts to 
get a clear picture of how things are in the world, 
using the western scientific and philosophical 
tradition as the sole source of reference, then one 
is starting from the farthest point possible from 
the truth.145  This is because the western tradition 
accepts ideation without reference to the principle 
of no secondary causation as a means of attaining 
knowledge.  Thus, the western tradition gives 
reality to these epiphenomena, and is in fact almost 
completely absorbed in them.  For the most part 
those within the western tradition operate in a 
realm completely dominated by the unbroken form of 
discourse or ideation.  So, if 
one begins with an epi-epiphenomenon of ideation, 
using as a guide the works of  men who accept as 
real what is not — as the author has done and as 
many others do every day and have done for centuries 
— then one is beginning with a tremendous 
handicap.146 
However, the principle of no secondary causation is 
the root of intellection.  Intellection is distinct 
from ideation.147  Intellection is a recognition 
which may use ideation as a tool.  The intellect 
sees the truth of the principle of no secondary 
causation immediately, unless it is dominated by the 
life-form of ideation so utterly that it is blinded. 
Since this principle is the core of all intellectual 
endeavor, it is possible to arrive at it, no matter 
where one begins, if there is persistence.  This is 
because, if one takes the process of ideation far 
enough, it negates itself and shows its illusory 
nature.  For this, however, the confrontation of 
thought with itself must be deep.  One must 
experience, in that process, the continuous need to 
relinquish the concepts one has formed and to think 
again.  One must ultimately go against even the 
channel one's thought takes of its own accord and to 
which everything points.  By this kind of confron-
tation the dominance of the life-form of ideation is 
eventually broken, so that the light of the 
intellect shines through. 
Whitehead has said that all western philosophy is a 
footnote to Plato.148  What is amazing is that the 
core of Plato's dialogues is the principle of no 
secondary causation, which no one in the western 
tradition has taken up.  Because of this, what Plato 
says about sophistry, which is the key idea the dia-
logues are designed to illustrate, becomes true of 
the entire tradition of western philosophy that 
flows from that source in Greek thought.149 Socrates 
confronted the other Greeks with this principle, and 
it is clearly stated.  This confrontation of the 
presocratics with the principle of no secondary 
causation is, strictly speaking, the source of the 
western tradition, but that tradition did not take 
that confrontation into itself. Instead, it 
forgot.150 So, not only is the principle of no 
secondary causation the root of intellection as 
such, but its appearance in Greek thought is the 
root of the whole western philosophical tradition. 
In order to realize this confrontation anew it must 
be understood within the context of contemporary 
philosophy.  This is the point.  We must begin where 
we are, and that is completely enveloped by the 
thought-forms that were developed by the western 
philosophical and scientific tradition.  It is no 
good pretending it is possible just to step outside 
this tradition into another, because we are it. 
Whatever is seen will be seen through the template 
of ideation that dominates us.  The people of the 
western world are completely saturated with this way 
of looking at existence.  Therefore, it is necessary 
to break this in ourselves, using the tools from 
within that tradition and the resources within 
ourselves.  The form that the unfolding of the 
template of ideation takes today is different to the 
form it took in Plato's time, so that it is not 
possible for us merely to reconstruct what happened 
then and have it serve us as well.  No.  It is 
necessary for us to struggle to make the principle 
of no secondary causation real for us within the 
universe of discourse within which our thoughts are 
formed.  Only in this way can there be any hope of 
escaping from the grip of the template of ideation; 
seeing it for what it is, and recognizing our 
saturation with it, then breaking it by using it 
against itself. 
The action of a discourse must constantly exemplify 
this confrontation.  Ideation produces concepts and 
systematizes them and structuralizes them in a 
continuous stream, and the intellect sees beyond 
this outpouring of ideal forms, by which it glimpses 
more than the concepts contain.  The intellect says, 
on the basis of what it glimpses beyond the 
constructs of ideation, 'No! That's not it!  These 
apparent causal connections are not real.  There is 
only one source.  There is complete disconnection as 
well as these apparent connections.'  Critical 
discourse should be criticism of oneself, not of 
others.  In the western tradition of scholarship, the 
setting up of an intellectual position comes after 
the criticism of one's forebears in the tradition. 
Self-criticism should be greater.151  So, if one's 
criticism of the forerunners is scathing then 
criticism of one's own position should be even 
stronger.  That is to say that the principle of no 
secondary causation is not an intellectual position. 
Any formulation of it must itself be confronted with 
that principle.  Ideation is the endless production 
of concepts and the formation of them into 
structural systems.  The intellectual activity is a 
sort of terrorism which one injects into this 
process to crack it open.  The outcome of this in-
jection at every point of connection of a portion of 
disconnection is genuine emergence.  It is the 
realization that the template of ideation is part of 
the unfolding of everything else in the world, and 
is not in a separate, protected, time-sphere of its 
own. Thus, the structure of theoretical systems in 
relation to emergence is a picture of this  
confrontation. 
Theories are the forms produced by the ideational 
process.  They are clusters of concepts which are 
being related systematically and structurally. 
Theories are constantly being refuted by a process 
of confrontation between them and the conception of 
the way things are produced by means of experiment-
ation.  What appears within this confrontation 
between theory and experimentation is artificial 
emergence.  This confrontation also occurs when 
anyone attempts to understand anything, for 
instance, in this case, the western philosophical 
tradition.  The person produces conceptual pictures 
of what he thinks is meant by his forerunners in the 
tradition, then he tests these pictures in his 
reading.  This process of testing goes on in an 
individual's study, and within the tradition itself. 
What is seen is that the tradition is a blown-up 
picture of the individual who interacts with it. 
What he sees in it is himself.  The realization that 
there is only genuine emergence must stop both the 
individual and the tradition dead in their tracks. 
Artificial emergence may be understood as the 
process of interlocking of the individual's self-
form and the form of a tradition which is the track 
left by intersubjectively undertaken ideation. This 
manifestation of the ideational template within 
and outside the individual is broken, when the 
individual realizes that both he and the tradition, 
with which he is engaged, flow from the same source 
as everything else, and that what is unfolding 
between him and the tradition is no different from 
the unfolding of everything else.  Here, there is a 
change in perspective, where one suddenly sees a 
universal process at work everywhere, of which one 
is merely a small part. 
This work is another example of that universal 
unfolding.  Yet, one only realizes that to the 
extent that it embodies the confrontation between 
the principal of no secondary causation and 
ideation.  That is to say that an author must strive 
to re-centre his work beyond himself and the 
tradition in which it is suspended, in order to open 
up an access to the realization that there is only 
genuine emergence. 
From within the conceptual system, genuine emergence 
appears as a possibility that cannot be realized — 
but only glimpsed.  And that glimpse is so tentative 
that it hardly appears at all.  It appears from one 
point of view as the possibility of making a sure 
and clear, distinction, in the face of the ambiguity 
that overcomes all distinctions produced by the 
conceptual system.  From the other point of view it 
appears as the possibility of an emergence that is 
not dictated by the structure of the conceptual 
system.  Bateson calls this the fourth metalevel of 
learning.152  What is seen is that the clear 
distinctions, whose possibilities are barely 
glimpsed through the conceptual system, are all 
around us in the natural world, that is, there 
beyond man's projection upon it of an artificial 
world whose source is ideation.  Each bird and 
flower and even man himself are clearly distinct 
forms in the world. The genuine emergence that only 
appears in contrast to artificial emergence as an 
unobtainable ideal, is the unfolding of the forms of 
existence that are so clear.  It seems so clear and 
obvious when seen in terms of the unfolding of 
natural forms.  The key point is then to see how the 
unfolding of the ideational system is also a natural 
unfolding.  The reason it does not seem natural is 
that we are  enthralled by it.  Because it has not 
been broken, it dominates us.  By breaking the 
ideational template one is then able to stop and see 
that it is like any other natural form.  It has 
clear and distinct outlines, and it unfolds like 
everything else in existence.  This view of the 
ideational template does not make it any different 
from what it was before — it is merely an essential 
recognition that the clear distinction and the 
genuine emergence are already contained in the 
conceptual form as it is.  It is perfect because 
breaking the ideational template gives knowledge of 
the genuine emergence, to which man would have no 
access otherwise.  By contrast with the illusion it 
produces, it highlights the purity and reality of 
the genuine emergence.  What emerges is perfect in 
every case already; it is merely for us to 
appreciate how it is perfect, beyond our conceptual-
izations, that prevent our seeing that perfection. 
The overarching argument that is being presented 
here may be stated in two ways.  It may be presented 
beginning either with the template of ideation, or 
with the principle of one independent source.  The 
reason it appears in this way is that, in order to 
construct an overview of the relation between the 
principle of no secondary causation, and the 
template of ideation that generates causal 
connections, one must see the two as if they were 
contained within the domain of ideation, which has 
two points of view contained within it.  This is 
impossible - in truth the ideational template cannot 
contain this principle - but for descriptive 
purposes it may be sketched as if it could, as long 
as the description remains tentative.  This makes 
the overarching argument of the same kind as the 
arguments concerning nihilism and emergence that 
will be presented later. The act of forming an 
argument is a relating of propositions, and the 
possibility of these relationships is denied by the 
principle of a single source. Therefore the 
arguments must be of a kind different from a 
syllogism.  Each segment of the argument must be in 
some way independent, yet intermeshed with the other 
segments.  This view of what an argument must 
consist of comes only from a confrontation of the 
ideational template with the principle of a single 
source.  If the arguments themselves express an 
incipient break-up of the ideational template as it 
is expressed in standard logical argumentation, then 
it is only acceptable to use such arguments 
tentatively in order to express how the break-up 
could occur.  Effectively, then, the arguments must 
contain discrete jumps which are unexplained.  This 
is, of course, exactly what an argument is not 
supposed to have in it.  In fact, in the sort of 
anti-argument proposed here, the whole point is to 
construct the argument in such a way that the jumps 
may be seen.  The jumps are the impingement of the 
principle of no secondary causation on the argument 
itself. 
In working out the line of thought that culminated 
in this essay, the author began within the 
ideational template, unquestioningly taking 
emergence as a topic, and the tradition of western 
philosophy as a source of information concerning the 
topic.  So let us lay out the overarching argument 
from this direction first.  In the research and 
presentation of results it is generally accepted 
that the order of discovery is different from the 
order of presentation of the results in a final form 
for others to view 153.  This is because of the 
temporalization of the two viewpoints within the 
domain of ideation.154  In the process of discovery, 
one uses one point of view, and upon discovery there 
is an automatic switch to the other point of view.  
Thus, the movement of research and the movement of 
method (meta-hodos: way after)155 postulated by the 
discoverer, so that others may arrive where he has 
gone by his research, occur within the form of 
ideation.  Here, both directions will be presented 
together, because they form a single system. 
The argument from the direction of discovery has 
four segments: 
1. Ideational arguments occur in related 
pairs which are the same argument seen 
  from two different view points. 
2. Each form of the argument exemplifies 
the template of ideation itself. 
3. When an argument is developed (worked 
out) from one point of view the 
implicit generation of the opposite 
argument occurs with it.  If the 
implicit argument is brought to the 
surface they both disappear. 
4.    The vanishing of the argument 
indicates the principle of no secondary 
causation.  The impossibility of 
linking the two arguments shows that 
there is a single disconnected source 
for both of them independently. 
The argument concerning Nihilism and that concerning 
Emergence are a pair.  The first starts from the 
recognition of nihilistic opposition, and shows how 
the possibility of clear distinctions arise from 
them.  The second begins with the distinction 
between genuine and artificial emergence, and shows 
how artificial emergence arises to form its own 
separate domain from which genuine emergence can 
hardly be comprehended.  These two arguments are a 
negative and a positive view of the same phenomenon. 
By working out the argument from the point of view 
of nihilism, a model of the template that governs 
the ideational process is constructed, and ideation 
is the source of both nihilism and artificial 
emergence.  So, thinking out an argument with 
respect to a topic, is the construction of a model 
of the process of thinking itself.  When this 
argument is turned back on itself by a switch from 
the, already worked-out, argument from one point of 
view, to the other point of view - making what was 
implicit, explicit and submerging the worked-out 
argument into the background - then, in this 
confrontation, the two arguments cancel each other 
out.  In the process of cancellation it is realized 
that they are both false.  Kant calls this the 
antinomies of pure reason.156  This phenomenon is 
well known from the history of philosophy.  But, 
because the philosophers who experienced exactly the 
same phenomenon themselves had forgotten the 
principle of no secondary causation, when it 
occurred to them, they retreated, like Kant, back 
into the ideational form. They saw it as negative, 
whereas that is exactly what thought that moves 157 
must do.  It must cancel itself out, in order to 
show its unreality.  By that, the complete dis-
connection that occurs between the segments of the 
dialectic of thought's movement is shown up.  That 
disconnection between segments of arguments implies 
the more radical disconnection between the 
individual thoughts, which make up the segments, 
which Hume declared, and to which Kant's philosophy 
was an answer.  This radical disconnection indicates 
that all the moments of thought must arise in 
relation/non-relation to/from 158 a single 
disconnected source.  There is no relation between 
the thoughts, but only the "relation to" or 
"dependence on" the single source that each thought 
is an exemplification of from a different aspect. 
What is thought provoking about the development of 
this kind of anti-argument is that it goes from 
seeing the disconnection between the two points of 
view in the form of ideation toward the realization 
that these two points of view are only there to 
indicate the pure disconnection that separates them. 
But one gets to this realization by the movement 
between the two points of view within the template 
of ideation.  It is as if there was a Mobius 
strip,159 and as one moved along the surface, first 
one thought there were two sides, then one realized 
that there was only one side, and finally one 
realized that one could jump from one side to the 
other directly, and, in that jump, one had not 
moved at all if the strip had no depth.  This means 
that the movement of the argument is no movement at 
all, unlike the transitiveness of the syllogism, the 
whole point of which is to get one from 'A' to 'B' 
via a connection between statements. 
Each part of the argument is a picture of the same 
thing.  That thing is the disconnected template of 
ideation split open.  The splitting open of ideation 
is the realization that it is already intrinsically 
split.  No movement occurs.  The separate pictures 
are merely presented, first in one order; then in 
another.  The changing of the order gives the 
impression of movement.  The other order to the 
propositions of the argument is as follows: 
1. The designating-as-real of the il- 
Iusoryl60 connection between the two 
domains makes it appear that the 
principle and the two domains form a 
triad.  This solidification of the 
tentative relationship between the 
domains that allows the crux of the 
principle of ideation to be seen, is 
the form of ideation. 
2. The concept of their being a relation 
between the two domains arises from 
the close proximity of the two, which 
is contrary to the principle that 
disconnects them.  The illusion of 
connection makes it possible for the 
crux of the principle of disconnection 
to 
be seen. 
3. This complete disconnection of every 
thing from everything else can only be 
seen by the arising of two mutually 
independent domains of discourse, 
within which the principle of only one 
source can be stated differently. 
4. There is no secondary causation. 
There is only genuine emergence. Only 
clear distinctions occur in existence. 
This form of the same argument goes from pure dis-
connection to pure connection.  What is seen is the 
unfolding of the template of ideation from the 
principle of no secondary causation.  This argument 
ends where the other argument started.  Because of 
the retreat from the point recognized by Hume that 
there is complete disconnection between thoughts, 
(which is recognized by Kant, in his positing the 
antinomies of Pure Reason) no one in the western 
tradition has worked out the implications in the 
principle of no secondary causation stated by Plato. 
From the point of view of those entrenched in the 
form of ideation, the idea of disconnecting every-
thing that one has worked so hard to connect logic-
ally and reasonably, seems very strange indeed. 
However, these implications are easy to work out 
because they are merely the obverse use of the 
template of ideation.  Merely by severing all the 
connections that hold the shell of the template of 
ideation together, one arrives at the state of 
affairs indicated by the principle of no secondary 
causation. 
The form of the two arguments may be simply stated 
as follows: 
1. Mediation:  relationship made 
substantive — three related things. 
2. Relationship posited tentatively --  
two are related to each other not to 
the source. 
3. No relationship --disconnected pair 
that make the disconnected source 
visible. 
4. The principle stated —single 
disconnected source. 
Each of these steps are phases in a process of 
solidification or de-solidification, depending on 
how you want to look at it.  They are moments of a 
dialectic of thought, that model the unfolding of 
ideation itself.  Ideation is a form that emerges 
from the single source and points ever back to it. 
The splitting-open of the template of ideation is 
the obverse of the opening-out of the form in the 
first place.  The principle is an icon of that 
single source, from which the template of ideation 
opens out.  The principle, when held to firmly, is a 
still point around which the process of ideation 
revolves.  The template of ideation that appears 
around this still point, ever indicating it anew, 
is, as it were, a repository for the seed of 
discovery contained in that still point.  The still 
point which is the end of the process of discovery 
contained in the seed is the same as the seed.  The 
breaking out of the ideational template, so that one 
comes to know it, is the whole point of the 
existence of that form.  This breaking-out is merely 
a transformation of that form itself, not a leaving 
of it.  When complete disconnection is the rule, 
then there is nowhere to go.  A transformation 
without movement or causation in a single place is 
what is called for - i.e. the impossible.161  That 
is to say that, what is impossible from the point of 
view of ideation is precisely what ideation 
indicates the possibility of, and is that which is 
necessary for ideation to transform itself into what 
it indicates.  The unfolding of the form of the 
template of ideation is precisely this impossible 
transformation, which does not need to occur because 
it is already true.  It is merely unrealized.  The 
transformation is merely the realization of the 
positiveness of this key philosophical experience 
that Kant called the antinomies, and Hume called the 
unrelatedness of the moments of thought.162 
These two arguments only appear within the domain of 
ideation.  They are an example of what they speak 
about.  They are, therefore, not true.  It is not 
enough to confront syllogistic argument with discon-
nection in this way, for the template of ideation is 
merely structuralized if this presentation is held 
on to.  Disconnection must be made real.  It must be 
complete.  In a way, the partial disconnection of 
the ideational template is worse than straight-
forward syllogistic argument, concerning it, which 
is obviously wrong.  It gives the impression that 
the process is comprehensible.  It gives the impres-
sion that there is a process or movement.  There is 
no connection between the point of view which sees 
things in terms of the principle of a single source, 
and that which sees causal connections produced by 
ideation.  The process is only in description.  The 
description is false.  By understanding the complete 
disconnection between the two points of view on the 
world, it is possible to appreciate the diamond 
point of what is indicated by the disconnection of 
the two.  That diamond point is the utter connected-
ness of everything in the single disconnected 
source.  Complete disconnection is complete 
connection.  With this one is left speechless.  The 
statement of the principle of no secondary causation 
which makes the causal context necessary leads to 
the impossibility of stating it, and that is its 
ultimate statement.  That is a recognition.  It must 
be realized. Its realization is what the words of the 
statement of the principle indicate as a 
possibility. 
This statement of the two versions of the overarch-
ing argument that ties this essay together will 
suffice to bring into focus the issues that will be 
presented in the following chapters.  The first 
chapter will deal with the origin of the principle 
of no secondary causation in The Phaedo of Plato, 
and its implications.  The second chapter will use 
the transition from the philosophy of Hume to the 
philosophy of Kant as an example of the transition 
between form and structure.  The third chapter will 
present the argument concerning Nihilism and 
introduce the form of the Ideational template.  The 
fourth chapter will present the argument concerning 
Emergence, that is, the obverse of the argument 
concerning Nihilism, and complete the outline of the 
form of the Ideational template.  And finally, the 
fifth chapter will present the way in which the 
topic of Disconnection may be approached that arises 
from the re-evaluation of the use of the ideational 
template. 
Presenting arguments must not obscure the connection 
of these issues to life.  What is spoken about here 
is the unfolding of one's life — the moment by 
moment opening out to existence.  The intellect can 
either merely monitor this unfolding, (or attempt to 
intervene to change it.  The difference between 
monitoring and intervention is not synonymous with 
action/inaction.  Monitoring may necessitate either 
action or inaction.  Intervention may be by action 
or inaction as well.163  Intervention is an attempt 
to dominate the process of unfolding, to alter its 
course and make it amenable to one's own wishes. 
Once intervention is attempted, then one immediately 
loses sight of the timing of Time itself —one has 
substituted an artificial temporality. The 
artificial temporality shows up as nihilism or 
artificial emergence.  We are so lost in artificial 
time systems that it is almost impossible for us to 
imagine being connected to the timing of Time, as 
are all the events of the natural world.  Man has 
become disconnected almost completely from the 
recognition that events are timed, not by him but by 
Time itself, which determines the times of all the 
events that come into existence.  Even the timing of 
the artificial time systems that man attributes to 
himself are still timed by Time, not man. Artificial 
time systems give the illusion of being able to 
dominate time, but they cannot control when any 
event measured in terms of them will occur. They do 
not have the power to make an event occur at any 
time other than when it does actually occur.  Each 
event descends at a precise moment of unfolding into 
existence.  The intellect monitors this process, 
neither seeking to hurry it nor to delay it.  If the 
intellect attempts to hold on to an event or grasp 
something ahead of its timing by Time, then the 
intellect ceases to monitor it and loses track of 
the timing of events.  In this disengagement, 
thought is generated by movement of the intellect 
ahead or behind.  Instead of letting things go, as 
new things appear in sight during the process of 
unfolding, things are held on to. 
Each thing has its own intrinsic temporality. So, by 
focusing on, and trying to hold on to, any 
particular thing, one is holding on to its unique 
temporality.  That temporality is only a part of the 
whole orchestration of the timing of the unfolding 
of existence.  It is like a sub-cycle.  Artificial 
temporality is comprised of the temporalities of the 
things that are held on to.  It is always a 
conglomerate of sub-cycles.  It cannot compare to 
the timing of the unfolding of the events them-
selves.  In that unfolding the temporalities of the 
sub- cycles are interwoven by Time itself, instead 
of by man making his own selection.  In this way it 
is possible to see how the timing of artificial 
temporality is still a timing by Time itself.  The 
temporalities of individual things can only indicate 
timing of Time, so that even if they are disconnec-
ted from that context artificially by man's focusing 
on them, they have not changed their timing in any 
way.  It is only man that sees a separate time-zone 
appear.  Man becomes even more disconnected when he 
begins to construct machines that have completely 
different timings.  The zone of artificial timing 
deepens dramatically.  But since man himself has an 
intrinsic temporality,165 just like any other thing 
that unfolds into existence, whatever comes from man 
can only express this intrinsic temporality, so that 
still no departure from the determination of timing 
by Time can occur. 
Once the zone of an artificial temporality has 
arisen, then the difficulty that the intellect faces 
is connecting the artificial timing to the genuine 
emergence.  Ideation arises as the means of making 
these connections.  The analogy to the artificial 
zone of timing is the rate of speech in the un-
folding of discourse.  Here the problem appears of 
how to fit the flow of discourse to the flow of 
events in the world.166  Ideation is the source of 
this running commentary.  The Greeks knew this dif-
ference as physis and logos.167  To them the 
unfolding of speech and the unfolding of nature 
seemed very different.  What may have been 
recognized by the early Greeks is that both are from 
the same source of unfolding.  It is not that the 
different temporality of speech need be imposed on 
the unfolding of the other temporalities, besides 
that of speech.  They are all from one source; 
speech is merely one of many different temporali-
ties.  The concept of the matching of the time of 
speech as a commentary on the unfolding of all other 
events is the beginning of the form of ideation.  It 
directly covers over the unique source by elevating 
speech above other phenomena and separating speeches 
from them.  Discourse becomes ideation by another 
further disconnection.  Inner speech is disconnected 
from outward speech and becomes thought.  Thought 
becomes another running commentary on discourse. 
This further disconnection corresponds to the dif-
ference between the conglomerate of timings that the 
artificial timing is originally based on and the 
emergence from man of machines which have unnatural 
rhythms.  Idealism and materialism are intimately 
connected in this way.168  Machines are embodied 
theories.169 
So the issues discussed here are central to the 
understanding of man's relation to existence.  The 
recognition of the intrinsic powerlessness of man in 
the face of the timing of events by Time rather than 
by man himself is crucial.  When man does not 
recognize this powerlessness, then artificial 
timing, within the scope of the timing of Time, but 
out of harmony with it, arises.  The timing by Time 
occurs by its giving each thing its own temporality. 
All the separate temporalities interweave, without 
there being any relation between them.  Man intro-
duces, by ideation, artificial connections between a 
few of these things or events, that he happens to 
hold on to, so that an artificial time-zone seems to 
appear. It is illusory, but appears real,170 
especially when within it things and events appear 
from man that are wholly artificial.  There is no 
time as a connective tissue between the separate 
temporalities set up in the things themselves.  Time 
is not an overarching concept that covers all these 
harmonized temporalities; but instead, Time is a 
name of the source from which all these separate 
temporalities arise. 
CHAPTER 1 
The classic statement of the 'principle of no 
secondary causation' (i.e. that there is one 
condition that arranges everything for the best, 
underlying what appears as the multiple causation of 
existence) is made by Plato in his dialogue called 
the Phaedo.l  An understanding of the issues 
discussed by Socrates before his death, may provide 
a starting point for the further elucidation of the 
nature of the principle of 'no secondary causation' 
within a contemporary context.  Socrates, just 
before his death, undertakes a defense of the 
existence of life after death.  The immediacy of 
death's presence for Socrates makes the arguments 
put forward extremely vivid.  Yet, the centre of the 
dialogue is the setting forth of Socrates' view of 
causation, of which the generation of the living 
from the dead, and the dead from the living, is a 
particular example.2  The point that Socrates makes 
here is never seriously considered again within the 
western tradition.3  Perhaps this is because the 
principle of a single source itself is only 
suggested, and is not the crux of the argument of 
the dialogue.  It is the background for the 
discussion, which is not itself developed.  It is 
necessary to understand the arguments presented in 
the dialogue in the context of this root-principle 
that is only suggested.  Perhaps here it will be 
possible to recollect these arguments in a way that 
will bring the principle of no secondary causation 
into sharper focus, and in this way also to see the 
limitations of Socrates' presentation.4 
Life, death, and the two processes of generation 
that occur in the movement between these two 
opposites are what connects the argument of this 
dialogue closely with the theme of emergence. Coming 
into existence (unfolding), and going out of 
existence (collapse) are two opposite processes.5 
They entail each other intrinsically.  Thus this 
dialogue is precisely about the theme of emergence. 
Nihilism also appears forcefully within the dialogue 
as the counter arguments of Simmias and Cebes 
against Socrates' account of the immortality of the 
soul.  Together they present opposite arguments 
against the immortality of the soul,6 which Socrates 
must counter.  In the refutation of the nihilistic 
arguments against the immortality of the soul, which 
is the core of the process of emergence and 
collapse, the basic confrontation between Nihilism 
and emergence is made, by which access to the 
principle of no secondary causation occurs.  The 
reason that the principle is left in the background 
is that one is meant to work out the implications of 
the dialogue and go one-self through the process of 
experiencing what happens, when these two arguments 
are brought into juxtaposition.  What happens is, of 
course, that one's perspective is shifted radically 
to the real meaning of the immortality of the soul. 
That immortality is based on the necessity of com-
plete disconnection.  The body is enmeshed in the 
world of causation.  It emerges and then disappears. 
That aspect of the human being that is independent 
of these causal relations is called the soul.  The 
soul is the core of the human being, seen in the 
light of the truth of the principle of 'no secondary 
causation.'  Both Emergence with its concomitant 
aspect—that is, collapse--and Nihilism only exist 
in the world seen in terms of causation.  The 
immortality of the soul is seen to be true when this 
way of seeing existence vanishes.  This vanishing, 
at which point the soul achieves independence, is 
death.  Thus the dialogue occurs at just the point 
at which Socrates is about to make the shift to 
seeing the truth of the principle of a single source 
in terms of the separation of his spiritual from his 
bodily existence - a shift he has already made 
intellectually. 
The place to begin the recollection of the dialogue 
is the point where the principle of 'no secondary 
causation' is indicated.  In this way,- a proper view 
of the balance of the dialogue around this principle 
may be attained.  This statement comes in a 
description by Socrates of his own intellectual 
career.7 He says that he began as a causalist 
looking for the ultimate cause of things in other 
things.  He then rejected this means of inquiry, so 
that he now disclaims any knowledge of the causal 
relations between things, or events, in existence. 
He indicates the viewpoint that he substituted for 
the inquiry into causes in the following paragraph: 
However, I once heard someone reading from a 
book, as he said, by Anaxagoras, and as-
serting that it is mind that produces order 
and is the cause of everything. That 
explanation pleased me.  Somehow it seemed 
right that mind should be the cause of 
everything, and I reflected that, if this is 
so, mind in producing order sets everything 
in order and arranges each individual thing 
in the way that is best for it.  Therefore, 
if anyone wished to discover the reason why 
any given thing came or ceased or continued 
to be, he must find out what it was best for 
that thing to be, or act or be acted upon 
in any other way.  On this view there was 
only one thing for a man to consider, with 
regard both to himself and to anything 
else, namely the best and highest good, 
although this would necessarily imply 
knowing what is less good, since both are 
covered by the same knowledge. (97 cd.)S 
The key point is that a single conditioning princi-
ple is substituted for the myriad of causes which 
the physicists see in existence.  That it is called 
'mind' in this context is inessential.  By that 
reading Plato is made into an idealist, which he 
appears to be in the western tradition.  What is 
essential is that the single condition arranges 
everything for the best, that is for the highest 
good.  This is what truly distinguishes the single 
source. 
As for a power which keeps things disposed 
at any given moment in the best possible 
way, they (those who see multiple 
causation) neither look for it, nor believe 
that it has any supernatural force.  99c; 
(Author's insert)9 
The single source is a power that determines timing, 
but not just any timing.  It determines the best 
timing.  To know the best timing it is necessary to 
know the untimely.  Without this contrast one would 
not really know the best timing.  Socrates says that 
they are covered by the same knowledge.  This means 
that even the un-timely is part of the order of the 
highest good.  The knowledge that comes from the 
contrast is a single knowledge.  It is knowledge of 
the truth of the principle that 'there is no second-
ary causation'.  This is the recognition that there 
is only one power, which determines all existence. 
Nothing in existence has any power to do anything to 
any other thing.  When you look deeply into it, this 
principle has profound consequences.  There are no 
accidents,10 no random events, nothing left out of 
account.  There is a set timing for every event, 
which is that it occurs at just the right moment, 
even if it doesn't appear so to human beings.  This 
is, of course, the key point.  The best timing is 
beyond what we see as the best.  Therefore, to 
appreciate how the timing that occurs could be the 
best timing, it is necessary to look beyond our 
selves.  This is what Socrates' account does. 
Socrates has broken out of the life-form imposed by 
the template of ideation and realized its inverse by 
looking back on the template.11 This breaking forth 
from the dominance of ideation marks the change in 
his philosophical career that Socrates describes.  
By taking the point of view of The Good as superior 
to one's own viewpoint, one breaks free from the 
limitations of it. 
Once the principle of 'no secondary causation' has 
been introduced, then it must be understood.  That 
understanding is made possible by the presentation 
of an alternative view of causation, to that in 
which things may be said to affect other things.  In 
the normal theory of causation there is either 
direct action or action at a distance. Descartes 12 
and Leibnizl3 developed these two views, which are 
still with us today.  In direct causation something 
comes into contact with another thing, and transmits 
a force to it, in order to  change its state.   In 
indirect causation the force is transmitted over an 
intervening distance without contact.  Either way, a 
relationship is set up between the two objects or 
events.  How things may change without such a 
relationship being set up becomes the matter that 
must be understood as soon as the principle of a 
single source is posited.  The key concept that 
makes this understandable is that of opposition, as 
it operates in existence.  It is by disconnected 
opposites that what appears to be causation occurs. 
Thus most of the dialogue deals with this theory of 
opposites.  The centre of the argument that Socrates 
puts forward is the following paragraph: 
Socrates had listened with his head turned 
toward the speaker.  It was brave of you to 
refresh my memory, he said, but don't you 
realize the difference between what we are 
saying now and what we said then. Then we 
were saying that opposite things come from 
opposite things; now we are saying that the 
opposite itself can never become opposite 
to itself - neither the opposite which is 
within us nor that which is in the real 
world. Then, my friend, we were speaking 
about objects which possess opposite 
qualities, and calling them by the names of 
the latter, but now we are speaking about 
the qualities themselves, from whose 
presence in them the objects called after 
them derive their names.  We maintain that 
the opposites themselves would absolutely 
refuse to tolerate coming into being from 
one another. (103b)14 
The difference that Socrates' interlocutorl5 did not 
comprehend is precisely the crucial one for the 
understanding of the theory of oppositions.  There 
is a difference in existence between opposite things, 
and the opposite qualities that are embodied, making 
them what they are.  The qualities 16 do not appear 
anywhere in a pure form except as abstractions.  They 
only appear phenomenologically as mixed in objects. 
By the dominance of an opposite quality in the thing, 
it is given the name of that opposite.  For instance 
when tallness is dominant in a thing, then the thing 
is tall, and when shortness is dominant, the thing is 
short.  It is by the actual movement of the opposite 
qualities within the thing that all changes of the 
thing are effected.  So, if one thing becomes tall 
and the other short, no matter what the apparent 
causal relation between these two things, the 
explanation is that tallness became dominant in one 
and shortness became dominant in the other.  As 
tallness advanced in one, shortness retreated, and in 
the other thing the opposite process occurred without 
any relation between the two events.  The opposite 
qualities may not mix, so, if one advances, then the 
other must necessarily retreat.  On the other hand, 
at the level of seeing things rather than the 
qualities within the things, opposite things give 
rise to one another.  This emergence of things from 
their opposites in continual dynamic is what appears 
in existence because of the impossibility for 
opposite qualities 'to be opposite to themselves'. 
(103c)17     
The disconnection between opposite qualities is com-
plete.  So, if a thing moves in relation to the lay-
out of qualities in existence, and the qualities 
within it do not move with it, then it turns into 
the opposite.  This means that there are two kinds 
of movement that interlock to make up the changes in 
existence; there is the movement of qualities within 
things, and the movement of things in existence. 18 
There is a disconnection between the qualities so 
that if the thing moves, then it may cross from the 
sphere of influence of one quality to the other. The 
fact that it does this shows that the disconnection 
between the qualities is complete.  If, when the 
object moved in relation to the qualitative context, 
it did not change into its opposite, then opposites 
might be able to become opposite to themselves.  In 
this way, the movements of the objects exemplify the 
disconnections between the opposite qualities in 
existence.19 
The soul moves from one realm that is invisible into 
a realm of visibility.20  In the invisible realm the 
opposite qualities are distinct whereas in the 
visible realm they are mixed in things.  The sane 
things appear sometimes tall, sometimes short.  When 
the soul, which is immortal, moves across the divi-
ding line between these two distinct realms, then 
the person whose soul it is changes from dead to 
living.  At death the soul moves back across the 
division so that the person changes from living to 
dead.  Certain qualities are intrinsic to the 
things, while other qualities are changeable for a 
thing.  Thus, for the soul, life is intrinsic to it 
- it cannot die.  However, for the person whose soul 
it is, there is the experience of life and death. 
That is to say that, for the human being, an 
indicator of the single source, the opposite 'life' 
is attached to it intrinsically, while for the human 
body as a Dasein (being-there) in the realm of the 
mixture of body and soul, then there is experience 
of life and death, as it moves in and out of this 
realm. Those opposites that are intrinsic to the 
person or thing are its core attributes that must be 
distinguished from the inessential attributes based 
on the movement of the thing. 
So we find, in certain cases like these 
(hot/cold: snow/fire are the examples 
Socrates uses for the same thing) that the 
name of the form is eternally applicable 
not only to the form itself, but also to 
something else, which is not the form but 
invariably possesses its distinguishing 
characteristic. 103e. (Author's insert)21 
The soul intrinsically is connected to the quality: 
Life.  The body on the other hand is not intrinsic-
ally connected to this quality and so experiences 
life and death alternately.  If a person or thing 
has an intrinsic connection to a quality, then it 
cannot remain what it is on the approach of the 
opposite quality. 
It must either withdraw at the approach 
of (the opposite) ... or cease to exist. 
(103d; Authors insert) 22 
The presentation of the relation between opposites 
is wholly designed to show up the disconnection 
between the opposite qualities.  This is precisely 
shown by the fact that things which have related to 
them certain essential qualities change into their 
opposites, if they move in relation to the distribu-
tion of opposite qualities, and things that have 
related to them a certain opposite at their core 
must move, or cease to exist when the distribution 
of opposite qualities changes so as to bring the 
approach of a thing's opposite.  The dividing line 
between the opposite qualities is always maintained. 
It is this dividing line that is highlighted by the 
movement of the opposite  qualities and the things 
with opposite qualities assigned to them, either at 
their core or in-essentially.  The point of this 
anticausal description has, however, to do with 
temporality. The opposite qualities are, at each 
instant, arranged differently in existence.  The 
unfolding of existence is nothing other than this 
continuously differing arrangement.  Things with 
form23 are like so many glass shapes, in which the 
different colored lights of the continuously 
differing arrangement of the qualities appear.  How-
ever, some of the qualities are intrinsically con-
nected to these forms, and some are not.  So, when 
the arrangement of the qualities changes, the forms 
have to move in relation to that change.  If an 
opposite that a form is intrinsically connected to, 
moves, then that form must readjust itself to the 
movement of that quality.  If the form does not 
move, and the opposite which is counter to that 
which is registered in its core approaches, then 
that form is destroyed.24 This is because the form 
tried to take a quality into its core that was the 
opposite of it.  Harmony, which Simmias argues to be 
the nature of the soul, is when the forms move in 
precise tune with the changing arrangement of the 
opposite qualities.  Disharmony is being either 
ahead or behind the advance of the changing arrange-
ment. The correct view of existence looks to the 
qualities within things, not at the things them-
selves, and takes into account the changes in their 
arrangement as a guide to action.  If, at any point, 
one focuses on the things instead of the opposite 
qualities, then one's attention is held there so 
that one loses track of the changing arrangement of 
qualities.  This sets up the possibility of an 
alternative artificial temporality arising.  It 
arises when, by the focus on form, one holds on to 
the form instead of following the qualities that may 
shift to another form.  A permanent move to seeing 
the forms, instead of the qualities leads to 
destruction because each form has a core of essen-
tial opposites. If one does not see the opposite 
quality coming, then when they meet the form will be 
destroyed.  A corollary to this is that, when 
opposites are equal, neither being dominant, then 
they both vanish.  This vanishing makes it impos-
sible to see the form any more, and so the form 
vanishes as well.  By this it is seen that it is by 
the contrast of opposite qualities that the form is 
seen, and not vice versa. 
The movement of existence is a response to the 
changing arrangement of opposite qualities that 
appears in things.  The qualities shift through the 
forms, so that one cannot hold on to the forms if 
one wants to follow the unfolding existence.  This 
holding on to forms is, though, exactly what is 
basic to the western philosophical and scientific 
tradition.  Forms are taken, by the members of this 
particular tradition, to be primary and not the 
opposite qualities.  The core qualities of an object 
are recognized, but not in relation to the approach 
of their opposites that demand movement or destruc-
tion.  Thus, western metaphysics has taken the 
structure of the Platonic description of existence, 
and missed the point.  It has focused on what does 
not move, when the whole point of positing the model 
is to see the changing of the inessential opposite 
qualities in relation to the thing with its core 
qualities.  This focus on the form rather than the 
opposite qualities leads to the appearance of the 
alternative temporality of artificial emergence. The 
form seems to have, besides its own internal tem-
porality that aligns it to the unfolding of every-
thing else, a temporal out-of-phaseness with the 
changing arrangement of opposite qualities.  That is 
to say, as the inessential qualities seen in the 
object move, and the object does not move in 
accordance with these changes, then the form seems 
to have a temporal character besides its own inner 
timing.  This third temporality besides the becoming 
of the thing itself, and the changing arrangement of 
opposite qualities, is its out-of-phaseness with 
regard to its own movement guided by the other two. 
It is essential to understand the temporality of 
this out-of-phaseness.  When one focuses on form, as 
all western philosophy does, then the result is an 
attempt to freeze the qualities in their present 
distribution and say that they are the 'secondary 
qualities' of the form.  The primary qualities like 
mass are those that physics uses to give the form a 
substantial designated reality.  The point is that 
as soon as the form with its content is taken to be 
fixed, the distribution of the arranged opposite 
qualities in existence changes in the next instant. 
Looking still at the form, and its contents, what is 
seen is a falling away of the form, as the qualities 
within it shift.  There is seen a falling away, 
because what occurs is an inevitable shift away from 
the first picture of the form's contents.25  If the 
first picture is taken as an ideal then, whatever 
change occurs to the form in relation to that ideal, 
must be entropic.  Now, every form has essential, or 
core, attributes and inessential, or peripheral, 
attributes.26 The core attributes 
form a cluster.27 As opposite qualities in  _  
existence shift in it's arrangement, then the 
opposite of the core qualities of the form may 
approach the form.  If these qualities, opposite to 
those of the form's core, enter the form, then the 
form is destroyed, because the opposite qualities 
cancel each other out.  This only happens when 
because of a focus on the level of forms rather than 
that of qualities, one does not see the opposites 
approaching.28  The point is, that each form has a 
cluster of qualities at its core, so that when one 
of the opposites of these qualities approaches the 
form and touches it, then the form ceases to exist 
in relation to that particular quality at its core, 
but not necessarily with regard to the other 
qualities at its core. 
This means that the forms may periodically undergo 
radical transformations29 which are seen by the one 
focused on form as complete breaks in the temporal 
continuity of the form. The study of these breaks 
in  continuity is dialectics,30 when a diachronic 
view of the phenomenon is taken, and 
structuralism,31 when a synchronic view of the 
phenomenon is taken.  Thus, by the focus on forms 
being held onto for a long period of time, there 
occurs a phenomenon of a radical break in the con-
tinuity of the form's qualitative content.  There is 
continuous shifting of content away from the initial 
picture of the form's content, and then a radical 
discontinuous jump to another form-content 
picture.32  This occurs when the opposite of one of 
the qualities associated with the core approaches 
and touches33 the form, so that, with respect to 
that quality and its opposite, the form ceases to 
exist.  This means that there is a redistribution of 
the core qualities of the form in relation to its 
peripheral qualities within the form.  What appears 
with this redistribution is a discontinuous change, 
or jump, from one form-content relation to another 
within the form.  These jumps in form-content 
relation are the substance of artificial emergence. 
In them, something startlingly new unexpectedly 
appears to the one focused on the forms. 
These two phenomena - continuous falling away of the 
form content relation with respect to its initial 
fixing and discontinuous jumps to other form-content 
relations - are the root of the artificial (third) 
temporality that insinuates itself between the 
intrinsic temporality of the form and the changing 
of the arrangement of opposite qualities.  It is 
wholly illusory and derives its apparent existence 
directly from a mistaken focus on forms, designating 
them as real. What is readily seen is that for this 
artificial temporality, or out-of-phaseness, to 
appear the description of existence in terms of 
opposite qualities must be held on to as a form. 
Then it no longer points to the principle of no 
secondary causation, but there occurs to it 
everything described above.  The opposites in 
disconnection, by which the principle of a single 
source is indicated, must constantly be changed.  No 
description may be held on to, so that even descrip-
tion by opposites must be relinquished at some time. 
The shifting arrangement of opposites in existence 
constantly indicates the truth of the principle of a 
single source. 
This then is the core of the set of arguments put 
forward by Socrates in the Phaedo.  If this core is 
understood, then the rest of the dialogue falls into 
place.  There Socrates is only following in 
description the changing arrangement of the opposite 
qualities and constantly attempting to indicate the 
principle of 'no secondary causation'.  There are 
many corollaries, which may be gone into concerning 
the setting-up of the anti-causal descriptive 
devices, which are displayed here and there through-
out the dialogues.  They are not developed system-
atically, because that would constitute a holding on 
to the descriptive form, rather than using it for 
the purpose of description.  Plato's writing about 
Socrates is itself already a holding onto form — 
the self-form of Socrates.  Plato does to Socrates 
what Confucius did to the man of the Tao in China. 
Confucius took the form of the righteous (jen) man 
and held on to its outward aspects, presenting it as 
a social ideal.  Thus, to give a systematic recon-
struction of Socrates' teaching, as fixed by Plato, 
would be more than counter- productive; it would be 
to do precisely that which is indicated above to be 
the wrong approach to existence.  If the Platonic 
dialogues are read in terms of an exemplification of 
the one who holds to the principle of 'no secondary 
causations's' ????? confrontation with different 
forms of nihilistic arguments, in order to see their 
process of emergence, then the correct view of the 
dialogues will be  obtained.  As long as the 
dialogues are viewed only from the point-of-view of 
the template of ideation, then they are confusing, 
because 
although written using that form, they indicate 
something beyond it by means of it (i.e., the open-
ing up of approaches to the single source.) The next 
step is to look at the development of the argument 
in the Phaedo that leads to the statement of the 
principle of 'no secondary causation'.  The scene is 
before Socrates' execution.  Phaedo is relating the 
events after the fact to Echecrates. When those who 
have gone to visit him enter, they find him 
released from his chains.  He is then in the 
position of the prisoner about to be dragged up into 
the light in the metaphor of the Cave that appears 
in the Republic34.  In fact, the prisoner is 
mentioned later in the dialogue. 
I will explain, he said.  Every seeker after 
wisdom knows that up to the time when 
philosophy takes it over his soul he is a 
helpless prisoner, chained hand and foot in 
the body, compelled to view reality not 
directly but only through its prison bars, 
and wallowing in utter ignorance.(82c)35 
Thus there is a direct allusion thereby to the three 
important similies that are the centre of the 
Republic: the Sun, the divided line, and the cave. 
These three together give, by means of metaphor, a 
comprehensive picture of the life-form that uses the 
template of ideation.  A very good exposition of 
them is found in Being and Logos by J. Sallis.36 
When Socrates' friends enter he is with his wife. It 
is a family portrait "...and Xanthippe - you know 
her! - sitting by him with the little boy on her 
knee."(60a)  What happens at this point sets the 
scene for the whole dialogue. 
As soon as Xanthippe saw us she broke out 
into the sort of remark you would expect 
from a woman, 0 Socrates, this is the last 
time that you and your friends will be able 
to talk together! 
Socrates looked at Crito. 'Crito' he said, 
'someone had better take her home.' 
Some of Crito's servants led her away, 
crying hysterically. (60a)37 
What occurs in the dialogue is that the wife and 
child go out and the friends come in, but in the end 
the friends display the same emotional attachment 
that the wife shows.  At the end of the dialogue the 
ties of family and of friendship are broken by 
death.  These ties are the equivalent of the ties of 
causation that are broken in the argument of the 
dialogue. 
Socrates sat up on the bed and drew up his 
legs and massaged them, saying as he did so, 
'What a queer thing it is, my friends, this 
sensation which is popularly called 
pleasure!  It is remarkable how closely it 
is connected with its conventional opposite, 
pain.  They will never come to a man both at 
once, but if you pursue one of them and 
catch it, you are nearly always compelled to 
have the other as well.  They are like two 
bodies attached to the same 
head.  I am sure that, if Aesop had thought 
of it he would have made up a fable about 
them, something like this — God wanted to 
stop their continual quarrelling, and when 
he found it was impossible, he fastened 
their heads together; so wherever one of 
them appears, the other is sure to follow 
after.  That is exactly what seems to be 
happening to me.  I had a pain in my leg 
from the fetter, and now I feel the pleasure 
coming that follows it. (60bc)38 
This paragraph contains the central idea of the 
whole dialogue.  Socrates sees his wife and child 
going, and his friends coming, and recognizes the 
unreal ties, which they impute as existing between 
them and him.  The pleasure of friendship and the 
pain of parting are what he is commenting on.  He is 
released from the chains of the illusion of the con-
nections to family and friends. Being released from 
that point of view, he comments on the pleasure and 
pain that mutually entail each other, when one is 
caught in the illusion of these bonds.  Pleasure and 
pain follow on one another necessarily.  If you have 
one of them, then the other is coming up.  However, 
one never has them together.  They alternate on man 
constantly.  Whichever one you pursue and attempt to 
hold on to, then you must necessarily have the other 
after it.  Stop there!  If the rest of the dialogue 
is forgotten and this point is grasped, then 
something great will have been achieved.  This 
insight into the nature of existence, which Socrates 
is trying to pass on to us, if grasped, can change 
one's life utterly. 
The two opposites — in this case pleasure and pain 
— never meet in man.  They are completely distinct, 
and that distinctness is maintained by their never 
being in man at the same time.  But, although they 
are never in man at the same time, they mutually 
entail each other.  This means that if one is 
present, then the other must necessarily come.  This 
interchange occurs precisely, in the timing of 
Time.39  This means that man does not determine 
when the opposites will change places in him.  The 
interchanging of the arrangement of the opposite 
qualities continuously indicates the single source 
of everything.  The point is that man may move in 
such a way as to take into account how the opposite 
qualities move.  That is to say that man may move 
toward the opposite of what he wants, and thus, 
having had the opposite that he doesn't want first, 
have a surer grip on the opposite that he does want 
when it, as it must, appears after its opposite.  If 
instead, man moves toward what he does want, then 
it is sure to leave him when its opposite 
necessarily appears.  Socrates does not state this 
extension of his argument, but it is obvious, if one 
takes a moment to reflect on what he is saying. 
Almost everyone in the world goes to what they want 
instead of its opposite.  They attempt to grasp it 
and hold onto it.  This is the source of the 
illusory connections between things in existence. 
These connections are based on desires.40  These 
connections must necessarily be broken when the 
opposite of whatever is pursued, on the basis of 
desire, appears. 
Almost no one recognizes that if they want something 
they must go toward its opposite and not pursue the 
thing itself.  This recognition is the practical 
understanding of the meaning of the principle of 'no 
secondary causation'.  By going to the opposite, 
instead of the thing desired, one has affirmed the 
principle of a single source, instead of causation. 
There is no way of forging a connection between 
oneself and whatever one wants.  Yet, because things 
and their opposites have a single source, if one 
lays hold of something's opposite, then that thing 
must follow necessarily.  By following this guide-
line, then, one has in fact laid hold of the princi-
ple of 'no secondary causation' by one's action. 
"They are like two  bodies attached to the same 
head."(60c)  The head is the single source that is 
completely disconnected from everything, and is the 
source of the disconnection that exists between 
everything, and, because of its being the source of 
everything, is pure connection at the same time. 
The opposites are completely disconnected from one 
another.  They do not entail one another, because of 
some connection between them, but because of the 
single source that they have in common with every-
thing else.  If this guideline for the grasping of 
the principle of 'no secondary causation' in action 
is followed, then the rest of the dialogue is un-
necessary, because the grasping of it in action is 
stronger than an intellectual grasp of it.  If one 
grasps it intellectually and not in action, then a 
split between words and actions is created.  If it 
is grasped intellectually, then one must put it into 
action, in order to have a full comprehension of the 
principle of a single source. 
Socrates introduces the intellectual elucidation of 
the principle by beginning to speak of fables.  The 
fable is different from that which is logically sug-
gested by what Socrates has just said above.  He 
says, 'God wanted to stop their continual quar-
reling.' (60c) But how can the opposites be seen to 
be quarreling, when they cannot be found present in 
man together?   They are never in the same place in 
order to quarrel.  They are separated irrevocably by 
utter disconnection.  Their continuous alternation 
on man is not conflict.  In the fable, though, it is 
viewed as conflict.  The fable is a false view of 
the relation between the opposites, which assumes 
that they can come into contact 41 in order to be in 
conflict.  The fable displays the illusory con-
nections between the opposite qualities posited by 
ideation.  What is seen as conflict is mere alterna-
tion — there is a misinterpretation of the 
phenomenon.  The fable says, 'God wanted to stop 
their quarrelling and found it impossible.'(60c) 
Surely if it was God, then He could not find any-
thing impossible.  On the contrary, it is man who 
wishes to stop the alternation of the opposites in 
him, which is decreed by God to arise from the 
single source.  Man wishes to stop the alternation, 
when he has followed his desires and the opposite of 
them has come to him by necessity.  This wish to 
stop the alternation of the opposites in him is the 
source of his focusing on form, instead of the 
changing arrangement of opposite qualities. He tries 
to stop at the point, when he has what he wants. 
When its opposite appears, he digs in and attempts 
to hold on to what he has grasped of his desires. 
Artificial temporality is the view of the interval 
between the grasping of the thing desired and the 
appearance of its opposite.  Man sets himself up as 
God in his attempt to freeze the alternation of the 
opposites, instead of moving with them and instead 
of grasping things in their opposites.42 
Socrates then says that 'God fastened their heads 
together'.(60c)  Outside the fable he merely said 
that they were two bodies with a single head.  There 
was no mention of two heads.  Ideation is modeled by 
a connecting of the different elements of the 
principle of a single source, and the disconnected 
opposites that indicate it.  Man who makes himself 
into a god attempts to forge this connection between 
the two disconnected opposites that indicate the 
principle of a single source.  The principle is in 
this way seen to appear as the deformity of two 
heads stuck together instead of as a single head. 
Ideation is a deformation of the description of 
existence in terms of disconnection, that posits 
connections, which do not take into account the 
necessity of the appearance of a thing's opposite 
after it. 
Immediately after the two descriptions of existence, 
one as a fable and the other not, Socrates calls our 
attention back to his legs and the pain and pleasure 
he feels in relation to the fetters. The two 
descriptions both refer to one matter. They are two 
ways of looking at actually experienced pleasure and 
pain, both emotional and physical. 
In the dialogue the next thing that appears is that 
Socrates has himself been composing verses on themes 
suggested by Aesop's fables.  He says that he used 
them because he was not good at inventing stories. 
Socrates has just invented a fable, though.  What is 
the meaning of this? Looking at the wider context 
it is seen that the dialogue takes place in a period 
of delay between Socrates' sentencing and execution. 
A fortunate coincidence, Echecrates.  It so 
happened that on the day before the trial 
they had just finished garlanding the stern 
of a ship which Athens sends to Delos. 
What ship is that? 
The Athenians say that it is the one in 
which Theseus sailed away to Crete with 
seven youths and seven maidens, and saved 
their lives and his as well.  The story 
says that the Athenians made a vow to Apollo 
that, if these young people's lives were 
saved, they would send a solemn mission to 
Delos every year, and ever since then they 
have kept their vow to the god, right down 
to the present day.  They have a law that, 
as soon as this mission begins, the city 
must be kept pure, and no public executions 
may take place, until the ship has reached 
Delos and returned again, which sometimes 
takes a long time, if the winds happen to 
hold it back.  The mission is considered to 
begin, as soon as the priest of Apollo has 
garlanded the stern of the ship, and this 
happened, as I say, on the day before the 
trial.  That is why Socrates spent such a 
long time in prison between his trial and 
execution. (58)43 
The period of delay between the word of the state 
that it is going to kill Socrates, and the action of 
killing him is very significant.  The period between 
word and action is very much like the period between 
the fixing of a form and its destruction.  In fact, 
it is the period between word and action, that is 
the image of the periodicity of artificial tempor-
ality.  From this period we have three dialogues 
from Plato.  The Apology that begins it, the Crito 
in the middle, and the Phaedo at the end.  The 
Phaedo takes place in this period of ambiguity, when 
it still remains to be seen if the word of the 
state, with respect to Socrates, will come to pass. 
For men that period between their words and the 
exemplification of their words in action has a 
special aspect, when words and actions do not 
immediately reinforce one another.  In the city 
there is purity and no executions, while the people 
wait to see if their vow to Apollo will occur or 
not.  The time between word and action is precisely 
like a voyage over the sea.  One does not know what 
storms will come to blow the ship of intention off 
course.  Phaedo says the following about this time 
with Socrates. 
In the first place, my own feelings at the 
time were quite extraordinary.  It never 
occurred to me to feel sorry for him, as 
you might have expected me to feel at the 
death-bed of a very dear friend.  The master 
seemed quite happy, Echecretes, both in his 
manner and in what he said; he met his death 
fearlessly and nobly.  I could not help 
feeling that, even on his way to the other 
world, he would be under the providence of 
God, and that when he arrived there all 
would be well with him, if it has ever been 
so with anyone.  So, I felt no sorrow at 
all, as you might have expected on such a 
solemn occasion, and at the same time I felt 
no pleasure in being 
occupied in our usual philosophical 
discussions - that was the form that our 
conversation took.  I felt an absolutely 
incomprehensible emotion, a sort of -curious 
blend of pleasure and pain combined, as my 
mind too took in that in a little while my 
friend was going to die. All of us who were 
there were affected in much the same way, 
between laughing and crying; one of us, in 
particular, Apollodorus - you know what he 
is like, don't you.(58e-59b)44 
In this period of delay there occurs the ambiguity 
of the mixture of pleasure and pain, of laughing and 
crying.45  Kant describes this in his aesthetic as 
the sublime.46  It is precisely what was referred to 
before in the fable of Socrates as the joining of 
the two heads by man as demigod.  The mixture of 
opposite qualities is impossible, because it brings 
a quality opposite to itself.  Therefore it is seen 
that there is a dramatic opening of an illusory 
closed-space in which the connection between the 
opposites is designated-as-real.  This is the space 
and time, in which formalism47 transforms itself 
into structuralism.48  Formalism occurs when the 
forms are fixed, and structuralism appears as the 
artificial temporality of the falling away of these 
fixed forms.  The form of philosophical discussion 
which had been usual between these friends was held 
on to in the face of Socrates' death.  Instead of 
taking the wisdom of his first remark, concerning 
the impossibility of joining pleasure to pain and 
the necessity of pursuing the opposite of what one 
wants, the friends of Socrates wished the same 
relations between themselves that they had 
ritualistically acted out before, to be created once 
again. In this way they attempted to attain the 
pleasure of philosophical discussion at an 
inappropriate time, so that it mixed with the pain 
of their grief. 
In this period of ambiguity Socrates reinterprets a 
recurring dream to the effect that he should "prac-
tice and cultivate the arts"(60e).  He has always 
interpreted it to mean the art of philosophy. So, in 
his reinterpretation, he takes it to mean that he 
should practice a particular art - so he decides on 
lyric poetry, beginning with an ode to Apollo, then 
taking the themes from Aesop, and finally with the 
fable that begins the dialogue he makes up an 
imaginary theme himself.  This progression from 
philosophy to the practice of a specific art, and 
then in that specific art from description to 
imaginative themes of someone else's, to making up 
one's own themes is precisely the order of degener-
ation that occurs as one enters the ambiguous space 
between word and act of artificial temporality. This 
is to say that what Socrates says first in the 
dialogue is pure philosophy.  The fable and the 
philosophical dialogue that follows is the practice 
of a specific art.  The art of sophistry.49  In the 
dialogue one goes from a description of the 
soul, to the imaginary and nihilistic opposing 
explanations of. Simmias and Cebes.  Socrates' reply 
to these opposite arguments about the nature of the 
soul that strengthens his own case is the construc-
tion of an imaginary theme himself.  In that con-
struction he presents a picture of the principle of 
no secondary causation within discourse.  That is, 
he presents a picture within the art form determined 
by the template of ideation. This is then a metaphor 
for the development of the dialogue itself. 
Socrates says that the poet Evanos should follow him 
in death(61bc).  In that, Socrates is contrasting 
himself with a real poet.  The poet does not go 
beyond the form of his art, whereas the philosopher 
only uses the art to exemplify what is beyond that 
art-form.  This mention of the poet's death in 
contrast to the philosopher's also has the element 
of delay.  Simmias says that Evanos would not want 
to follow Socrates into death.  This is because the 
poet, working within the limits imposed by the 
template of ideation, believes in the apparent con-
nections between the things in this world and does 
not know of the principle of a single source.  The 
delay between the death of Socrates and that of the 
poet is an extension into another direction of the 
delay between the sentence and execution of 
Socrates.  This delay is then immediately turned 
into a discussion of hurrying and delaying death. 
Each segment of the argument of the dialogue is then 
a transformation of the primary delay period.  It is 
possible to quickly trace this series of transforma-
tions up to the point where the principle of 'no 
secondary causation' emerges.  The series is as 
follows. 
58b   Delay between sentence and execution. 60d-61d  
Delay in the death of the poet following the 
philosopher. 
61d-63d   Suicide (rushing death) and not wanting to 
die (delaying death). 
64    Mock trial begins.  Philosophy is a 
preparation for death. 
64b-65d  Rootedness of the soul in the body 
(opposites from each other.) 
70d  Reincarnation. 
72d  Recollection 
77d   Argument against the dispersion of the 
soul after death. 
79b-84b  End of reincarnation arguments. 
91e-95a  Socrates' refutation of Simmias. 
95a-108a  Socrates' refutation of Cebes (opposite 
qualities cannot mix - principle of a 
single source stated). 
109a   Socrates' vision of the earth. 
It is only necessary for the purposes of this essay 
to look at the development of the dialogue in 
general terms.  This is because our purpose is to 
understand these same issues in a contemporary 
setting, not to get stuck in an endless elucidation 
of Plato.50 
As has been said, the period of delay between 
sentence and execution is within the dialogue con-
tinuously transformed, first into the delay between 
the death of the philosopher and that of the poet; 
secondly, into the opposition between rushing death 
by suicide and delaying it.  Rushing and delay both 
create similar periods of ambiguity.  In fact, rush-
ing and delay are a picture of the opposite domains 
within the template of ideation.  The argument of 
artificial emergence arises from anticipation, 
whereas the argument of nihilism arises from regret. 
Anticipation attempts to grasp what is coming in the 
laying out of events by the timing of Time51, 
whereas regret holds on to what has passed.  Both 
miss the moment itself, because of an obsession with 
the future or the past. Time-of-other-than-the-
moment is a product of the ideational process, 
positing illusory connections between temporal 
moments.52 Moments are not 'points' in a linear 
sequence, either.  The point of time is generated by 
the ideational template as the opposite to the 
future/past.  Both come from the specious present 
that William James53 speaks of, which is the period 
of ambiguity.  The past/future and the point 
of time are the articulation of the 'specious 
present' interval on the pattern of the two sub-
domains of the template of ideation.54 
Next in the dialogue there begins a trial which is a 
private version of the public trial that appears in 
the Apology.55  These two trials are reciprocally 
related.  So, the delay period is turned into the 
time of a trial.  A trial56 is an artificial event 
in which a case is presented and a decision render-
ed.  The case here is for the validity of the 
philosopher's cheerfulness in the face of death, and 
his confidence in finding blessing in the next 
world. The trial is an excellent metaphor for the 
period of delay in which artificial temporality 
occurs.  The   two sub-domains that appear within it 
are the presentation of the case and the rendering 
of a decision.  These are related to words and 
action- through-words respectively.  The opposite of 
this is action, like the execution of a sentence, 
and description of the action.  This is how words 
and action interrelate.  The action of words and the 
words about actions (descriptions) occur from the 
mixture of the two pure categories of words and 
actions.  That is, the mixture of opposites.  Thus, 
it is seen how, when we enter into the discussion of 
actions-of-words, as was done in the beginning of 
the introduction, one has already entered into the 
ambiguous period of delay.  This presentation is 
inextricably bound to the form of that delay period. 
To pretend that this discourse, itself, goes beyond 
the form of ideation would be to give a false view. 
Within the trial in the Phaedo, Socrates first dis-
cusses the rootedness of the soul in the body.  This 
leads him to give a coherent picture of the passage 
from life to death and from death to life again. 
This is done in terms of the development of the 
concept of cyclical reincarnation.  Within the delay 
period as 'Trial' there is given a case for cyclical 
reincarnation.  Cyclical reincarnation is a further 
specification of the form of the delay period in 
terms of a different metaphor.  This argument con-
cerning reincarnation is proved on the basis of the 
argument that learning is recollection, and an argu-
ment against the possibility of the dispersal of the 
soul after death.  The basic idea of the possibility 
of cyclical reincarnation is what is important for 
this essay.  What is thought-provoking about that 
possibility is how cyclical reincarnation forms a 
closed circuit that gives an excellent represen-
tation of the two domains of discourse, in terms of 
the passage of the soul between the visible and the 
invisible worlds, back and forth again and again. 
This picture is, however, obviously false in terms 
of the principle of no secondary causation.  It is, 
in fact, certain that, if the principle of no 
secondary causation were taken into account, the 
model of reincarnation would be radically altered. 
This is because the model does not consider the 
emergence from and the return to the source.  In 
cyclical reincarnation the universe appears as a 
closed system with endless oscillation between the 
two domains.  This does not in any way point toward 
the single source.  Thus the oscillation cannot be 
endless.  The source is the beginning and the end. 
Therefore, a correct model must exemplify this and 
point directly toward the source of everything. 
In this way, the case for reincarnation is a pre-
paration for the emergence within the dialogue of 
the principle of a single source.  In response to 
the cyclical model of reincarnation, Simmias and 
Cebes present counter-arguments that show that they 
have recognized the flaw of the over-neatness of 
Socrates' argument.  They, as it were, bring out the 
flaw, and display it by giving two nihilistically 
opposing views of it, neither of which quite 
captures that flaw.  Simmias proposes that the soul 
is harmony, and Cebes that it outlasts many bodies, 
but still perishes.  Both of these arguments are 
comments on the closedness of the cyclical reincar-
nation model.  One says that such a closed system is 
in balance and so long as it is in balance, then the 
phenomenon of the soul appears; while the other says 
that the closed system is out of balance; so that 
the cycles stop after a while. 
Both views posit that the soul is not immortal. This 
is a consequence of argument based on closed-ness of 
the system of cyclical reincarnation that does not 
point to it's source.  Thus Socrates' model of the 
immortality of the soul has the ultimate consequence 
that the soul is not immortal.  His own model turns 
against him and has implications contrary to those 
he is arguing for.  Socrates exemplifies a 
fundamental feature of all theorizing. The going out 
of balance of the closed system either causes the 
soul to cease immediately, or after a while.  Thus, 
the nihilistically opposite arguments of Simmias and 
Cebes show a period of delay between immediate 
cessation and cessation-after-a-while. This initial 
recognition of entropic breakdown occurs because the 
system does not refer to its source.  It is 
presented as nihilistic opposites, but inherently 
Simmias and Cebes are pointing out to Socrates that, 
because everything is in a state of falling away 
(entropy), which is not exemplified by the model 
itself, his model could not possibly be true.  From 
this it is possible to see that the manifestation of 
nihilistic opposition is a stage in the breaking 
forth of something into manifestation. 
In this case, what breaks forth is the indication of 
the principle of a single source.  Within the state-
ment of the nihilistic opposition, if the opposites 
are considered together, there is an inherent recog-
nition of the flaw in the original form of cyclical 
reincarnation as a theory.  It works out too well. 
It works out too well because it goes on and on, and 
does not indicate the single source from which its 
temporality came. 
Simmias' argument is refuted fairly quickly by 
Socrates, and it is in his refutation of Cebes that 
the principle of no secondary causation appears. 
Socrates has in the course of the trial acted  as a 
midwife yet again.  A model of cyclical reincarna-
tion which was closed was presented, and then the 
flaw of its over-perfection was recognized and 
presented in terms of nihilistic opposition.  By 
bringing the model of emergence, in the form of 
cyclical reincarnation, together with the recogni-
tion of this flaw, in the form of nihilistic 
opposition, the principle of the single source was 
indicated.  Implicitly the two opposite arguments 
concerning Emergence and Nihilism cancel each other 
out in that indication, although Plato does not show 
this in the dialogue.  After the arising of the 
principle, Socrates goes on to discuss opposite 
qualities rather than the oppositeness of things. 
The principle of 'no secondary causation' is only 
just  indicated, then we are returned to the closed 
system again in another respect.  In the dialogue as 
a whole it is the oppositeness of qualities and 
things that forms a closed system of argumentation. 
The single source is only just barely indicated, and 
then back one goes into the too perfect system of 
oppositions.  It is too perfect, when it is not 
oriented to the principle of 'no secondary causa-
tion'.  The key point of this is that in nihilism 
there is a recognition of the flaw in any model that 
works out too well, and that by developing that 
opposition the principle of a single source appears. 
The positing of the over developed model, the 
recognition of its flaw, and the development of the 
nihilistic opposition that expresses that flaw, are 
themselves a model of the transformation and adapta-
tion of the first cyclical model to the principle of 
a single source.  It is the development of a 
structural model out of a formal one within the 
delay-period of ambiguity.  The understanding of the 
arising of the structural out of the formal is very 
important.  In the introduction it was breached in 
terms of the two-way argument concerning the arising 
of ideation from the principle of a single source. 
There the structural argument, it was said, is the 
most dangerous because it makes it appear as if the 
connection between ideation and the principle of a 
single source may be understood.  What is seen here 
is that the trial of Socrates by his friends, which 
mirrors his trial by the state, is of precisely the 
same form as the structural argument presented in 
the introduction.  The difference is that, in 
Socrates' trial by his friends, it is seen how the 
principle of 'no secondary causation' appears as the 
'primer' for the conversion of the argument he 
presents from a formal into a structural one.  This 
is an extremely thought-provoking state of affairs. 
Look at it closely.  If one sticks to formalism, 
then one never reaches the principle of a single 
source.  Formalism in itself does not take one any-
where but into the deeper complexities of the formal 
system.  It is only when one sees the flaw in a 
formal system that one may construct the opposite 
statement to that form.  Then, bringing the two 
statements together one sees that they cancel each 
other out and that beyond this canceling the 
principle of 'no secondary causation' appears.  If 
one doesn't get out of the life-form of ideation at 
that point, one generates a structuralism that takes 
one back into ideation even more strongly. The point 
is to stick with the principle of 'no secondary 
causation' when it appears, and to leave ideation 
behind.  Socrates describes this leaving of ideation 
behind in the final section of the Phaedo, in which 
he describes the nature of the earth (108e- 114d). 
Next, said Socrates, I believe that it 
(the earth) is vast in size, and that we 
who dwell between the river Phasis and the 
pillars of Hercules inhabit only a minute 
portion of it — we live round the sea 
like ants or frogs around a pond — and 
there are many other peoples inhabiting 
similar regions.  There are many hollow 
places all around the earth, places of 
every shape and size into which the water, 
mist, and air have collected.  But the 
earth itself is as pure as the starry 
heaven in which it lies, and is called 
aether by most of our authorities.  The 
water, mist, and air are the dregs of this 
aether, and they are continually draining 
into the hollow places in the earth.  We 
do not realize that we are living in its 
hollows, but assume that we are living on 
the earth's surface. Imagine someone 
living in the depths of the sea.  He might 
think that he was living on the surface, 
and seeing the sun and the other heavenly 
bodies through the water, might think that 
the sea was the sky.  He might be so 
sluggish and feeble that he never reached 
the top of the sea, never emerged  and 
raised his head from the sea into this 
world of ours, and seen for himself — or 
even heard from someone who had seen it — 
how much purer and more beautiful it 
really is, than the one in which his 
people live.  Now we are in just the same 
position.  Although we live in a hollow of 
the earth, we assume we are living on the 
surface, and we call the air heaven, as 
though it were the heaven through which 
the stars move.  And this point too is the 
same, that we are too feeble and sluggish 
to make our way out to the upper limit of 
the air.  If someone could reach to the 
summit, or put on wings and fly aloft, 
when he put up his head he would see the 
world above, just as fishes see our world 
when they put up their heads out of the 
sea.  And, if his nature were able to bear 
the sight, he would recognize that it is 
the true heaven and the true light and the 
true earth.  For this earth and its stones 
and all the regions in which we live are 
marred and corroded, just as in the sea 
everything is corroded by the  brine, and 
there is no vegetation worth mentioning, 
and scarcely any degree of perfect 
formation, but only caverns and sand and 
measureless mud, and tracts of slime 
wherever there is earth as well, and 
nothing is in the least worthy of being 
judged beautiful by our standards. But 
things above excel those of our world to a 
degree far greater still.  If this is the 
right moment for an imaginative description, 
Simmias, it will be worth your while to hear 
what it is really like upon the earth which 
lies beneath the heavens. (109b - 110b).57 
Ideation gives a narrow and constricted view of 
existence.58 By connecting everything together it 
creates the 'hollows' that Socrates describes people 
living within.  This is why ideation is called in 
this essay a 'life-form'.59  ideation appears in 
many different forms.  But all these forms together 
are patterned by a single pattern called the 
ideational template. 
In the earth itself, all over its surface, 
there are many hollow regions, some deeper 
and more widely spread than that in which 
we live, others deeper than our region but 
smaller in expanse, some both shallower than 
ours and broader.  (11c) 60 
The broadness and the depth of the hollows of the 
life-form of ideation vary, so that they appear to 
be different but actually it is the same thing in 
every case.  The hollow is equivalent to the delay-
period spoken of before.  By setting up a delay-
period an artificial form is created.  These forms 
seem to have a temporality of their own, and it is 
the different shapes of the hollows that indicate 
the different variations of these temporalities.  To 
break out of ideation is for these artificial 
spacetime/timespace regions to disappear.  When this 
occurs then the timing of Time is seen, in which 
each thing and event appears perfectly proportioned. 
Well, my dear boy, said Socrates, the real 
earth, viewed from above, is supposed to 
look like one of these balls made of twelve 
pieces of skin, variegated and marked out in 
different colors, of which the colors we 
know are only limited samples, like the  
paints which artists use; but the whole 
earth is made up of such colors and others 
far brighter and purer still.  One section 
is a marvelously beautiful purple, and 
another is golden.  All that is white of it 
is whiter than chalk or snow, and the rest 
is similarly made up of other colors,  still 
lovelier than those we have seen.  Even 
these very hollows in the earth, full of 
water and air, assume a kind of color as 
they gleam amid the different hues around 
them, so that there appears to be a 
continuous surface of varied colors.  The 
trees, the flowers and the fruits that grow 
on this earth are proportionately 
beautiful.  The mountains too, and the 
stones have a proportionate smoothness and 
transparency, and their colors are lovelier.  
The pebbles which are so highly prized in 
our world — jaspers and rubies and 
emeralds and the rest — are fragments of 
these stones, but there everything is 
beautiful as they are, or better still. This 
is because the stones are in their natural 
state, not damaged by decay or corroded by 
salt water as ours are by the sediment that 
has collected  here, and which causes 
disfigurement and disease to stones and 
earth, and animals and plants as well. The 
earth itself is adorned, not only with all 
these stones, but also with gold and silver 
and other metals; for many rich veins of 
them occur in plain view in all parts of the 
earth, so that to see them is a sight for 
the eyes of the blessed.  110b - lllb 6l 
Here the focus is upon the qualities of things 
rather than their form, for the form is recognized 
as perfect the way it is.  The forms are like trans-
parent glass shapes, in which the colors of the 
qualities of things are seen.  Socrates has given a 
spatial description of what must be understood in 
terms of temporality.  The hollows are the delay 
periods which become cloudy with ambiguity.  Whole 
peoples live their entire lives together in these 
artificial temporal periods because of their 
designating of form as real.62  Everything is 
distorted by the delay-period for those trapped 
inside it.  When the distortion disappears, the 
earth as-it-is-really appears.  Looking at forms the 
qualities are seen only dully, so that when one 
focuses back on the opposite qualities they take on 
an incredible luster in comparison with what is seen 
in the 'hollows' of time.  It is the same earth, 
seen from two different perspectives.  One 
perspective is out of phase with the changing of the 
arrangement of the opposites which gives the luster 
that Socrates speaks of to existence, and the other 
is in phase with it. 
Thus it is seen that the leaving of ideation behind 
is not the disappearance of everything, rather it is 
that the tissue of ideas that is placed between 
one's self and the world disappears.  Everything 
becomes crystal clear when this happens, and the 
timing of Time is seen, instead of artificially 
imposed timings.  However, even the artificially 
imposed timings are part of the timing of Time. 
Even these very hollows in the earth, full 
of water and air, assume a kind of color, as 
they gleam amid the different hues around 
them, so that there appears to be a 
continuous surface of varied colors. 
(110c)63 
It is this 'continuous surface of varied colors' 
that is the carpet of the arrangement of opposite 
qualities.  In each moment it is laid out in a 
different pattern.  This patterning is the opposite 
of structure.64 Structure is the temporalizing of 
form, a holding on to form, whereas the patterning 
is a letting go of form and a focus on the opposite 
qualities instead.  The forms are like transparent 
glass shapes, within which the colors of the 
opposite qualities shine. The focus on form, and its 
structuralization, merely muddies the view of this 
carpet of colors and distorts it.  The carpet itself 
is not disturbed by these distortions. They are 
like, as Socrates says, the distortions of light by 
water.  The aether of the upper world is the same 
medium as the air of this world and the water of the 
sea in different phases of viscosity.  One might 
say, in terms of Socrates' metaphor, that the aether 
is the earth seen in the timing of Time, the air is 
the same earth seen in terms of form, and the sea is 
the same landscape seen in terms of the 
temporalizing of form into structure.  Another 
metaphor traditionally used for the same thing in 
the East is the lotus that has its roots in the mud, 
its stem in the water and its flower that lies on 
the surface of the water, in the air.  Patterning is 
seen more and more clearly as the viscosity of the 
medium is reduced.65 
In the earth, seen without having to look through 
the viscous medium that comes from attachment to 
form, there are seen to be two aspects of temporal-
ity.  One is the timing of the changing arrangement 
of opposite qualities laid out in each instant, and 
the second is the timing given independently to each 
form itself.  In the timing of Time these two form 
the weft and warp.  Artificial temporality appears 
as breaks in the carpet of time.  All the forms are 
independent of each other, coming from the same 
single source, from which they are disconnected 
while being dependent upon it.  In their independ-
ence of each other, they have a temporality of their 
own.  However, pure disconnection is pure 
connection.66 And this connection appears as the 
light of the opposite qualities that shine in the 
translucent forms.  Connection/disconnection: both 
must be said in order to indicate the depth of the 
principle of a single source.  Because of the 
insidious predominance of ideation within the 
western tradition, disconnection is declared first. 
However, complete disconnection is a form of con-
nection of the single source to itself, and this 
appears as the perfect interlacing of the weft and 
warp of the timing of Time.  Time is disconnected 
from all disconnected forms that each contain their 
own special timing.  Time is completely connected to 
itself by this total disconnection of everything 
else, and the total disconnection of the timing of 
the different things, which, nevertheless, harmonize 
in their different cycles.  This complete connection 
of Time to itself shows up in the single arrangement 
of opposite qualities that appear in each moment and 
shine in the forms. 
The single pattern of opposite qualities and the 
myriad timings of the individual forms appear as 
opposites from the single source.  They say, by 
their appearance, opposite things about that source. 
The former says complete connection, and the latter 
says complete disconnection.  This is another way in 
which the opposite domains appear which indicates 
the nature of the single source.  The single source 
is not, however, captured by either of these 
descriptions, and yet it is indicated.  Descriptions 
that capture it and don't capture it are again 
opposite domains.  The point is that the single 
source is the origin of all the possible descrip-
tions.  It captures the descriptions!  Time is seen 
in the timing of the appearance of the various 
descriptions of Time.  Descriptions are like the 
forms with qualities.  Their articulation is based 
on the use of that template of ideation, which 
appears when words are matched to actions as a 
commentary or to things as descriptions.  The 
temporal ambiguity that arises from this matching is 
dispelled if the word's meanings are looked at and 
discourse, like a running stream, is not used to 
create an illusory continuity between actions or 
things.  The tagging of words on to actions or 
things is the source of the delay that ideation 
grows up in. 
'Well, after this', said Socrates, 'when I 
was worn out with my physical investi-
gations, it occurred to me that I must 
guard against the same sort of risk which 
people run when they watch and study an 
eclipse of the sun; they really do sometimes 
injure their eyes, unless they study its 
reflection in water or some other medium. I 
conceived of something like this happening 
to myself, and I was afraid that by 
observing objects with my eyes and trying 
to comprehend them with each of my other 
senses I might blind my soul altogether.  
So, I decided that I must have recourse to 
theories, and use them in trying to discover 
the truth of things. 
Perhaps my illustration is not apt, because 
I do not at all admit that an inquiry, by 
means of theory, employs 'images' any more 
than one which confines itself to facts.  
But, however that may be, I started off in 
this way, and in every case I first lay down 
the theory that I judge to be soundest, and 
whatever seems to agree with it -- with 
regard to either causes or anything else — 
I assume 
to be true, and whatever does not to be true. (99d-100a)67 
not I assume 
Physical investigation attributes causal connections 
between things in existence.  These connections are 
posited by means of the model of ideation.  Ideation 
occurs because of the focus on forms and the match-
ing of the continuity of discourse to the unfolding 
timing of events in existence.  Discourse provides 
an artificial rhythm of timing, to which events may 
be orchestrated to correspond.  This is based on the 
tagging of things or events with words.  It is all 
based on the focus on form and the using of words as 
a technical device instead of using them as in-
dicators of meaning.  The focus on form blinds the 
soul.  This is compared by Socrates to looking at 
the sun in eclipse.  The eclipsed sun is an analogy 
for the single source.  The single source may only 
be viewed through the medium of words.  It can never 
be seen directly.  Sensory blindness is contrasted 
to theoretical blindness in Socrates' metaphor.  The 
theoretical blindness comes from looking at the 
forms, instead of the qualities, by means of words, 
and by using words as technique, instead of with a 
view to their meanings.  Sensory blindness comes 
from looking at the single source directly, instead 
of finding indications of it in the timing of the 
arrangement of opposite qualities and the temporal-
ity of things, as one must be satisfied with 
seeing the reflection of the things in the water of 
the running stream of logos, that indicates 
qualities but does not try to provide an alternative 
timing by acting like a synchronome. 
There are three stages in this:  language used as 
technique, language as a form with its own temporal-
ity and core attributes, and language which is still 
(i.e. intelligent silence)68.  The first generates 
ideation, the second may be used to see the 
qualities, and the third is the means of seeing the 
single source in the qualities and the temporalities 
of the forms.  From this is seen the centrality of 
language.  It can be a means of holding on to things 
or a means of letting go of forms and grasping the 
opposite qualities, and when stilled it may be a 
means of letting go of everything.  When the flow of 
the temporality of the form of language is arrested, 
then the timing of all the other events, given 
timing by Time, is seen more clearly. It is how one 
uses language that is the key to whether one is tied 
to forms or set free from them.  The manner in which 
one uses language determines how one treats language 
itself.  The structuralist has a structural view of 
the form of language (i.e. transformational grammar) 
and the formalist formalizes language (i.e. non-
transformational grammar and philology). Language is 
that natural form upon which ideation and 
dialectical discourse are built as additions. 
Through it access to the qualities may be gained. 
However, in that case, language itself must be seen 
as supple, and may not be formalized and structured. 
The suppleness of language may be increased up to 
the point where words stop, and there is only 
intelligent silent comprehension.  If words are like 
water, which Plato is constantly using as a 
metaphor, then certainly distortions appear in 
moving water that disappear in still water.  The 
stilling of the water produces that which is like 
aether in relation to air.  Intelligent silence is 
not a mere stopping of the flow of discourse.  It is 
rather the becoming transparent of the form of 
language until the point when the form does not 
interpose itself at all in the view of the timing of 
Time.   
CHAPTER 2 
In the first chapter, there has been set out a read-
ing of the Platonic dialogue 'the Phaedo' which has 
brought to the fore the place in it of the principle 
of 'no secondary causation', and the relation to 
each other of Emergence and Nihilism.  What has come 
to light, though, is an alternative way of talking 
about existence in terms of opposite qualities and 
opposite things, that shows up the principle in a 
practical way in discourse, by positing disconnec-
tion between opposite qualities.  When one looks at 
the western philosophical tradition fresh from this 
exposition it is immediately apparent how far one is 
from understanding any of this in that context. 
Plato spent most of the space in his dialogues 
giving an exposition of sophistry.1  Sophistry is 
the active, indiscriminate application of the 
ideational process, which takes many forms.  The 
point is that the whole of the western tradition may 
be subjected to the critique of sophistry given by 
Plato.  The terminology and the issues are 
different, but the sophistry is the same.  In the 
context of the unchallenged dominance of sophistry, 
the concept of disconnected opposites is so foreign 
that it is almost impossible to appreciate just how 
deep a  critique of the western tradition is offered 
by looking at the world in this manner.  Yet the 
amazing thing is that in the development of the 
ideational view of existence to its extreme, there 
occurs an indication of this other, radically 
different, view of existence. 
The classic example is the case of Hume and Kant. If 
these two philosophers are considered together, then 
a very clear example of the picture given in the 
foregoing chapter on the Phaedo appears again at the 
beginning of modern philosophy. Hume sets the 
problem, that Kant sets out to solve. 
Now the proper problem of pure reason is 
contained in the question: How are a priori 
synthetic judgments possible? 
That metaphysics has hitherto remained in 
so vacillating a state of uncertainty and 
contradiction is entirely due to the fact 
that this problem, and perhaps even the 
distinction between analytic and synthetic 
judgments, has never previously been 
considered.  Upon the solution of this 
problem, upon a sufficient proof that the 
possibility which it desires to have 
explained does in fact not exist at all, 
depends the success or failure of 
metaphysics.  Among philosophers, David 
Hume came the nearest to envisaging this 
problem, but still was very far from 
conceiving it with sufficient definiteness 
and universality.  He occupied himself 
exclusively with the synthetic propositions 
regarding the connection of an effect with 
its cause (principum causalitatis), and he 
believed himself to have shown that such an 
a priori proposition is entirely impossible. 
If we accept his conclusions, then all that 
we call metaphysics is a mere delusion, 
whereby we fancy ourselves to have rational 
insight into what, in actual fact, is 
borrowed solely from experience, and under 
the influence of custom has taken the 
illusory semblance of necessity.  If he had 
envisaged our problem in all its 
universality, he would never have been 
guilty of this statement, so destructive of 
all pure philosophy. For he would then have 
recognized that, according to his own 
argument, pure mathematics, as certainly 
containing a priori synthetic propositions, 
would also not be possible; and from such 
an assertion his good sense would have 
saved him.2 
Kant underestimates the depth of Hume's critique of 
causality when he says that Hume would have stopped 
short of destroying pure mathematics.  Although the 
two philosophies are based upon two contending forms 
of mathematics, (probability and the calculus) and 
are merely exemplifications of their respective 
implications, the arguments go beyond the confines 
of mere casuistry for different mathematical forms. 
Hume's argument does destroy mathematics, and it is 
precisely because of this that it is thought-
provoking.  It is Kant's arrogance toward Hume, in 
this respect, that shows the non-recognition by him 
of the real depth of Hume's argument.  Whether Hume 
would have baulked at the extension of his 
skepticism to the destruction of pure mathematics or 
not, isn't the point.  What is necessary is to 
recognize the implications of this extension of 
Hume's argument and Kant's own withdrawal, or 
recoil, from this 
conclusion of that train of thought.  Kant takes 
Hume's argument further than Hume did himself, and 
then backs away from the even more devastating 
results, which he sees appear, when Hume's already 
radical skepticism was radicalized even further. 
These even more devastating results are that the 
whole universe of Mathematico-philosophical dis-
course is destroyed by the argument against causal-
ity.  Hume's argument, if radicalized, would destroy 
the very realm in which it may be stated.  Philo-
sophy is a casuistry for mathematics.  Hume begins 
by seeing the implications of the mathematical ideas 
of probability.  If these ideas are taken to their 
conclusions, they destroy the discipline of 
mathematics itself.  Kant uses the concepts of the 
calculus in order to save the realm of discourse. In 
other words, he uses the resources within the realm 
of mathematics to save mathematics itself. However, 
what is called for, in order to provide a really 
firm foundation is support from outside that realm.  
This support, is not forthcoming.  So, Kant's 
counter-argument is a recoil back into the 
mathematical system, after he has seen the limits of 
it clearly.  That is, more clearly than Hume.  Hume 
does not quite reach those limits by his thought  --  
Kant reaches them and retreats.  Those limits are 
defined by the principle of no secondary causation. 
The roots of the Formalist and Structuralist 
positions in the western tradition may be seen in 
the opposition between Hume and Kant.  The pattern 
identified in the Phaedo is reenacted here in cruder 
terms.  It is not self-conscious, but instead, a 
blind mimicry, presented in flattened-out arguments 
that do not hit the mark so effectively as it was 
struck in the Phaedo.  Only a caricature of the 
principle of 'no secondary causation' appears in 
Hume's denial of the connection between cause and 
effect.  A pure formulation doesn't even appear in 
the Phaedo but only a simulacrum used to generate 
the structuralist transformation of the dialogue. 
Here one is even further away from a pure 
declaration of the principle of 'no secondary causa-
tion'.  Still what occurs in the history of the 
western tradition is that the basis of all structur-
alism, which is the Kantian system, appears even 
from this weak invocation of the principle of 
disconnection.  Thus here, as well as in Plato, the 
principle of no secondary causation is used as an 
act of magic instead of being recognized per se.  It 
is this magical act that is the basis of ideation. 
The magician is the sophist, whom Plato devotes him-
self to exposing.  In Plato's terminology, Hume is 
what is called a 'man of earth', which he defines as 
someone who only believes in what he can grasp in 
his hands, whereas Kant, who is the sovereign 
defender 
of subjectivity, is an archetypical sophist. The 
'man of earth' is the dupe of the sophist; they have 
a pact — what Hegel calls a master/slave relation-
ship.3  It is necessary to realize that without a 
connection with the principle of 'no secondary 
causation' (because Hume doesn't quite get there, 
and Kant sees the limits at which the universe of 
discourse would fall away and recoils from it) the 
two positions they take become a nihilistic 
opposition.  All the arguments that they advance are 
mere exemplifications of the nihilism of these 
opposing positions.  This means that they are 
working out their arguments completely encapsulated 
by the template of ideation, without even a clue 
that there is any other possibility.  The vague use 
they make of the principle of no secondary causation 
is not in the least self- conscious, as it was in 
Plato, and no contrast at all is made with any 
position outside that of ideation.  It can clearly 
be seen that by Hume's delay and by not reaching the 
limits at which the realm of mathematical discourse 
evaporates, and by Kant's advance beyond it, there 
is the same form of delay and anticipation, that was 
seen as the central metaphor being worked out in the 
Phaedo.  Nihilism is the result of the application 
of the template that produces the lifeform of 
ideation, without reference to any possibility 
beyond that life-form.  Emergence occurs because the 
principle of 'no secondary causation' impinges on 
the arguments of those who do not recognize it, as 
much as upon the arguments of those who do.  As was 
seen, the nihilistic opposition is founded on a 
vague recognition that the life-form of ideation 
works out too well, and sets the stage for the 
genuine emergence of the principle of no secondary 
causation.  When the stage is set but this emergence 
does not take place, then the result is a dialec-
tical series of nihilistic oppositions.  Hence, the 
western philosophical tradition, which is the 
constant setting up of the possibility of the 
emergence of this principle, that always remains 
stillborn.  This very process of setting up the 
nihilistic oppositions is, however, a constant 
indication of the possibility of the principle, and 
an implicit recognition by those trapped within it 
that it contains something more than ideation. 
Consider Hume's argument against causality.  It is a 
denial of the connections between forms, without the 
affirmation of a single source.  This is why proba-
bility is the starting point for his thought. 
Though there be no such thing as chance in 
the world, our ignorance of the real cause 
of any event has the same influence on the 
understanding, and begets a like species of 
belief or opinion.  There is certainly a 
probability...4 
Hume begins by declaring his ignorance of 'Real 
cause', while still denying "chance's" reality.  It 
is, therefore, an article of faith that there is the 
possibility of true knowledge,5 although this goes 
hand in hand with the recognition that he does not 
possess it and finds himself left with opinions. Not 
having access to true knowledge has the same effect 
on the understanding as if chance did exist. Thus, 
for one stuck with his opinions,  'there is 
certainly probability...'.  Probability is a halfway 
house between the unknown real cause and chance. It 
is possible to identify the true knowledge of 'real 
cause' with the principle of no secondary causation. 
Hume might have imagined that there was a myriad of 
real causes in existence, hidden from him; but which 
he believed in merely because his philosophical 
argument could not explain the source of existence.  
If he had gone from what amounted to a rejection of 
physical investigation, such as Socrates subscribed 
to in his early days, to the positive task of 
understanding the source of existence instead of 
sticking with his critique of ideation; and had, in 
so doing, followed the same route as Socrates in his 
own thought, then he may have broken out of the life 
form of ideation.  To do that, however, he may have 
had to apply Socrates' injunction to do things by 
their opposites.  This belief in a real causality 
which one does not know from experience, but merely 
holds as an article of 
faith, is a key feature in Hume's thought.  Kant is 
right in saying, that Hume would logically have to 
withdraw from the implications of his skepticism, if 
he saw them clearly, because his whole argument 
against causal connection is based on making con-
nections of a syllogistic kind in arguing the case. 
Thus, his argument does not do what he speaks of 
through it.  He is fundamentally disconnected from 
what he is saying because the way he says it does 
not exemplify it.  If he had exemplified it, he 
would have destroyed the realm of discourse in which 
the argument itself unfolded.  Further, Hume's whole 
argument for the illusory nature of causality, and 
the psychological reductionism, can be applied to 
Hume himself.  In all this, the question of the real 
cause is continually begged.  The step, to saying 
that there is a real cause and that it is singular, 
and further, that it arranges all things for the 
best, such as Socrates made, is a big one, because 
it necessitates the rethinking of the whole position 
of the simple denial of causes in a radically 
different way. 
Hume recognizes that causality implies the opening 
out of the past and the future, and the transference 
of experience in the past to prediction in the 
future.  In this transference there are regularly 
conjoined events and irregularly paired ones.  Hume 
 denies that it is possible to count on the reappear-
ance of even the regularly conjoined events.  From 
his argument it is obvious that past and future are 
assumed to be mirror-images of one another.  The 
transference of causal inference is the act of 
transcendence that is the core of western philo-
sophy.6  Hume's argument denies transcendence from 
one form to another by causal link, just as much as 
it denies the transcendental motion from past to 
future entailed in the concept of causality. 
Temporal and spatial transcendence are denied, but 
an illusory sort of transcendence is designated-as-
real, which makes causal connections appear in the 
mind as if they were there.  Hume has a clear view 
of the illusory nature of the ideational process and 
its twin-concept producing template, which creates 
the mirror-images of past and future.  
Unfortunately, he cannot offer anything more than a 
critique of it, and at that, one which is still 
bound by the template of thinking that he is 
criticizing. 
In generating the twin concepts, past and future, a 
distinction is made between them.  This process of 
making a distinction is immediately referred to in 
the section following that on probability,7 in terms 
of the clarity of mathematical distinctions in 
relation to all others, which are progressively more 
ambiguous.  Moral distinctions are here contrasted 
with the mathematical ones.  However, moral terms, 
though ambiguous, are much simpler than the 
inherently complex distinctions of mathematics, that 
are so clear.  This contrast between morality and 
mathematics in terms of simple/ambiguous and com-
plex/clear shows immediately the shifting nature of 
the model of presenting distinctions, given in terms 
of the generation of the twin concepts of past and 
future.  It is the same model presented in another 
light.  Both are excellent examples of nihilistic 
mutually exclusive opposition.  They are like 
textbook examples of the kind of opposition that 
polarizes the universe of discourse in such a way as 
to flatten it out into barren 8 and useless dis-
tinctions.  The twin poles of the opposition define 
the two ends of the delay-period, and that is all. 
They are flattened out into conceptual markers. 
Within the delay-period ambiguity arises, which 
takes over the primary distinction that set up the 
original opposition, which defined, by its mixing, 
the delay period.  That ends when the mixture re-
separates.  Hume endeavours to confront this ambi-
guity, which arises in the delay-period of the move-
ment from the mathematical to the moral. The 
mathematical is the first setting out of distinc-
tions, upon which discourse is based in a clear way. 
Then, as the discourse begins to work with these 
distinctions, the movement toward the other end of 
the delay-period begins, which is seen as a move 
toward the moral questions. It is a move toward 
moral questions because it is a search for the 
grounds upon which those first distinctions are 
based, and the grounds of words must be in action. 
As one explores these grounds in philosophical dis-
course, the original distinctions become more and 
more indistinct; but what is realized is that the 
core of the matter is simpler than the clear mathe-
matical treatment at first suggested.  Thus, a pro-
gressive increase in ambiguity is accompanied by an 
increase in simplicity.  Unfortunately the discourse 
starts from multiplicity and, although it goes 
toward simplicity, it never reaches the single 
source. One must start from that source for any 
discourse that treats of it to make sense.  It is 
the geometrically increasing ambiguity that prevents 
the single source being comprehended by intellectual 
argument.  Built into the system of nihilistic 
opposition is a precise mechanism that makes it 
impossible to break out of the form imposed by the 
template of ideation. This is because it is set up 
so that, if one variable decreases (i.e. complex-
ity), a complimentary variable increases (i.e. 
ambiguity). 
Hume recognized, however, that the hub of the most 
intense ambiguity and simplicity was the concept of 
power 
There are no ideas which occur in 
metaphysics more obscure and uncertain than 
those of power, force, energy or necessary 
connection, of which it is every moment 
necessary for us to treat in all our 
disquisitions.  We shall therefore endeavor 
in this section to fix, if possible, the 
precise meaning of these terms, and thereby 
to remove some part of that obscurity which 
is so much complained of in this species of 
philosophy.9 
The nihilistic opposites set up the problem of a 
locus of radical simplicity and ambiguity, which the 
philosopher then attempts to break after he has 
already entered this set-up arena of discourse and 
agreed to its parameters.  Such an effort is, by 
definition, futile.  Camus gives a metaphor for it 
in terms of the myth of Sisyphus,10 who pushes the 
rock up the hill only for it to roll down again. The 
result is endless oscillation; for, if the locus of 
intense ambiguity is successfully clarified at one 
point, it merely shifts its locus and one has to 
begin all over again with the task of 
clarification.11  The most intense point of 
ambiguity in this system, which creates illusion, is 
found when one asks where its operational efficacy 
comes from. How are the nihilistic opposites 
connected?  What gives them their power? Where does 
the energy that produces the movement of oscillation 
come from? Notice that Hume wants to fix this 
concept, after its inherent ambiguity has been 
established by the 
system of nihilistic opposition that he has set up, 
and accepted, beforehand.  This setting up of an 
impossible situation and then attempting to perform 
the operation that has been specifically designed to 
be impossible, is a precise definition of the 
movement of those trapped in the form of ideation. 
No wonder Hume never reached the limits of the 
mathematical system, at which the universe of his 
own discourse would have vanished.  He placed an 
insurmountable barrier before his own train of 
thought. 
Hume's basic methodological statement is that 'all 
our ideas are nothing but copies of our impres-
sions', and in this it is possible to see the 
precise nature of the barrier that Hume erected 
before his own train of thought.  This barrier is a 
methodological reduction of everything to the 
sensory, and a denial of the realm of ideas as epi-
phenomenal.  Look at the contrast between Hume's 
statement of belief in the possibility of 'real 
causes', at the beginning of the section on 
probability, and his institution of a methodology 
that makes it expressly impossible to even approach 
knowledge of them, because one is trapped in the 
sensory.  Hume could not have understood Plato's 
devastating refutation in the Theaetetusl2 of the 
proposition that perception is knowledge.  Hume is 
defining himself as what Plato calls the 'man of 
earth',13 who only believes in what he can touch and 
sense.  Simmias in the Phaedo, with his position 
that the soul is harmony, is recognizably patterned 
on this form, which Hume later assumes.  Hume 
expands the definition of his methodology by saying, 
'it is impossible to think of anything which we have 
not antecedently felt, either by external or 
internal senses.'14  If this is so, then because he 
advocates a contradictory position, it would be 
impossible for Hume even to get close to the 
conception of a single source. Applying disconnec-
tion to the level of the senses, and then denying 
any other level, gives pure separation.  Here is a 
plenum of completely unrelated sensory information. 
If this is so, then the world has disappeared!  It 
would be impossible to see anything.  Hume has been 
blinded in the way Socrates feared his physical 
investigations would blind him.  Hume thinks that 
the sensory plenum is clear, but does not realize he 
has looked at too bright a light and has become 
blinded.  He has become blinded to the disconnection 
of the single source.  The progressive reduction of 
Ideas to simple ideas, and finally to sensory 
impressions is seen as a process of the elimination 
of ambiguity.  Ambiguity is replaced by a false 
clarity, which is, in fact, equal to complete 
blindness. 
'These impressions are all strong and 
sensible.  They admit not of ambiguity. 
They are not only placed in a full light 
themselves, but may throw light on their 
correspondent ideas, which lie in 
obscurity.  And by this means, we may, 
perhaps, attain a new microscope or 
species of optics, by which in the moral 
sciences the most minute and most simple 
ideas may be so enlarged as to fall 
readily under our apprehension, and be 
equally known with the grossest and most 
sensible ideas that can be the object of 
our enquiry.15 
Hume mistakes the light of the sensory for the light 
of reason.  When a man looks at the sun and is 
blinded, he sees a bright light that is so intense 
that the forms can no longer be seen.  The result of 
going to the extreme of brightness is the extreme of 
darkness.  As Socrates says, if one has one of a 
pair of opposites, then one must have its opposite 
after it.  The extreme clarity of the sensory realm 
is balanced for Hume in the extreme darkness of the 
disconnected realm of 'real causes'. The single 
source cannot be seen by definition.  The extremes 
of light and darkness obscure it, and cut Hume off 
from it. 
'To be fully acquainted, therefore, with the 
idea of power or necessary connection, let 
us examine its impression with greater 
certainty, let us examine its impression; 
and in order to find the impression with 
greater certainty, let us search for it in 
all the sources from which it may possibly 
be derived.'16 
What appears in Hume as the sources of power are in 
Kant the subject.  Kant, unlike Hume, affirms both 
the sensory and the realm of pure idea, pure reason, 
but places a third thing, the understanding, between 
them.  Thus Hume subtracts from the situation of 
merely defining two opposite domains while Kant adds 
a third to them.  This is another example of their 
advance and delay.  What Hume sees about the sensory 
realm is true, but it is only part of the story. 
'When we look about us toward external 
objects, and consider the operation of 
causes, we are never able, in a single 
instance, to discover any power or necessary 
connection, any quality, which binds the 
effect to the cause and renders the one an 
infallible consequence of the other.  We 
only find that the one does, in actual fact, 
follow the other.  The impulse of one 
billiard ball is attendant on the motion of 
the second.  This is the whole that appears 
to the outward senses. The mind feels no 
sentiment or inward impression from this 
succession of objects: consequently, there 
is not in any single particular instance of 
cause and effect anything which can suggest 
the idea of power or necessary connection. 
From the first appearance of an object, we 
never can conjecture what effect will result 
from it.17 
Hume recognizes what was said by Socrates about the 
qualitative opposites being laid down in a different 
pattern in each moment with respect to the opposites 
cause/effect.  He says that these opposite events 
are conjoined and connected. He also notes that one 
follows the other, so that what is seen is that 
there is here an implicit restatement of the point 
made by Socrates at the beginning of the Phaedo, in 
much more conceptual and much cruder terms.  It is 
important to see that it is essentially the same 
point.  It is not that Hume does not know how the 
opposites work; but that he cannot formulate it 
clearly to himself because the conceptual apparatus 
of ideation gets in the way.  This is primarily 
because of the focus on form and event, rather than 
their qualitative opposites.  It is not that the 
sensory is unimportant.  Rather, it is that the 
primary qualities closely attached to form are what 
Hume means by sensory.  The other sensory qualities 
are ignored, and so their opposites are not taken 
into account. 
'In reality, there is no part of matter 
that does ever, by its sensible qualities, 
discover any power or energy or give us 
ground to imagine that it could produce 
anything or be followed by any other object 
by which we could denominate its effect.  
Solidity, extension, motion: these 
qualities are all-complete in themselves 
and never point out any other event which 
may result from them.  The scenes of the 
universe are continually shifting, and one 
object follows another in an uninterrupted 
succession; but the power or force that 
actuates the whole machine is entirely 
concealed from us, and never discovers 
itself in any of the sensible (primary) 
qualities of the body.18 
All power and energy arises from a single source. 
It is true that the source is not manifest in the 
solidity, extension, and motion of forms per se. 
Instead, the source, in pure disconnection from the 
forms, contains pure connection.  Because it con-
tains pure connection it may be maintained that it 
is everywhere manifest.  Hume focuses on form and 
sees the continual shifting of the objects, instead 
of that shifting of the qualities to which the move-
ment of the objects is a response.  Thus one could 
say that it is exactly the movement of the universe, 
seen as forms bearing the opposite qualities, which 
is the open manifestation of the power or force that 
actuates the whole 'organism' of the universe.  What 
is necessary to see this is the positing, as 
Socrates does, of a realm other than the sensory in 
which the opposite qualities are pure and separated? 
Hume denies such a realm, so that even his apprecia-
tion of the sensory is reduced.  He is stuck with 
forms, and can only see their primary qualities. 
Hume goes on to discuss in detail the relation of 
the body to the soul, and the question of will.  He 
shows that the power that moves the body at the 
command of the soul is equally as mysterious as that 
which connects cause and effect outside in the 
universe.  Although he posits a mystery, Hume has 
some appreciation that whatever the 'power' is, it 
has equal efficacy in the universe and in the inner-
most core of the human being. 
'For, first, is there any principle in all 
nature more mysterious than the union of 
soul with body; by which a supposed 
spiritual substance acquires such an 
influence over a material one, that the 
most refined thought is able to actuate the 
grossest matter.  Were we empowered, by a 
secret wish, to remove mountains, or 
control the planets in their orbit, this 
extensive authority would not be more 
extraordinary, nor more beyond our 
comprehension.19 
It is interesting that Hume speaks here of a union 
of soul and body.  Even the idea that there could be 
such a thing as a soul is totally against his 
doctrine, because he denies the existence of an 
invisible realm in which it could exist.  Unless, 
that is,  he follows Simmias and posits that the 
soul is only harmony.  Next, he says that the union 
between soul and body is what is mysterious.  After 
denying connections in the sensory-formal realm, he 
posits connection in the ideational realm, whose 
existence he denies!  Soul and body are opposites, 
and so, they are disconnected just like all the 
other opposites.  It is not that there is some great 
mystery, but that there is only a single source 
manifested in all existence.  The mystery is why 
Hume doesn't begin his chain of reasoning with this 
single source, instead of positing the impossibility 
of knowing it, then trying to know it, thus 
contradicting himself and bringing about stalemate 
in his argument. 
Hume posits that it is impossible to know the power 
that moves things by cause and effect in the 
universe, that it is impossible to know the power by 
which the volition moves the body, and finally, he 
argues that it is impossible to know what moves 
volition itself.  But this negative statement is 
fruitless without the concomitant affirmation of a 
single source from which this power issues, that is, 
manifest in a) the unfolding of the universe, b) the 
movement of the body, and c) the appearance of 
volition.  The denial suggests so strongly the 
affirmation of the single source.  Saying that there 
is no secondary causation as strongly as Hume has 
done does not render the primary causation a 
mystery, but instead makes its affirmation a neces-
sity.  Hume, in fact, rejects the positive affirma-
tion of a single source by setting up a caricature 
of Berkeley's20 position, which goes to the other 
extreme of assigning all causation to 'God'.  'God' 
in this case is only a theological, conceptual, 
device that lends no greater clarity to the 
argument.  One knows no more by replacing the 
mystery by the word 'God'.  These two positions 
outlined by Hume, are another example of nihilistic 
opposition which produces dialectically related 
flattened-out dichotomies.  Kant calls these the 
'antinomies of pure reason'.  Two perfectly valid 
arguments, starting from opposite premises.  The 
philosophies of Hume and Berkeley are an example of 
two antinomical philosophies.  They are, with regard 
to their central precepts, mirror reflections of one 
another.  Kant's philosophy is designed precisely to 
overcome their mutual implicit cancellation of one 
another.  Hume confronts nihilistic opposition both 
within the way he states his arguments, and also in 
the world, by being in counterpoint within the 
philosophical tradition to the philosophy of 
Berkeley.  Kant confronts this obvious nihilistic 
opposition, which is self-destructive, and attempts 
to remedy it instead of merely accepting it. 
The flattened-out theological concept of 'god' is, 
in fact, just as much a mystery as Hume's mysterious 
unknowable power.  One puts off the question of 
source too far, and the other answers too quickly. 
Within the ideational system 'god' is always a 
convenient conceptual marker for the point where 
thought stops and the thinker decides to close it 
off.  How can any description of God be valid unless 
it were from Him Himself? When a thinker says 'God 
is....' he is putting a limit on Him which is merely 
a reflection of the self of the thinker.  Any des-
cription which contains a genuine attempt to set up 
the correct relation between God and man must, by its 
nature, begin with the affirmation of the principle 
of 'no secondary causation'.  This is because man 
must dismantle the self/ideational-template 
entanglement in order to be able even to begin to 
approach a correct relationship with God.  Other-
wise, man sees only himself in his conception of 
God.  God is reduced to a mere conceptual marker, 
'god', in a philosophical system, showing the limits 
of that system.  Affirmation of a single source is 
the first step of iconoclasm that destroys all the 
idols and demigods, and cutting through the 
nihilistic opposition which would fix a conceptual 
picture of God that has nothing to do with the 
Reality.21 
Having defined his position as dialectically 
opposite that of Berkeley, Hume goes on to restate 
his conclusion. 
'...so that, upon the whole, there appears 
not, throughout all nature, any one instance 
of connection which is conceivable by us.  
All events are entirely loose and separate.  
One event follows another; but we never can 
observe any tie between them.  They seem 
conjoined, but never connected.  And, as we 
have no idea of anything, which never 
appeared to our outward sense or inward 
sentiment, the necessary conclusion seems 
to be that these words are absolutely 
without any meaning, when employed either 
in philosophical reasonings or common 
life.22 
After this statement he goes on to give a positive 
account of what causality actually is, which is a 
habit of the mind to imagine connections when 
presented with regular conjunctions of events.  The 
mind, in this case, is an image of the universe of 
discourse, dependent on the possibility of con-
nection, which is necessary for Hume to work out his 
negative argument.  Ideation projects connections 
between forms where there aren't any, instead of 
grasping with the intellect that everything is 
dependent on a single source.  Hume correctly states 
the illusory nature of the ideational process, which 
is completely wrong in its hypothetical connection 
of the forms to each other.  However, he does not 
see beyond the confrontation of illusory ideational 
connection and sensory disconnection.  Hume does not 
attempt to answer the question posed by the dialec-
tical opposition between his philosophy and 
Berkeley's, but is only interested in taking up a 
position.  His disconnection of all sensory things 
from one another is, itself, more than an ideational 
fantasy because, in order to state it, he had to 
create a connective tissue of ideas in his argument. 
Hume does not do what he says; for if he did, the 
result would have been silence.  As it is, the 
resulting philosophical position is equivalent to 
silence.  Words not coupled with action are merely 
idle chatter, as Rosen says in Nihilism23, and idle 
chatter is equivalent to silence.  This is because 
it silences speech that is to the point and thought 
provoking. 
On the whole, the interest in Hume's philosophy can 
only be limited.  Its significance is that it intro-
duces a disquieting note into the universe of 
discourse of western philosophy, to which there was 
a massive response by those who attempted to find 
reassurance for themselves, that the ideational 
realm was not just a fantasy.  What is interesting 
about this is that Hume severely limits his own 
scepticism,24 and does not connect it to any sources 
in the Greek tradition.  So Hume, by presenting a 
watered-down version of the skeptical position is 
setting up a 'man of straw' for other philosophers 
to refute.  This is what, in fact, the role of the 
skeptic is.  He follows the philosophical dialogue, 
throwing in arguments on either side, just to keep 
it going, which may be refuted by those who take up 
positions in the dialectic.  This makes the 
dialectician's arguments stronger, since they have 
to deal with arguments from non-standard points of 
view.  This is precisely what happened in the  
western philosophical tradition.  The massive 
systems of Kant and Hegel were the response to the 
limited skepticism of Hume.  Kant responded directly 
to Hume's obviously fallacious skeptical argument. 
He extended that argument to the destruction of the 
realm of discourse, which necessarily follows from 
it, when the constraints placed on the argument by 
Hume are lifted.  This is to say that, when the 
principle of disconnection is applied to the 
argument that expounds it, silence must result. That 
silence is the ceasing of the monologue of the self, 
which is matched as a commentary to the events and 
things in the world.  This monologue is the core of 
the process of ideation.  The source of this 
monologue is as mysterious as the mysterious 'power' 
expounded by Hume. 
Kant connects the two mysteries and makes the inner 
monologue the source of the mysterious power that 
moves the universe.  The ultimate point in the 
Critique of Pure Reason is where the Transcendental 
Subject is identified with the Transcendental Object 
by means of transcendental Affinity in the section 
called the Transcendental Deduction.25  It is easy 
to get lost in Kant's system and terminology,26 so 
it is best to have a simple presentation of this 
main point and keep the argument clear.  Transcen-
dental in its simplest definition means beyond 
experience.  Hume contrasts the 'power' as causality 
in the universe to the 'power' acting in the body 
and in the mind.  It is equally mysterious in all 
three places.  It is beyond experience, as Hume 
says, and Kant calls this transcendental.  The 
transcendental subject is this power, as it is mani-
fested in the root of volition.  It is associated 
with the voice of that monologue, coming from out of 
nowhere, with which men identify themselves.  The 
transcendental object is the same power as is mani-
fested in the body and the universe.  Transcendental 
affinity is the matching of the monologue with the 
events that occur in the universe and in the body. 
'There are only two possible ways in which 
synthetic representations and their objects 
can establish connection, obtain necessary 
relation to one another, and, as it were, 
meet one another.  Either the object alone 
must make the representation possible, or 
the representation alone must make the 
object possible.  In the former case, this 
relation is only empirical, and the 
representation is never possible a priori.  
This is true of appearances as regards that 
(element) in them which belongs to 
sensation.  In the latter case, 
representation in itself does not produce 
its object, in so far as its existence is 
concerned, for we are not here speaking of 
its causality by means of will.  None-the-
less, the representation is a priori 
determinant of the object, if it be the 
case that only through the representation 
is it possible to know anything as an 
object.27 
Synthetic representations are the ideational connec-
tions, that Hume denied the possibility of, which 
make the connections between two objects or events, 
such as cause and effect.  Hume effectively showed 
that these connections are nowhere made in experi-
ence.  Thus, the  object is not the source of the 
synthetic representations that occur in the mind. If 
that is the case, then the only other possibility, 
if we are determined to give these 
connections a reality, is to say that the synthetic 
representations (ideational connections) make the 
objects possible.  This means that the world can 
only be seen through the ideational lattice or 
template.  The connections come first and then the 
objects take up their places within the mould of the 
connective relations that are projected on to the 
world, by the ideational process, like a filter for 
sensations.  This is an accurate picture from the 
point of view of those trapped in the life-form of 
ideation.  What is seen in the move from Hume to 
Kant is a fixing of the form of the template of 
ideation.  Hume says that sensory separation is  
real, and ideational connection is illusory.  Kant 
says that sensory separation is filtered beforehand 
by the ideational form, and points out the solidity 
of the filtering device.  Hume cannot really argue, 
because he is trapped in the limits of the 
ideational template himself.  His argument has been 
effectively disarmed. 
Kant does not claim that ideation produces the 
existence of the object, but that it determines its 
form in connection with other objects.  This is 
crucial because it institutes the difference between 
the objects as seen inside and outside the 
ideational template's jurisdiction.  In Kant's 
terminology, this is the difference between 
phenomena and things-in-themselves (das ding an 
sich).  That which he calls 'noumenon', is the pre-
formed mould of the object, projected as a prototype 
beyond the template of ideation's jurisdiction, that 
acts as the filter which brings sensations into the 
template of ideation in a      predigested form.  
This prototypical character of the ideational 
template is what gives it its seeming 
substantiality.  It jumps ahead of the sensations 
into a realm that seems outside experience. Actually 
it is not outside experience, but it is merely 
outside the limits of the self (self-form) of the 
one embroiled in the ideational life-form.  When one 
does not look beyond one's self, then the ideational 
template expands out to mould experience in order to 
cohere with one's own self-obsessions. The voice 
within, which comes from nowhere, acts to filter the 
incoming sensations into a certain pre-set form.  
The monologue which at first appears as an overlay 
to the timing of events comes to select which 
external timings are to be seen, by filtering out 
everything that does not fit the pattern of the 
self-form of the self-obsessed.  Thus the ideational 
template seems to dictate the patterning that 
connects together the objects, even though it does 
not dictate their existence. 
Truly, Kant's philosophy is of limited application 
because it does not consider in the least what the 
objects are like beyond this filtering system, or 
how they come into existence in order to be filtered 
as a secondary process.  Kant's philosophy is an in-
depth look at the realm of artificial temporality 
which the ideational process produces.  The entering 
of sensation as preprogrammed is artificial emer-
gence, and the forms that objects take once inside, 
is the designated reality of nihilistic opposition. 
Kant specifically precludes the consideration of how 
the objects come into existence, by the fact that 
his whole philosophy is an attack on the traditional 
metaphysics which functions  unselfconsciously 
within the form of ideation, thinking that the 
ideational forms are an accurate tool for knowing 
about existence.  'Metaphysica specialis' which Kant 
precludes from philosophy as a pursuit of pure 
reason, concerns the connection of the Soul to the 
World by 'God'.28 The connection of the 
transcendental subject to the transcendental object 
by the transcendental affinity is a transformation 
into terms of the ideational template's outer shell, 
of this rejected path of scholastic metaphysics.  It 
is the ideational template become self-conscious and 
critical of the connections that it posits, tying 
them to sensations.  Thus the distinction is made 
between ideation disconnected from sensations, and 
connected to sensations.  When connected to 
sensations it forms the basis of understanding, 
whereas in isolation it merely produces pure self-
cancelling twin concepts of the ideational template. 
Connection, then, is at the heart of the Kantian 
project, where he attempts to forge a link between 
reason and sensation.  He represents reason clinging 
to sensation, whereas Hume clung to sensation and 
rejected reason as illusory, although he used it to 
state his case. Pre-critical metaphysics applied the 
form of the template of ideation indiscriminately to 
things it could know and to things it could not know 
by sensory experience.  Kant tied metaphysics down 
to only those things that may be sensed.  In a way, 
Kant completed the programme begun by Hume.  Hume 
fastened on to sensory experience as the only means 
to knowledge, rejecting ideation as illusory.  Kant 
followed him, but brought the ideational form, which 
Hume was unselfconsciously using, and attached it 
intimately to the sensory forms, making it the 
source of those forms.  Experience becomes a narra-
tive by a voice-from-nowhere.  However, in doing 
this, Kant says it is impossible to know anything of 
what lies beyond the ideational template's limits. 
The whole philosophical tradition, which has come 
after him, accepted this limitation to the realm of 
discourse set up by ideation.  As the dialectic 
worked itself out within that realm, there has been 
greater and greater specification of the form of the 
ideational process.  Those trapped in it know its 
form, and exhibit it with precision.  They take on 
that form, so that they are saturated by it, and 
exemplify it in everything they say and do.  The 
point is that they do not go beyond it in any way. 
The regimen of it is totalitarian.  The fact that 
the form of the template appears in many different 
manifestations only serves to re-emphasize the 
imprisoning character of the ideational process, 
that Socrates saw so clearly.  The variety of 
appearances of the ideational template's form is 
superficial and not a deep kind of variety.  An 
apple and a pear are different intrinsically.  The 
metaphor for the differences produced by the 
ideational system is an apple painted to look like a 
pear, then a lemon, and then an orange.  The sensory 
forms all look different but the core attributes are 
the same.29  This shows the danger of focusing on 
form, because, if one sees only form, it may be that 
one is seeing the same thing in superficially 
different manifestations.  This is exactly what has 
happened to those in the western tradition.  They 
see the form of the template of ideation manifesting 
itself over and over in different disguises, which 
they do not recognize as being the same. 
The form of the template of ideation is the basis of 
all the technology and institutional forms in the 
western world.30 These outward products of this way 
of thinking embody and exemplify its specific 
structure.  Technological devices and institutions 
are materialized theories.31  When Heidegger speaks 
of the confrontation between man and tech-nology32 
it is the interlinking between the self-form of men 
and the ideational life-form that is being 
indicated.  What man faces in this confrontation is 
a progressively more intense embedding in the 
sensory, which is just the opposite of what Socrates 
indicates is called for in philosophy. Kant's work 
ties men to the sensory even more strongly than 
Hume's.  In Kant, men are tied to the sensory 
through their reason.  They are not led to a 
rejection of it.  Hegel goes even farther and makes 
the Absolute the most concrete level of experi-
ence.33  in effect, he makes the sensory realm 
equivalent to the mysterious power of which Hume 
speaks.  The progressive immersion into the sensory 
is accompanied by desensitization.  Men come to be 
able to see only the things that are pre-filtered 
and predigested for them by the ideational life-
form. They come to the state in which they must rush 
to project the form of ideation in order to be able 
to see anything at all.  This state is the point of 
total immersion in the ideational template, which is 
concomitantly an attachment to, and overloading of, 
sensory stimulation.  It is precisely because of the 
involvement in the ideational template, that 
attention is drawn away from what is happening on 
the sensory level of experience.  The not-paying-
attention to the sensory experience allows an over-
involvement in it to go unchecked.  Contrary to what 
is generally thought, involvement in the ideational 
template disconnects the attention of the intellect 
from the sensory side of experience, and by that 
means unconsciously connects those involved in 
ideation behaviorally and bodily even more securely 
to the sensory.  Thus, the ideational life-form is 
both a way of thinking and a way of acting.  The 
concomitant way of acting leads to a total immersion 
in the sensory which goes unnoticed because of pre-
occupation with the ideas. 
Because the ideational filtering system desensitizes 
by sensory overload and pre-structuring experience, 
thereby setting up the realm of artificial temporal-
ity, which is manifest as an out-of-phaseness to the 
timing of Time itself; because of this difference, 
between artificial and genuine, emergence is set up. 
Artificial emergence is a change in the pre-
structuring of experience by the ideational 
template, whereas genuine emergence is the entrance 
of unpre-structured material into the ideational 
form.  By 
the entrance of non-pre-structured material, a 
connection to genuine timing outside the compass of 
the ideational template is made.  These are known as 
synchronaiety, unforeseen consequences, or even as 
miracles. Desensitization also results in the 
flattening out of experience within the ideational 
template's jurisdiction.  The nihilistic oppositions 
are caricatures of the opposite qualities.  The 
overload of the sensory makes it impossible to see 
the sensory manifestation of the opposite qualities 
clearly.  Only, flattened out, conceptually 
structured images of opposition appear within the 
ideational template's jurisdiction.  This, then, is 
another reversal of what is generally conceived to 
be the case.  The sensory is mediated to the 
desensitized individual through ideas, so that 
instead of tasting the sensory fully, the experience 
of it is blunted by the intervention of the 
ideational template's mediation.  What can be seen 
here is what Plato called the mixture of opposites 
that occur in the delay period -- pleasure and pain, 
laughing and crying — which results in what Kant 
calls in his aesthetic 'the sublime'.  Ideation by 
drawing attention away from the sensory allows an 
undisciplined immersion in sensory experience in 
terms of behavior.  But that overload of sensation 
is mediated to the one who is immersed in 
conceptualization, so that he cannot really taste it 
directly.  The form of ideational mediation of the 
opposite qualities is nihilistic opposition, which 
presents flattened out and conceptually structured 
images of the opposite qualities.  Desensitization 
is the result of the artificial mixture of opposites 
in the delay period.  The principle expounded by 
Socrates that opposites cannot be opposite them-
selves is specifically violated within the delay 
period of differing and deferring as described by 
Derrida-34  In it the opposite qualities are brought 
into conflict artificially by the dialectical form 
of the movement of nihilistic oppositions.  This 
conflict of the opposites is nihilistically opposite 
the pure cancellation of the opposites that occurs 
in pure reason, which Kant describes as happening 
when reason is detached from sensory involvement. 
Look how the embedding of reason, as an a priori 
filter into the sensory, brings about the conflict 
of the nihilistic opposites, and how opposite this 
is the cancellation of the opposites, when reason is 
disengaged from the sensory.  This nihilistic 
opposition which is the root of the Kantian meta-
physic is mediated by what he calls the under-
standing.  The understanding is based on the trans-
cendental subject and object.  The transcendental 
object is what is beyond the flattened-out 
conceptual caricature of the sensory object, to 
which one has been desensitized, and the trans-
cendental subject is beyond the cancellation of the 
nihilistic opposites.  Both are the representations 
of the limits of the delay-period, within which 
nihilistic opposition occurs.  The transcendental 
affinity posits that the two ends of the delay-
period are identical.  The unity of the subject 
appears in the coherent unity of the objects that 
appear to him.  The subject- turned-inside-out is 
the object, as Nietzsche commented on Kant's 
philosophy.35  The delay-period is the 'time' it 
takes for the subject to turn inside out.36 This 
turning-inside-out is a process of separating mixed-
up opposites after having mixed them.  The movement 
from the mixture of opposites in the sensory to the 
cancellation of the opposites in pure reason is an 
example of the creation of an illusion, because the 
opposites need not have been mixed up in the first 
place in order to be re-separated.  Also, the 
concepts of transcendental subject, object and 
affinity are wholly fictitious since they do not 
appear within the delay-period itself, but are 
indeed transcendental with respect to it.  This is 
why the transcendental subject is identified with 
the empirical subject as its substratum that is 
manifested as a voice from nowhere, and the objects 
are seen as images attached to the narrative of that 
voice.  These are all that appear in the delay-
period in actuality, and the transcendental concepts 
are fictions projected to explain these images 
locked into a narrative. 
The movement from mixing opposites to the cancel-
lation of nihilistic opposites is the movement of 
the ideational process itself within its delay-
period.  The delay-period begins by the wavering 
between opposites, and ends with its cancellation. 
Thus we see here not just the static structure of 
the ideational template's form, but also its 
temporal manifestation.  The two are completely 
intertwined.  The key thing is to get a clear 
picture of the ideational template's structure, and 
the dialectical playing out of that structure, in 
order to recognise it in existence.  The form of 
ideation unfolds into existence and collapses back 
again, until it vanishes, just like all the other 
forms in existence, according to the timing of Time. 
It has its own inherent temporality, like all the 
other forms, and it participates in the laying down 
of the pattern of the opposite qualities from moment 
to moment.  The wholeness and naturalness of its 
unfolding and collapse, indicating the single 
source, cannot be appreciated from within the com-
pass of the life-form of ideation.  It is only by 
the advent of genuine emergence, at which the 
ideational template disappears, that this inherent 
connection to the timing of Time may be appreciated 
fully.  This may occur at any time, since the 
structure of the ideational template is completely 
illusory, but it is at the end, when the ideational 
template cancels itself out, that a clear picture is 
most likely to be gained. 
The cancellation of the ideational template at the 
end of the delay-period is different from the 
cancellation of opposites that occurs at certain 
points in the working-out of the dialectical 
movement within the delay-period.  The cancellation 
of the opposite qualities alters the form-content 
(quality converted into information) relation within 
the ideational template.  This cancellation points 
to the principle of 'no secondary causation,' 
because it shows that the opposites cannot in truth 
be mixed, and that the mixture within the delay-
period is illusory.  The cancellation of the 
dialectical structure of the whole ideational 
template points even more strongly to the principle 
of 'no secondary causation.'  The beginning point 
and the end point of the delay-period is the same.37 
By entering the delay-period, the illusion of 
artificial time is produced.  If one had not entered 
the delay-period, then following the timing of Time 
no artificial time would have been 
produced.  There would have been no surplus capital 
to express it in economic terms.38 Just as the 
present economic system, that follows the ideational 
template's form in its structuring, is based on the 
accumulation of a horde of surplus capital for 
investment and lending with interest; so the 
ideational system is itself concerned with the 
production of artificial time.  The 'horde' of 
artificial time is the 'hollow' of the delay-period 
itself.  The opposite of the horde in economic terms 
is the constant circulation of the bartered goods in 
flow.  So the opposite of the 'hollow' of the delay-
period is the timing of Time.  The absence of 
artificial time is a constant indication of the 
single source.  The whole of the horde of artificial 
time points toward its own absence by moving toward, 
in each instant of the specious present, its own 
cancellation.  The movement toward cancellation 
within the delay-period points toward the 
nonexistence of artificial temporality.  When 
artificial temporality does not exist, then the 
single source is indicated by the timing of Time at 
each instant. 
The nonexistence of artificial temporality, affirmed 
before it is entered into, is a stronger indication 
of the principle of 'no secondary causation'.  It 
means that the focus on the level of form cannot 
occur in the first place.  For the cancellation of 
the opposites, which alters the form-content 
relation of the form focused on, to take place, 
there had to be an initial focus on the level of 
form.  If this initial focus had not occurred, then 
the opposites would not have cancelled, but would 
have maintained their intrinsic separation.  The 
movement of the forms would have followed the laying 
down of the pattern of the opposite qualities.  The 
cancellation of the whole of the ideational template 
indicates, however, that this focus on form, which 
makes the cancellation of the opposites occur within 
it, should not have occurred in the first place. The 
affirmation of the illusory nature of artificial 
time is thus an even stronger indication of the 
principle of a single source.  One should not get 
into a position where one can see the cancellation 
of the opposites in the first place.  The strongest 
affirmation of the principle of a single source is 
never to let go of it, so as to see the delay-period 
become manifest.  If one does let go, then the 
intrinsic cancellation of the ideational template 
indicates and reaffirms that principle.  The 
opposites cancel each other out and the whole 
ideational template is therefore cancelled.  Their 
different kinds of cancellation are not equal.  If 
one reaches the cancellation of the whole of the 
ideational template, then there is a stronger 
affirmation of the principle of no secondary 
causation.  This is because the one who sees the 
whole thing disappear, knows not to enter it again. 
Not to enter the dialectic in the first place is the 
heart of the matter.  When it is entered, first 
there is the fixing of form, then follows the 
playing out of the cancellation of opposites, until 
the whole dialectic is worked through and the 
ideational template finally cancels. 
The ideational template's form is not something 
solid such as the visible form of an object. Visible 
forms — shapes of natural and artificially-produced 
objects -- are only one species of form. Ideation is 
primarily a behavioral mode; that is, a certain way 
of doing things.  The form of it resides in what 
might be called the shapes of the actions, produced 
in the one who uses the ideational template to 
negotiate his way through the world.  Actions based 
on the ideational template have a certain coherence, 
and it is this coherence that suggests the structure 
of the form of the template itself. Primarily, this 
coherence comes from the matching of the actions to 
the pattern of internal dialogue which connects them 
into a narrative.  The interfacing of action and 
monologue occurs in a specific way that has 
definable parameters.  It is these parameters that 
are set out in conceptual terms by philosophers such 
as Hume and Kant, and the whole 
tradition that springs from them.  In the ideational 
template's form there are basic disconnections 
between words and actions which occur precisely 
because the words are placed in a narrative form and 
then matched, in timing, to an action sequence.  The 
narrative form and the artificial timing come 
between the word and the action producing the delay-
period.  Because of the ambiguity and wavering 
between alternatives that occurs in the delay-
period, it is likely that what is done will not be 
the same as what is said, or that the description of 
the action will be different from what occurred. 
Therefore, although the ideational template makes 
connections between words and between words and 
actions, its result is actually a disconnection. The 
ideational template itself shows up in the con-
sistent aspects of this real disconnection between 
words and actions, which is a result of the mixing 
of opposites and the production of ambiguity.  Thus 
the form of the template itself is not a visible 
object, but more like a coherent way in which 
actions continually go astray from the original 
intention expressed in words, or how descriptions of 
actions deviate from what occured.39 This 
consistent deviation of actions in the world from 
what is said before and after them has specific 
parameters, these are called the 'form' of the 
ideational template. When this 'form' is consciously 
conceptualized and imposed on life as a template or 
patterning device, and not merely the result of an 
incidental separation between words and actions, 
then it becomes a way of life, a life-form.40  The 
working out of this life-form, in terms of negotiat-
ing one's way through existence, consciously 
applying it in specific situations, may be called 
the 'process' of ideation.  The process of ideation 
means that the experience is being run through the 
filter of the ideational form.  In that process the 
experience is pre-structured.  Seeing the 'structure' 
of the life- form of ideation only occurs when that 
template is used as a processor of experience.  What 
happens when the template is used in this way is 
completely different from what is seen if the form 
of the template itself is looked at on its own. This 
difference is again the difference between form and 
structure.  Form is the parameters that appear in 
the disconnection between words and actions. When 
these parameters are conceptualized and then used to 
process experience by being taken as a guide for 
further words and actions, then the experience 
becomes structured.  This structuring shows the 
interior design of the template of ideation.  All 
this indicates how the template of ideation itself 
unfolds and collapses again, like any natural form. 
This means that it is possible to see that the 
template of ideation has its own temporality — it 
has been given its own timing by Time.  For process, 
structure, and the becoming of unfolding/collapse, 
are all aspects of ideation's manifestation in 
existence; but they too are dependent on the focus 
on form, to be seen.  The formalization of ideation 
itself into a template, which is the result of the 
process of focusing on form, is obviously the 
embedding of form into itself.  The word template 
describes this embedding.41  That is the production 
of a structure.  Thus structure and form imply one 
another.42  Structure is merely the self 
consciousness of the formalization process becoming 
manifest. 
This brings about a consideration of how the 
attempted connection between words and actions, 
which actually produces an intrinsic disconnection, 
'causes' a focus on form to occur.  The opposite of 
ideation is to do what one says as soon as possible, 
and to say what one does as accurately as possible. 
When this is done, then even if one is still 
operating on the basis of the ideational template, 
the delay-period is reduced and the ambiguity is 
ameliorated.  The only way to see one's way toward 
the 'way out' of the ideational template's arena of 
domination is the application of the principle of a 
single source in an iconoclastic manner.  To the one 
ensnared in the ideational life-form there is a 
constant stumbling, interference,43 'sludge,'44 
deviation,45 which is encountered, that puts a drag 
on action.  It is the experience of this phenomenon 
which draws one's attention to form.  The primary 
qualities of form: solidity, mass, extension, are 
all experienced as a result of the-one-whose-action-
is-being-held-up looking to see what is hindering 
him.  Since his action is not cutting through the 
world, his vision goes from his purpose toward what-
is-hindering-the-achievement-of-that-purpose, and at 
that point the focus on form occurs.  This 
interference seems to be a property of the forms 
themselves, when it is not recognized that in fact 
it is a result of the split between words (purposes) 
and actions (results), and a non-recognition of the  
principle of no secondary causation.  The principle 
of a single source negates the concept that the 
interference could be from the forms, because they 
have no causal power.  If that is the case, then it 
must be from one-self, what one does and says.  The 
material world is then a mirroring back of the break 
between words and actions, produced by ideation in 
terms of interference-phenomena.  Instead of 
connection between word and action there should be a 
mutual confirmation.  It is not necessary to 
rationalize actions, neither in the sense of 
justifications, nor in the sense of making them 
systematically based on oral accounts.  Words 
and actions should be independent — not holding on 
to actions with words, nor holding on to words in 
action.  Yet these opposites should confirm and 
support one another, as they alternate in man.  If 
this occurs, then a clear view of the timing of Time 
is possible, wherein the interferences cease to have 
the same effect, because if they manifest them-
selves, then this produces a recognition of the 
single source rather than a reflection of one's 
self. 
The philosophies of Kant and Hume exemplify the same 
movement from form to structure that was witnessed 
in the exposition of the Phaedo given in Chapter 1. 
This is an important episode in the development of 
the western philosophical tradition, because it 
represents the movement in that tradition, from a 
concern with form. to the laying of the ground work 
for a concern with structure.  For although Kant and 
Hegel are still speaking about formal systems they 
are really beginning to explore the structural 
framework underlying the formal system.  This is why 
their philosophies are so much more massive than 
those that went before.  They are proper philo-
sophical systems, in which the structuring of the 
ideas is for the first time as important as what is 
said.  It is the limited introduction of the 
principle of disconnection by Hume that was the 
impetus for this transformation of the- western 
philosophical tradition.  There was a massive 
response defending the template of ideation, a 
limited version of that principle being introduced, 
so that it is easier to see why Socrates was put to 
death for the more vivid introduction of the 
principle in a clearer form in Athens. 
CHAPTER 3 
In Chapters one and two, two exemplifications of the 
movement from the formal to the structural mode of 
apprehending existence have been displayed.  The 
first was at the very beginning of the western 
tradition in its Greek roots.  There the whole of 
what has hitherto been manifested in the western 
tradition was played out in microcosm.  Not only was 
it played out, but those who were involved had a 
better grasp of the subtleties of the phenomenon 
that was appearing within the city state of Athens. 
So much was this the case, that Plato could capture 
the essence of it in a dramatic dialogue such as the 
Phaedo.  The second example was taken from a 
specific turning-point in the western tradition, 
that begins with Descartes and Leibniz in sixteenth-
century Europe.  The transition from Hume-Berkeley 
to Kant-Hegel, which represents dialectically inter-
related moments in the western tradition, displays 
the same movement historically that Plato displayed 
dramatically.  From a purely formalist setting 
because of an even limited involvement with the 
principle of 'no secondary causation', there 
appeared Kant's, and then Hegel's massive philo-
sophical systems.  In Kant's philosophy, the key 
element is the 'architectonic', the structuring of 
the ideas themselves.  Although formalism is still 
the topic being defended, the basis of structuralism 
has been built into the way in which the ideas are 
presented.  In Hegel's philosophy what appears is 
dialectics, which is also used as the device by 
which the ideas are presented, even though the issue 
still seems to be the defense of formalism.  Hegel 
merely takes as his premise the opposite of Kant's 
premises.1  Thus his philosophy is an inversion of 
Kant's, and therefore is tied to it in an essential 
way.  Structure and dialectic are intimately re-
lated.2 The dialectic is a moving structure.3 Hegel 
sets the a priori categories in motion. 
The next two chapters will contain a presentation of 
arguments concerning Nihilism and Emergence respect-
ively.  Both these arguments assume that one is 
immersed in the structural-dialectical system 
already.4  This is, in fact, the situation in which 
we of the western philosophical tradition find 
ourselves.  Kant has set the parameters, within 
which all the other philosophical positions have been 
worked out.  They are all commentaries and means of 
bringing to light the subtleties of the structural 
system that Kant posited; just as the whole of the 
western tradition is, on a wider scale, a footnote 
to Plato as Whitehead has commented.  In these 
terms, the perspective, taken from this point on in 
this essay, is one of being within the life-form 
created by the template of ideation, and looking 
out, trying to see if there is any possibility of 
anything beyond it.  Thus, the perspective is re-
versed from that of the two previous chapters that 
effectively looked at the phenomena from the outside. 
Also, because one is dealing with the structural 
system and its intricacies, the formal element is no 
longer the centre of focus.  In this segment of the 
tradition, structuralism is the sole concern; the 
elements of the formal system have been assumed.5 
Thus, in the process of presenting the arguments 
concerning Nihilism and Emergence, an attempt will 
be made to give an "overview" of the form of the 
structural system and its related ontology.  It is 
here, then, after the setting has been made clear, 
that the actual process of dealing with the struc-
ture of theoretical (or formal) systems in relation 
to emergence/nihilism begins.  The structural-
dialectical system was instituted by the 
philosophies of Kant and Hegel, and has been, step 
by step, unfolding in the development of the western 
tradition up to this point.6  Its form is not 
arbitrary, but is very precise, and has been worked 
out in great detail and intricacy.  It is first 
expressed theoretically, which means in terms of the 
ideational template, and then it is given concrete 
expression in institutions and technology.  Nihilism 
and emergence express the dynamic of the structural-
dialectical system.  Nihilism is the dynamic move-
ment from the inside toward the outside and emer-
gence is the dynamic movement from the outside 
toward the inside.  In the former one begins with 
the nihilistic oppositions that occur within the 
ideational template, and attempts to define the 
possibility of a clear, unambiguous non-nihilistic 
distinction.  In the latter one begins with the 
clear distinction between artificial and genuine 
emergence, and works toward the definition of the 
difference between the timing within the template of 
ideation, and that form's own unfolding as an 
example of genuine emergence.  These two together 
are an example of nihilistic opposition that occurs 
within the ideational template expressed in terms of 
the dynamic of the structural system. 
In this chapter the issue is the argument concerning 
nihilism, the opposite of which will be approached 
in the next chapter.  What is necessary is to set 
the context for the comprehension of the argument, 
and then present the argument itself, followed by 
what is seen of the structural system from the 
perspective it offers.  The argument will be in the 
same form as those presented in the introduction, 
concerning the relation between the principle of 'no 
secondary causation' and the template of ideation. 
That is to say that the argument is itself 
structural, not syllogistically formal.  Kant uses 
the syllogism and the traditional form of logic as 
the source of his architectonic.  Out of that came 
the basis of the structural system.  This is a clear 
indication that structure unfolds from form.7  It is 
this unfolding of structure from form, that is the 
background for understanding the argument concerning 
the nature of nihilism.  Once the structural panoply 
has unfolded, a certain problematic is framed by it, 
which the argument concerning nihilism answers.  
That problem is essentially concerned with the 
nature of the ambiguity created in the delay-period, 
in which form and structure are manifested, and the 
argument concerning nihilism seeks to approach the 
possibility of clear distinctions on the basis of 
understanding the nature of this ambiguity. This 
project is, by necessity, of the same sort as that 
in which we saw Hume engaged in the last chapter.  
Hume accepted an ambiguous simplicity as the 
opposite of complex clarity; and then, having 
accepted the parameters of the definition of this 
problematic, attempted to solve the problem within 
those very terms that defined it 
as impossible to solve.8  In the development of this 
argument, concerning the nature of nihilism, I 
followed,  albeit unwittingly, the same route.  This 
route is necessarily taken by everyone who works 
within the parameters given in the western tradi-
tion.  If you accept the existence of 'problems', 
you must search for 'solutions'.  Problems and 
solutions are like cause and effect:  when you 
disconnect them they disappear as meaningful ways of 
seeing the world.  On the other hand, qualitative 
opposites are only meaningful ways of looking at the 
world as long as they are disconnected. 
The point of going over this problematic and its 
solution is to display, once again, how this self-
defeating system of argumentation 9 works in a 
contemporary context.  We must continually call 
attention to it, so that others may be warned of 
it.10  In the process of exemplifying it, however, 
one gets a view of how the structural system works. 
Thus by going completely down the wrong path 11 one 
learns a great deal.12  The object that this study 
had, when it was begun, was to understand the 
structure of theoretical (formal) systems.  This 
object is achieved in the course of pursuing an 
impossible goal.  By the re-display of this course 
of inquiry a view of the resulting vision of the 
structural system may be gained. 
Nihilisml3 is a term used in a restricted part of 
the western philosophical tradition, and the only 
reason the term is used in relation to the 
definition of emergence, is that those who worked 
with that term 14 gave a very clear picture of the 
phenomenon 15 that the author was trying to under-
stand.  This whole essay stems from the action of 
getting rid of that term.  For, as has been said, 
when the term 'emergence' was substituted for it,16 
the whole argument, which had been designed around 
it, disappeared.  The substitution of the term 
'emergence' for 'nihilism' entailed turning the 
argument upside down,17 and rendering it positive. 
The initial argument and its inverse cancelled each 
other out.18  This is the experience associated with 
what Kant called the antinomies of pure reason. At 
that point there was the option of writing nothing 
19 or attempting to elucidate the experience 
itself.20 This attempt at elucidating the experience 
is necessarily structural21 in outline. However, by 
struggling to indicate the meaning of the principle 
of 'no secondary causation', there is a struggle 
against the passive acceptance of the structural 
mode that asserts itself after the point of 
cancellation has been reached.  The cancellation of 
the structural mode itself will, I hope, allow a 
stronger affirmation of the principle of 'no second-
ary causation.'22  The term 'nihilism' has been 
used by Nietzsche, Heidegger, and more recently by S. 
Rosen in his book by that name.23  It is not 
necessary, however, to use this term.  Nihilistic 
opposition is precisely the same thing as the 
antinomical opposites described by Kant in the 
Critique of Pure Reason.24  More recently, T. Adorno 
has based his entire critique of western 
philosophies, such as Heidegger's, on the 
identification of antinomies.25  This same 
phenomenon appears over and over again in the 
western tradition under different names.  This is 
because it is the root of philosophical experience.  
One either realizes that one is caught in this 
mirroring,26 or one does it unselfconsciously.  The 
oscillation between ideational opposites is the 
basic feature of thought's movement within the 
ideational form.  Thus, the term itself 
is not particularly important,  -- it is the 
experience indicated by that term that counts. While 
studying nihilistic, or antinomic, opposition there 
occurred a cancellation of nihilism, with its 
opposite, which is emergence.  The subject was sub-
jected to topicalization by the topici27  What is 
the relation between thinker and thought in this?2S 
A historical picture of the development of philo-
sophy's appreciation of the phenomenon of nihilism, 
or antinomic opposition, might be apropos, but by 
the rules of philosophical exegesis, historical 
reconstructions do not qualify as a basis for the 
understanding of a phenomenon.29  Therefore, if 
comprehension is the aim, another tack will have to 
be taken.  This is because emergence is the opposite 
of nihilism.  Historical reconstruction pins down 
that which it studies and fixes it into a framework. 
The only framework in ideation is that of antinomic 
opposition.  So, to provide a historical reconstruc-
tion of the dialectic, by which discussion of the 
phenomenon of nihilism (antinomic opposition) mani-
fested itself in the western tradition, would be to 
be nihilistic.  Understanding must be a going-beyond 
historical reconstruction, which would mean the 
breaking of the antinomical framework by the emer-
gence of something new.  The history of the concept 
of nihilism-antinomy is a record of emergences in 
human thought.  It is a dialectical progression. 
Emergence and nihilism are intimately bound one to 
the other.  One cannot separate their topicalization 
from the way one deals with them in speaking about 
them, for they are manifested in that act of speak-
ing.  Historical reconstruction versus dialectical 
understanding,30 nihilism-antinomy versus 
emergence,31 language versus speaking (Merleau-
Ponty)32, dialectic and the dialectic applied to 
itself (Sartre);33 these are all examples of the 
form-to-structure conversion, that is at the centre 
of attention in this essay.  This transformation 
invades the speech about it, so that the only 
alternative is to present a conceptual model of this 
process, which will fix it, and then watch that 
model transform.  That is to say,  if one is to say 
anything comprehensible, one must submit to the 
reification process.  Otherwise, poetry which is a 
complete surrender to ambiguity is the result.34 
Heidegger has already noted the nihilistic 
opposition that holds between thought and poetry in 
his later works.35  This is another example of 
exactly the same antinomic dichotomy.   Endless 
examples of icons of the form-to-structure trans-
formation may be given from the western tradition. 
What is presented here is the terms in which this 
standard phenomenon presented itself to the author. 
The thing to be noticed is that in this paragraph, 
form/structure has been identified with  nihilism/ 
emergence, because nihilism has been taken as a form 
and fixed upon.  The fixation or the fetishism of 
the experience of antinomic opposition is the centre 
of philosophical endeavor. 
The best way to define the nihilism-antinomic 
opposition, without going into the history of the 
conceptualizations about it proposed by the differ-
ent philosophers, is to contrast it to qualitative 
and formal opposition, discussed by Socrates 
in the Phaedo.  This is justifiable because there is 
no assurance that the philosophers in the latter 
part of the western tradition have a clear picture 
of it. In fact, trapped as they are, in the life-
form imposed by the ideational template with no 
reference to anything else — no understanding of 
the opposites, such as that displayed by Plato in 
his dialogues — it is certain that they have no 
comprehension of the nature of the nihilistic 
opposites, because their very expression of them is 
itself unselfconsciously nihilistic. 
The nihilistic opposites are an illusory mediation 
between opposite qualities and opposite things. They 
are an attempt to build a bridge, or connection, 
between the two types of opposites defined by Plato 
in the Phaedo.  Nihilistic opposites are twinned 
conglomerates of opposite qualities.  They are 
structural because they are dependent on a code.36  
First, a set of binary oppositions are marked off as 
a pool of resources.  Then, a subset of qualities 
are selected from this pool and made into a 
conglomerate, all their opposites being made into 
another conglomerate.  These twin conglomerates are 
presented as a pair of opposite things.  For 
instance, the opposite arguments concerning cosmo-
logy called the antinomies of Kant are an example of 
twin conglomerates such as these.37 Or, take the 
example from the previous chapter concerning Hume's 
setting-up of the difference between clear complex-
ity and ambiguous simplicity.  The pool of binary 
oppositions contained the opposites complex/ simple 
and clear/ambiguous.  This was the code, that is the 
definition of the possible bits of information and 
their binary correspondences.  The definition of the 
code specifies the system, because only those 
opposites contained in the code may be used.  Then, 
Hume selects two of these information-bits and pairs 
them in such a way as to produce a "trade-off". 
Clarity is paired with complexity instead of 
simplicity.  In this way, two opposite conglomerates 
are made up of the binary code in which positive-
negative opposites from the pool are mixed together 
in two separate amalgamations that are the reverse 
of one another.  It is quite obvious that this is 
the mechanism by which mixture is produced in the 
delay-period.38  This mechanism might be called 
twinning.39  It produces twin entities as mixtures 
of binary oppositions.40  These twinned entities may 
be presented in many forms, and this process is 
never stated explicitly as being the standard means 
of producing theoretical entities41 — thus there is 
a lot of mystery surrounding what is in effect a 
very simple operation.  One way they are presented 
is as opposite arguments; Kant does this in the 
Critique of Pure Reason. 
The twin conglomerates of coded opposites are a way 
of attempting to connect opposite qualities to 
opposite things.  Remember that opposite qualities 
do not proceed from each other, whereas opposite 
things do.  Thus, the things and the qualities are 
opposites.  There is, then, no connection between 
them.  The qualities appear in the things, but are 
not attached to them except in-as-much as a form has 
a core of specific qualities, which must always be 
seen to remain in the particular form designated. 
The twin conglomerates are a caricature of this 
core.  The caricature is made to stand for the 
thing.  It is neither opposites which must be looked 
at one at a time, rather than in systematized sets; 
nor is it a thing (or form), since the thing itself 
is disconnected from the qualities that, except for 
the thing's core qualities, appear within it, and it 
is essentially disconnected from the opposites of 
its core qualities.  The caricatures of the core 
stand half way between the qualities and the things, 
and it operates as a reduction in-as-much as the 
opposites used in the code are conceptual binary 
oppositions, instead of opposite qualities; and the 
core of the form is being characterized, instead of 
the form itself being copied.  The qualities in the 
core of a form do not coalesce into a conglomerate; 
they are not stuck together in some way.  They are 
independently  attached to the form like the seeds 
in an apple — each has its own encasement by the 
apple core.  Or it is like the orange that is inter-
nally differentiated into sections, with one or more 
seeds to a section.  Socrates, in his description of 
the earth, uses this latter metaphor.  Thus the 
mechanism for producing twinned opposite caricatures 
of entities in connection to their qualities is a 
process of mixture with a very definite outline.  It 
is an attempt at making a mediating theoretical 
device by a reduction to conceptual terms of the 
opposite qualities and things. 
The point about antinomic, nihilistic, or, as they 
may be called 'twinned opposite' conglomerates, is 
that when they are brought together they cancel each 
other out.  Opposite qualities may never be brought 
together, and opposite things produce one another; 
so that the twinned opposites made by 
conceptualization are of a completely different 
nature from the qualities and forms that they are an 
attempt to mediate.  By means of the conceptual 
twins, structure and dialectic are modelled.42  
These models are produced by making even more 
complex conglomerates, so that there are subsets 
within them twinned in more than one way.  This 
patterning of the conglomerate is the structure; and 
when it is set in motion by the process of 
cancellation being carried out, there is 
differential cancellation of 
only part of the conglomerate at a time; so that new 
qualities appear and disappear with each structural 
rotation; this is the means by which the dialectic 
is modeled.  Specifically, the code pool is divided 
into subsets, and a conglomeration is made of the 
subsets before the conglomeration of the individual 
binary opposites.  The internal division of the pool 
of the code is the structure.  This internal 
division may be as complex or simple as one likes. 
When the twins are constructed they then have 
different layers which cancel each other out 
differentially.  Differential cancellation means 
that, when the twins are brought together, only one 
subset can be cancelled at a time.  There is, then, 
a progressively rotating cancellation which only 
cancels part of the twins at a time.  This creates a 
model of the change in the form-content relation, 
which occurs when one of the opposites in a form is 
cancelled by its opposite.  In the Savage Mind Levi-
Strauss specifies this process in terms of what he 
calls the 'totemic operator'.43  The following is a 
simple model of it. 
FIGURE 1 
The structural difference inaugurated in the code 
pool acts like a pivot44 so that when 'A2' cancels 
with 'Bl', 'D3' and 'C4' are held apart and vice 
versa.  In this way different aspects of the twins 
appear at different times.  Such a simple example, 
  
seems trivial but when the structure is sufficiently 
complex, this becomes an important device for 
modeling change. 
Structure in its simplest definition, along the 
lines of this model, is the encoding of differences 
into the code-pool.  Dialectics appear after that as 
the resulting differential cancellation of the 
twins.  That is to say that in canceling, the twins 
must work through the encoded structural 
differences, before complete cancellation can occur. 
The totemic operator must appear in progressive 
stages, and the differences put into the code pool 
must be unraveled, before cancellation may be 
complete.  It takes time for structure to manifest 
itself.45  The time-span of manifestation is the 
delay-period, in which the ambiguity that is the 
result of this mixing process occurs.  The stages of 
progressive differential cancellation are the 
moments of the dialectic.  Structure is the dead 
dialectic.46  It is the reading of the embedded 
differences, which are added to the code in the 
systemic pool, by which time is represented in the 
caricature of form. 
In the Phaedo, the arguments of Simmias and Cebes 
are a picture of the synchronic and diachronic47 
aspects of structural encoding.  The structure in 
the synchronic moment appears to be an in built 
harmony among the parts,  while diachronically it 
appears as something that lasts through the dialect-
ical phases of cancellation, until the whole mixture 
of the totemic operator has been unearthed and the 
twins are completely cancelled.  These are the two 
possible views of structure.  In the dialectical 
moment it is an inbuilt harmony between the parts of 
the canceling twins that is apparent, but which 
disappears when the next phase of cancellation 
occurs.  The harmonic aspect of structure is like an 
incomplete sketch of the structure itself, which is 
only wholly seen at the end of the delay-period when 
the whole dialectic has been worked out.  Simmias' 
and Cebes' arguments are nihilistically opposite, 
and what they give a model of is antinomic opposi-
tion itself.  Thus, they completely embody the 
nihilistic point of view.  The point is that nihil-
ism has welled up inside them; they are the twinned 
images that cancel each other out, unknown to them-
selves.  All this may seem trivial from the point of 
view of the modeling of structural emergence.  But, 
when one begins from the point of view of the one 
who is only given structurally encoded, twinned, 
images within a delay-period, which is emerging 
according to an unknown pattern, in which one is 
one's self embodying and exemplifying part of the 
movement of that dialectic,  then it is, from this 
interior perspective, where one is immersed in the 
unfolding ideational template, difficult to see the 
simple pattern behind complexly orchestrated events. 
The structuring is merely a way of making it appear 
within the double mirroring48 of the cancellation, 
as if there were something there when there is, in 
fact, nothing.  In other words, the cancellation is 
in effect from the first, and the delay-period 
merely puts off the discovery that, in fact, there 
is nothing of any substance to either form or 
structure.  When one is trapped in the template of 
ideation, whatever one does will exemplify that 
template.  In that state, where the template of 
ideation is emerging in one's self and in those with 
whom one is interacting. It is almost impossible to 
get any view-point from which the structuring 
principle, no matter how simple, may be seen.  It is 
difficult to imagine how the preliminary structuring 
by ideation takes place.  One experiences one's self 
as already immersed in the delay-period, so that 
there doesn't seem to be anytime when the mixture 
one is participating in has taken place.  The point 
is that the mixture occurs instantaneously at the 
point at which one enters the delay-period by 
focusing on form.49 This is how the prototypical 
projection of the ideational template a priori — 
before experience — works.  The opposite of the 
delay-period is the no-time of the projection of 
pre-structuring.  It is this that makes the 
beginning and the end of the delay-period the 
same.50  And it is the sameness of its beginning and 
its end that points to the principle of 'no secondary 
causation'. If the beginning and the end are the 
same, (i.e., if when you enter the delay-period you 
only end up where you started), then the question is 
why enter it in the first place? 
The word 'nihilism' designates the debilitating 
effects of continually entering these pre-structured 
delay-periods.  'Antinomy' designates the twinned 
images that, appearing within the ideational 
template, are presented as arguments.  Socrates 
refers to the phenomenon, which these words 
designate as 'mislogic'.  In a digression, a delay-
period within the delay-period of the trial, which 
is in the delay-period of the stay-of-execution, 
Socrates explains what he means by mislogic; and 
this is the best definition of the phenomenon that 
is under consideration here that maybe obtained, if 
we are determined to avoid the perpetually 
transforming definitions of the philosophers, who 
exemplify nihilism themselves. 
'However, you have led me into a 
digression.  The resemblance between 
arguments and human beings lies not in 
what I said just now, but in what I said 
before, that, when one believes that an 
argument is true, without reference to the 
same thing happens again and again — you 
know how it is, especially with those who 
spend their time arguing both sides (i.e. 
the  skeptics) — they end by believing that 
they are wiser than anyone else, because 
they alone have discovered that there is 
nothing stable or dependable either in facts 
or in arguments, and that everything 
fluctuates just like water in a tidal 
channel, and never stays at any point at any 
time. 
That is perfectly true. 
Well, then, Phaedo, he said, supposing that 
there is an argument which is true and valid 
and capable of being discovered, if any one 
nevertheless, through his experience of 
these arguments, which seem to the same 
people to be sometimes true and sometimes 
false, attached no responsibility to himself 
and his lack of technical ability, but was 
finally content, in exasperation, to shift 
the blame from himself to the arguments, and 
to spend the rest of his life loathing and 
decrying them, and so missed the chance of 
knowing the truth about reality — would it 
not be a deplorable thing?51  (90b-d, 
Phaedo, Authors insert) 
Socrates' definition of the phenomenon of nihilism, 
in which antinomical oppositions of structured twins 
are continuously produced, goes directly to the root 
of the phenomenon and that is oscillation, or waver-
ing.  But it is not just wavering once or twice, but 
a continual repetition of wavering until one doesn't 
know any more what is correct and what isn't.  By 
this process, human beings take on the character of 
arguments.  That is to say human beings are imprint-
ed with the ideational template, when, through 
wavering, they become receptive to the mirroring 
which occurs in pure reason, or, as it is here 
expressed, 'logic'.  By oscillating between the 
twinned images, that appear in the mirroring, one 
takes that mirroring in, and embodies it in a 
fundamental way. 
The one who is caught in this situation finds the 
alternation of the opposites in him to be like the 
fluctuation of water in a tidal channel.  The onto-
logical mould is like the shallow tidal channel 
which focuses on the action of the waves.  The 
dissipation of the waves in the channel is analogous 
to the transformation of the alternating opposites 
into the nihilistic background.  By the wave 
form rebounding off the end of the tidal 
channel and re-crossing itself, the energy 
is dissipated into a choppy perturbation, whose form 
is broken.  The only access to the ideational 
template is, in this analogy, through the phenomenon 
of the solitary waves,52 which do not 
dissipate and rebound from the wall of the channel 
without losing their shape.  The ideational template 
is the origin of all the wave-formations, all the 
oscillations between antinomic opposites, but its 
own differentiation can only be seen in certain 
specific kinds of waves, which appear as quanta.  
The specific quality of solitary waves is that they 
do not dissipate — entropy or nihilism does not 
effect 
 
them in the same way as other wave formations.  It 
is this non-dissipation which points to a harmonic 
patterning device, that lies behind the phenomenon 
of waves.  This phenomenon, like that of the 
solitary waves, is only seen in the tidal channel, -
- not on the open ocean.  The rebound of the waves 
that causes dissipation to increase is precisely the 
addition of the delay-period.  It comes from the 
focusing on the alternation of the opposite quali-
ties into the narrow ontological mould.  The point 
is that this instability, when taken in, makes the 
whole world seem to be in flux.  As a response, the 
framework of the twins is manufactured in order to 
have something to hang on to.  For, as the oscil-
lation occurs, one may switch from one twin to the 
other.  The only problem occurs when the twins are 
brought together, because then they cancel each 
other out.  So, structuring is a 'ploy' that delays 
this cancellation.  Thus, the antinomical opposite 
conglomerates are produced as a further focusing on 
the fluctuation within the ontological mould -- a 
solidification of it into an artificial form, as it 
were. 
It is when man shifts responsibility for this state 
of affairs outside himself, that the imprinting of 
the ideational template is complete.  Nihilism is 
'lostness' in the resulting confusion which is ever 
increasing for those imprinted by the ideational 
template.  First, man begins to waver, then the 
oscillation becomes continuous, and man becomes 
attached to it as a form by actually arguing on both 
sides.  After that, he finds that everything 
exemplifies his own oscillation, and then he shifts 
responsibility for the instability that appears to 
him to be outside himself.  The oscillation of the 
rebounding wave-forms turns into erratic perturba-
tions.  These are the stages of the unfolding of the 
ideational template, for the oscillation must occur 
by rebound, and for that rebound there must be a 
narrowing obsession with form within the ontological 
mould.  The existence of the oscillation implies the 
projection of an a priori patterning device, which 
produces the waves of the alternation of the 
opposite qualities, that are transformed into a re-
bounding oscillation, that then dissipates into per-
turbations of nihilism.  It is as if each wave that 
hit the shore had a different quality all its own. 
When the tide is in, then certain qualities appear, 
and when the tide goes out, their opposites come in 
with the waves.   On the other hand, when the onto-
logical mould is posited like the construction of a 
tidal channel, the different qualities of each wave 
are forgotten, and the waves are merely seen as the 
transference of mechanical energy.  The unique 
qualities of the waves are no longer seen.  The 
a priori positing of the template of ideation is 
instantaneous, and it joins by structuring the 
beginning to the end, so that the delay-period is 
artificially unified.  It is only seen in the 
appearance of certain kinds of waves — an analogy 
with solitary waves.  That unification of beginning 
and end is the synchronization of speech to event. 
This is what is meant by arguments resembling 
people.  Human beings are reduced by this process to 
caricatures, to speeches that are twinned arguments. 
The grammatical structure of language is imprinted 
on them, and their lives become entrapped in a 
narration from a disembodied voice; they become 
fictional characters playing out a drama within an 
artificial time-span. 
Socrates contrasts with this the possibility of an 
'argument which is true, valid and capable of being 
discovered'.  The possibility of such an argument, 
from the point of view of the one entrapped in pre-
structuring by the template of ideation, means that 
there is a possibility of release from the prison. 
But note that Socrates says that this means of 
release is itself an argument.  This means that the 
release may only be envisaged by the one entrapped 
in terms of the form of the prison itself.53 Thus, 
where nihilism, as complete 'lostness' in 
ambiguity, which is ever-increasing, exists, then 
one conceives of a non-nihilistic, clear distinc-
tion, that cuts through the wavering once and for 
all.  This is Hume's impossible project all over 
again.  Since the solution is formed in terms of a 
problematic, then it can only be the antinomical 
opposite of that problematic.  Thus, instead of 
freedom, there is an unfolding of one antinomic twin 
from another, which is a caricature of the things 
giving rise to their opposites.  This is dialectical 
movement.  Structure is embodied instantaneously, 
and then it is given time to unfold.  What is seen 
is that the time of the unfoldinq of structure is 
precisely the time in which the next structure, 
after the culmination of the present dialectical 
phase, is encoded.  The manipulation of content in 
one phase of dialectical unfolding is the embedding 
of structure on to the code-pool for the next phase 
of unfoldinq, which will occur.  The 
instantaneousness of positing the structure depends 
on not noticing that anticipation is antinomically 
opposite delay, and that for every delay-period 
there must be a period of anticipation. In the 
period of anticipation the structure of the delay-
period is laid down. Thus, it appears as if it were 
instantaneously posited.  However, the a priori 
exists in the simultaneous positing of the periods 
of anticipation and delay, because their connection 
through artificial time is not in the same time. It 
is an 
instantaneous connection.54  The instantaneous 
connection is no connection -- it is a direct 
mirroring. The step outside the ideational template 
cannot be conceived of in terms of that template.  
The only option is for the possibility to be 
proposed as the possibility of a clear distinction, 
or a true argument, in the context of nihilism, 
which is the same as an antinomic oscillation gone 
wild, or in the context of the invalidity of all 
arguments that contradict one another. 
'Very well,' he said, 'that is the first 
thing that we must guard against.  We must 
not let it enter our minds that there may 
be no validity in argument.  On the 
contrary, we should recognize that we 
ourselves are still intellectual invalids, 
but that we must brace ourselves and do 
our best to become healthy -- you and the 
others partly with a view to the rest of 
your lives, but I directly in view of my 
death, because at the moment I am in danger 
of regarding it not philosophically but 
self-assertively.' (90e)55 
The approach to intellectual health by the produc-
tion of an argument, that cuts through the very 
mechanism that makes all arguments invalid, is 
exactly the taking on of Hume's impossible task. 
Socrates took this on in the face of death and 
staked his fate on it.  Immediately, in the face of 
nihilism, Socrates appealed to the principle of 'no 
secondary causation'.  This task is that of cutting 
through the structure that underlies nihilistic 
opposition.  Thus, the difference between Socrates 
and Hume is that, where Hume tries to solve the 
problem set up in terms of ideation itself, Socrates 
appealed to the opposite of the ideational template, 
which is complete disconnection. Still. Socrates 
produces an argument, instead of merely invoking the 
principle of 'no secondary causation' and leaving it 
at that.  He therefore went into a structural phase, 
which displayed what was hidden in the nihilistic 
opposition, and caused his own argument to become 
structured.  What is seen here is how the self-form 
interlocks with the template of ideation.  Nihilism 
appears to Socrates in response to his argument 
concerning reincarnation.  Socrates responds, and by 
that displays what is hidden in the nihilistic 
opposition that confronts him, but in so doing his 
own argument becomes more solid and structured.  The 
self, in responding to nihilism, becomes enmeshed in 
it, just as in transferring responsibility from the 
self to the arguments, the self becomes imprinted 
with them.  Both to attack and to give up are 
antinomical responses.  What Socrates says is that 
one is trapped in it either way, but that it is 
best to struggle in that situation.  For then it is 
possible that, with help from the outside, one may 
work through the dilemma and become free of it.56 
The self-form may either be passively imprinted by 
the ideational template, and thereby connected to 
it, or there can be struggle against that imprint-
ing, in which it will emerge as an unfolding of the 
structuring of the self.  The imprinting of the 
ideational template on the self, when it is in a 
passive state, manifests itself in words and 
actions, once the self begins to struggle against 
the imprinting process with help from outside the 
ideational template through the appeal to its 
opposite — i.e. the principle of 'no secondary 
causation'.  Precisely the opposite of this struggle 
against imprinting occurs in the politic of the use 
of the ideational template in order to establish the 
structure which is imprinted in the self-form 
indelibly.  This is that the imprinted individual is 
moved to a free space, in which he is given room for 
the imprinted structure to manifest itself.  Sensory 
deprivation is an effective means of eliciting 
hallucinations from a person who is immersed in a 
culture based on sensory overload.  On the same 
principle, if a person who has been programmed by a 
systematic introduction to the ideational template 
is put into a free space, then the structuring 
underlying that programming will manifest itself in 
the development of his self-form in that situation. 
The selective allocation of individuals to free 
closed-spaces is a means of impregnating specific 
individuals with the capacity to structure.  To 
struggle within the imprinting situation is to move 
in the opposite direction from this free space; but 
it has the same effect — i.e. structure manifests 
itself in the self-form of the individual. To move 
in this direction opposite to the free space, and to 
invoke the opposite of the ideational template, 
turns the programmed individual into an iconoclast 
of the first order.  He is not merely a revolu-
tionary, who in opposing the established order still 
uses the basic ideational format, which is used by 
all the different contenders for political power. 
Instead he has broken with the system at the root of 
its formation. 
Socrates sets up the antinomic opposites of 
approaching death philosophically (passively) or 
self-assertively.   He further defines self-
assertion as the act of trying to convince one-self 
rather than an audience.   Thus, he is defining a 
situation in which the self is struggling against 
itself.   The struggle against imprinting must be 
waged against one-self.   In that case, as the 
structure manifests from the self-form, one has hold 
of it, instead of it having dominance over one, as it 
does if the structure manifests itself in the free 
space which is institutionally provided to elicit 
the same effect.  Also, it is indicated that the 
true and valid argument must be one in which one 
has 'the strongest possible conviction, in one's 
self. This means that the possibility of freedom 
from the ideational template lies within the self-
form's struggle against itself.  So, Socrates 
regards his refutation of Simmias' and Cebes' 
arguments as a struggle against himself.  This means 
that he regards the nihilism of their twin arguments 
as arising from himself -- not from them.  He has 
not given up responsibility for the nihilism of 
their twin arguments, but on the contrary, has taken 
responsibility for them, and has, in refuting them, 
taken action against the structuring which has 
appeared in the delay-period, forced on him by the 
stay of his execution. The key to this is to note 
that, in this delay-period, Socrates began to 
practice an art for the first time, other than the 
philosophical art — i.e. lyrical poetry.  The 
practice of this art led to his inventing the fable 
to rival Aesop with which the dialogue began.  By 
means of this art the imprinted structuring within 
Socrates himself began to manifest itself based on 
the wavering of his resolution that his dream meant 
to practice philosophy rather than a specific art. 
When this view of the dialogue is taken, it becomes 
a documentation of the struggle of a man against his 
self, and the nihilism coming from within him, that 
it presents him with.  It is a struggle to the death 
between him and his daemon57 — the voice from no- 
where in the dream. 
This is how Socrates defines the phenomenon of 
nihilism, or antinomic opposition, in simple human 
terms.  Quite straightforwardly, it derives from the 
connection between two different sorts of cognitive 
method.  One cognitive approach is an oscillation 
between two points, and the other is a circling of a 
single point.  These are the basic approaches open 
to man, by which he can know existence, other than 
his being the point circled or one of the end points 
of the oscillation.  Oscillation is the basic 
movement from one thing to another, while circling 
is a staying with, by moving around, the same thing.  
These two approaches might be called Transcendence 
and Sameness.58  These are disconnected opposite 
modes of cognition which are connected to produce 
the ideational form.  In the ideational form an 
oscillation between images is placed within a 
circling, the image of which is a delay-period, in 
which the beginning and the end are the same.  It is 
structure in the ideational form which is used to 
connect these two modes of cognition.  By structural 
coding the beginning and end of the delay-period are 
made the same, and the structure is coded into the 
twin images that are oscillated between within that 
delay-period. Structure is a means of building an 
illusory bridge 
between these two quite separate modes of cognition. 
These two methods are comparison and reiteration, or 
information about sensory opposites and recognition 
of meaning by indication of non-conceptual oneness, 
and they alternate in man as a means of comprehend-
ing existence.  When he tries to mix them, the 
ideational life-form is the result.  They become 
reduced to the two motifs that underlie all philo-
sophy, which in the western tradition pushes Trans-
cendence forward, and bases it on a hidden Sameness. 
The point moved 'from' and the point moved 'to' are 
surreptitiously connected by another, hidden route; 
the structure is an example of this hidden passage, 
which is coded into that which is presented.  In 
this way, the two cognitive modes are mixed in order 
to produce a ploy.  The ruse is of the form: how can 
you get from 'point A' within a sphere to 'point B' 
outside a sphere without crossing the boundary of 
the sphere?  It is a ruse because the one offering 
the dilemma has already set up a higher dimensional 
passage from A to B for himself, by invoking the 
other cognitive mode, without accounting for it to 
those to whom he has posed the problematic or trans-
cendence.59  Look at Kant's connection of trans-
cendental subject to object.  Their 
transcendentality already suggests that they are 
connected by another route which, by definition, 
those within the ideational form have no access to.  
And so it is 
that Kant bases his whole system on the distinction 
between infinitude and finitude.  Infinitude is 
taken from the calculus of Newton, so that it is 
seen that the Kantian philosophy is a casuistry for 
classical physics.  Already the connection by same-
ness has been specifically precluded by relegating 
'metaphysica specialis' to pure reason.  Yet since 
the subject and object in question are 'transcend-
ental', they are therefore already in that very 
realm where the precluded cognitive approach 
applies.  This surreptitious connection, between 
subject (A) and object (B) provides the basis for an 
overt, presented connection between them — i.e. 
transcendental affinity.  The surreptitious and 
overt connections form an antinomic pair.  It is all 
based on mixing the two cognitive modes, turning 
them into philosophical motifs that are mutually 
interdependent, and making possible the positing of 
illusory connections.  This is, of course, a severe 
reduction in the value of both these cognitive 
modes.60  Their mixture produces nothing but 
ambiguity.  It is out of this ambiguity that 
structure arises. 
Consider the simple model of a grid of distinctions 
being laid over a landscape.61  In the Introduction, 
the landscape was designated 'Time'.  It was said 
that different distinctions could be 
applied to this landscape and that, by each of them, 
different features would be highlighted.62  It was 
also stated that if these different distinctions 
were connected, a system would be produced.  Con-
sider the code pool, a set of mutually-related 
distinctions, from which a formal system may be 
built and into which structure may be coded.  In 
this grid- landscape model, ambiguity may appear in 
two places. It may appear in the closed-space 
between the grid and the landscape, or it may appear 
at a point of intersection of the grid and the 
landscape.63  If it appears between the grid and the 
landscape, its form will be a constant shifting or 
wavering of the distinctions, either in relation to 
each other, or of the whole set in relation to the 
landscape.  If it appears as a point of intersection 
between grid and landscape, then an actual locus of 
paradox or contradiction is produced.  The point is 
that the actual space between the grid and the 
landscape has the quality of producing ambiguity and 
optical illusion.64 Heidegger defines this 
difference in terms of two different concepts of 
Being:  an Atemporal Being,  which is pure presence, 
and Temporalized Being, which is a mixture of 
presence and absence.65  It is out of this special 
space between the mathematically clear net of dis-
tinctions and the shifting landscape that structure 
appears.66  It appears as a means of connecting 
form and content (here content refers to what 
appears within the grid from the landscape).  It 
basically involves constructing a second finer grid, 
called the code, from which the contents of the form 
are selected.  Thus, the contents of the forms are 
no longer qualities, but instead are 'micro-forms'. 
Complete disconnection from qualities has taken 
place within the ideational template.  The embedding 
of form into form is structure.  Structure is the 
bridge between form and micro-form which attempts to 
eliminate the ambiguity that still persists in the 
shifting of the two grids in relation to each other. 
The two grids are the twin images of each other that 
progressively cancel each other out, and their 
cancellation is delayed by the encoded structure. 
Between the two images lies the line of cancella-
tion, that is the boundary which by definition 
cannot be crossed, but is nevertheless surrepti-
tiously crossed by the one who puts forward the ruse 
— the sophist.  He is the one who acts differently 
from what he says.  It is in approaching the 
crossing of this line that ambiguity is produced. 
The more closely one approaches it, the more intense 
the ambiguity.  Structure is the transformation that 
specifies the two end points' relation to one 
another. Structure is encoded into the form of the 
twin on this side of the line of cancellation, so 
that one may transform that twin into its nihilistic 
opposite, without having to cross the boundary at 
all.  So the secret passage may be seen instead, as 
the positing of a necessity to cross the boundary 
when it is not really necessary. 
Once structure appears it begins to transform it-
self.  For this a new kind of Being is necessary, a 
new ambiguous space is opened up, in which the 
transformation-of-the-transformations takes place. 
As Sartre says, the dialectic must itself be 
dialectically transforming.67  Adorno calls this the 
negative dialectic,68 and Merleau-Ponty glimpses it 
in his re-writing of Being and Time under the title 
Phenomenology of Perception, where he calls this new 
third modality 'the recoil of Being-in-the-World'.69  
Later, in the Visible and the Invisible70 Merleau-
Ponty calls this third kind of Being, that is 
different from pure presence and the mixture of 
presence and absence, 'Hyper-Being' which he 
contrasts to yet a fourth kind of Being which he 
calls 'Wild Being'.  Structure unfolds in a series 
of transformations.  This unfolding circles around a 
point that is outside the whole system, based on the 
preconceptions, like ontological monism, with which 
the system began its unfolding.  This ideal of a 
kind of Being beyond our presuppositions is what 
Merleau-Ponty calls Wild Being.  However, 
conceiving a state beyond presuppositions depends on 
the working out of the implications of 
presuppositions in the first place.  All this is 
merely a re-statement of Hume's impossible project 
at a higher level of sophistication, as it is worked 
out in the dialectical unfolding of contemporary 
philosophical debate.  The four kinds of Being71 
form a circular system, which cannot be broken out 
of as long as one accepts the terms in which it is 
posed.  The whole problem becomes the differences 
and similarities between these different specified 
sorts of Being. The idea of having different kinds 
of Being is itself a paradox; ultimately one is 
returned to the connection between Sameness and 
Transcendence that they represent. 
This brief overview of the development of Hume's 
impossible project of unifying the antinomic 
opposites without their cancellation in terms of the 
contemporary philosophical scene, where it is played 
out on a grand scale, has been necessary, in order 
to show up clearly the problematic posed by anti-
nomic opposites and the nihilistic situation that 
results. What is shown is that, opposite to, and 
underlying, structural systematics is a complete 
ontology.  Ontology defines the nature of the 
differentially ambiguous spaces, in which form is 
posited, structure arises, and then unfolds, and 
finally the collapse of these spaces into one 
thought-provoking matter.  The definition of the 
progression of differentially ambiguous spaces is 
analogous to the encodinq of delay by means of 
structure.  Ontology and structural systematics are 
mutually dependent, and are, in fact, twinned 
antinomic opposites.  In contemporary philosophy 
nihilism is embodied, not just by two men putting 
forth opposite arguments,72 but by four or five 
interlocked arguments presented by several 
philosophers.73  The point is that in the end, the 
whole dialectical progression is seen, as in the 
case of the definition of the different types of 
Being, to collapse and cancel itself out at the end 
of the playing out of the dialectic.74  Thus it is 
seen again that opposite the pair structural 
systematics/ ontology is set up what may be called 
conceptual oneness. 
Conceptual oneness is the embedding of Infinitude, 
interpreted as 'interpenetration', rather than God, 
as Kant did, into finitude. Interpenetration, 
popularized by Zen Buddhist enthusiasts in the west, 
is a way of conceptualizing Oneness, as appearing 
within form without destroying form.  Each form is 
said to reflect every other form in the universe. 
Interpenetration is the identification of Form with 
No-form by reason.  This is completely different to 
the experience of the Zen Buddhists themselves, 
without which conceptual Oneness becomes meaningless 
speculation based on someone else's experience. This 
embedding of Infinitude into finitude may be 
modeled, using the paradigm from mathematics of 
higher dimensionality, which is bounded by zero and 
'n' dimensionality.  'N' dimensionality is 
interpreted as the internal coherence of zero 
dimensionality and zero dimensionality is 
interpreted as the external coherence of 'n' 
dimensionality.  By this interpretation a model of 
interpenetration is constructed conceptually. 
Conceptual oneness is the idealized model of this 
collapse of the four states of Being, and is posited 
as a state of affairs simultaneous with the differ-
entiations projected by structural systematics and 
ontology.75 One could say that conceptual oneness 
is the ultimate landscape for the double grid of 
structural systematics and ontology.  Conceptual 
oneness is that which ideation posits as lying 
beyond the precincts of the ideational template.76 
It is the instantaneousness of the connection 
between advance and delay.77 Conceptual oneness is 
the opposite of the ideal of merging the opposites 
without cancellation. It is the seeing of 
cancellation (Infinitude) simultaneously mixed with 
the state of non-cancellation (finitude).  The 
ideational template is bent on the mixture of 
opposites to the end.  The illusory connections it 
posits are based on this.  Notice that cancellation/ 
production-of-antinomic-opposites and the ideal of 
merger-of-the-twins-without-cancellation/conceptual 
oneness makes an interlocking conceptual grid, 
analogous to the differentiation of the four kinds 
of being.  Thus the same phenomenon occurs to the 
description78 as occurred to the described.79 It 
vanishes.80  The point is to let go of it.81 
The argument concerning the nature of nihilism, and 
its relation to the possibility of a clear distinc-
tion, is posed in this context.  The idea of the 
argument is merely to point out the positive aspects 
of this phenomenon of nihilism, that seems to be 
negative from the perspective of the one entrapped 
in the template of ideation.  The argument in its 
most simple statement has the following outline: 
1. There is nihilismS2 -- antinomic 
opposition 83 and its consequences.84 
2. Nihilism has systematic features85 that 
show that it has a coherent essence.86 
 
3. Systematics87 and ontology 88 together 
indicate conceptual oneness,89 and these 
together further indicate the possibility 
of; the non-nihilistic distinction.90 
4. The non-nihilistic distinction is the 
homeopathic-like 'potency' 91 of the 
antinomic opposites.92 
This argument comes from looking positively at a 
negative phenomenon.  The destructive effects that 
stem from the imposition of the ideational template 
on existence are everywhere manifest.93  They are 
myriad critiques of the state of the world as a 
result of the imposition of the ideational template 
by means of institutions and technology. There are 
all true!  The affair that the human species is 
engaged in fills one with awe.  But look how man's 
self-destruction, genocide, and the destruction of 
the planet all stem from his being caught up in a 
conceptual life-form which is completely without 
substance,94 that is completely illusory.  All these 
terrible effects occur because man looks at 
existence in a way that is fundamentally wrong. 
However, to appreciate the meaning of this error, it 
is necessary to look at the phenomenon of the nihil-
istic effects of the application of the ideational 
template to existence in a positive light.  Thus it 
is necessary simply to accept the appearance of 
nihilism in existence.  Those who present their 
critiques of the state of the world, or their 
analyses of the phenomenon of nihilism do not accept 
its manifestation in the world.  They have no solu-
tions, which will not make things worse, because 
they too are based on the ideational template; and 
they do not accept the world as it appears to them 
95 They are lost in an ambiguous position, 
somewhere in between, which is precisely the point. 
Nihilism to them is an incoherent phenomenon that is 
somehow endemic to man's character, and is 
antinomically opposed to reason.  Rosen presents 
this position very distinctly in his book 
Nihilism.96 
Once the phenomenon of nihilism has been accepted, 
then its coherence begins to appear.  It has, when 
looked at in a broad perspective, systematic 
features that point to the fact that it has, after 
all, a coherent essence.  Heidegger, despite the 
inherent nihilism of his own position, as pointed 
out by Rosen97 and Adorno,98 who themselves embody 
nihilism fully, recognized this coherence of the 
phenomenon of nihilism, which he noted in his letter 
The Question of Being.99 The question then becomes: 
What is the meaning of the coherent essence of the 
phenomenon of nihilism, that appears when the 
phenomenon is accepted, but which does not appear 
when it is not accepted? This is another way of 
approaching the question of the relation between the 
template of ideation and its nihilistic effects, 
which appear when it is applied to existence. 
Ideation is a way of seeing the world.  As such, it 
is a means of rendering visible.  The application of 
the grid to the landscape is made in order to see 
the landscape.  The coherence of the phenomenon of 
nihilism appears in the way it renders things vis-
ible.  By the application of an artificial device 
for looking at the world, the world is affected. 
This is Heisenberg's famous principle.100  Instru-
mentation effects measurement in a way that produces 
ambiguity.  The effect does not come from the obser-
ver, but from the observer's insistence on observa-
tion through a mediating device.  The instrument is 
the concretization of the delay period.  It distorts 
experience.  The disturbance in the thing under 
observation is part of the process of observation — 
without it the thing would remain invisible. Thus, 
nihilism's appearance in existence is just   like 
that -- it is the effect on existence of the lens of 
ideation and nothing more.  In order for the forms 
or concepts produced by ideation to be seen, there 
must be produced a 'background noise.'101 This 
background noise is the echo of previous appli-
cations of the template of ideation.  The coherence 
of nihilism appears in the relationship of the 
disturbances in the context to the thing rendered 
visible in that context.  The constant shifting of 
the landscape 102 is necessary for the grid to be 
seen, or if one is looking at the landscape, then 
the grid appears to be shifting, or contains a 
paradoxical point within it.  The disturbance or 
interference ('noise') is not random. Instead, it 
has a very special erratic character, that allows 
continuities to show up.  The continuities are the 
connections posited by ideation.  In order to pro-
ject them the ground has to be prepared by a prior 
tilling process.  That tilling process amounts to 
the previous effects of the application of the 
template of ideation on the world.  The preparation 
for rendering visible occurs simultaneously with the 
actual visibility of something that has already been 
prepared for in the moment before.  The nihilistic 
effects of ideation and the form of the ideational 
template are completely interlinked. 
It is the separation of the mechanism of rendering 
visible from the self, that is the root of this dis-
turbance being projected into existence.  This is 
seen by the fact that in the eye, the same kind of 
erratic change is produced,103 and that, when in 
experiment the image being viewed is moved exactly 
in time with the erratic movement, the image dis-
appears.  This also sheds light on the phenomenon of 
cancellation which, in terms of temporality, is 
exactly the matching of the timing of the erratic 
motion with the motion of the presented object.  The 
separation of the self from the template of idea-
tion, the projection of the means of seeing outside 
the self, means that the whole mechanism that exists 
in the self must be reduplicated outside it.  Part 
of what must be reduplicated is the mechanism that 
produces erratic change, which in turn allows con-
tinuities to be seen. Thus, nihilism results.  The 
struggle with the self in the nihilistic situation 
is the means of bringing the ideational template 
back into focus with the self-form, and the real-
ization that they are the same thing.  When the 
self-form and the ideational template are brought 
into focus, then only vision, only Time, remains. 
The erratically moving objects and the erratically 
moving background vanish.  The point is to let go of 
them. 
Once nihilism has been accepted and its positive 
value recognized to be in the production of erratic 
change, which serves as a background on which what-
ever is presented to theoretical vision is seen; 
then it is possible to locate the source of this 
erratic change and see that the very thing that pro-
duces nihilism serves to define the possibility of 
the opposite to nihilism.  The definition of the 
possibility of the opposite to nihilism is not, 
however, the same as the grasping of that opposite. 
Thus, there is a distinct move from the grasping of 
the possibility of a clear distinction, which may be 
done in terms of the very thing that produces nihil-
ism, to the grasping of what this possibility 
implies.  These two distinct stages form the rest of 
the argument concerning the nature of nihilism. 
The structural system is the mechanism that produces 
erratic change.104  It is constructed out of 
specific components in order to fulfill this func-
tion.105  Any variation in the specifications for 
the formation of a structural system must be within 
the tolerances that allow this function to occur. 
Just because it is conceptual does not mean that the 
structural system is arbitrary and function-less.106  
The literature would not be so full of such precise 
descriptions of it if this were the case.  The 
motion of erratic change is a result of the way the 
concepts are fitted together, which creates a 
gestalt effect — an optical illusion in the realm 
of theory.107 
The structural system is itself seen on the back-
ground of the erratic change it produces, as well as 
whatever is presented in that context.  Presentation 
of theoretical forms other than the structural sys-
tem itself is the function of ontology.  For every-
thing that is presented on the background of erratic 
change, there is a concomitant withdrawal of some-
thing else.108  complementary to structure in the 
structural system is the framework 109 of 
presentation and withdrawal which appears in onto-
logy.  The framework is related to the whole of the 
ambiguous closed space, within which structure mani-
fests, as structure is related to the whole of the 
coding-pool which defined the boundaries of the sys-
tem.  Heidegger calls the whole of this ambiguous 
closed space the 'Clearing-in-Being'.110 
FIGURE 2 
Thus the structural system provides the context for 
the presentation of theoretical objects.  The onto-
logical component, which is its opposite, controls 
the interchange function of presentation and simul-
taneous withdrawal of something else. 
Both the structure and the framework, which are 
twinned formations, have an internal articulation 
which, in specific circumstances, defines the 
singularity lll and the non-nihilistic distinction 
respectively.  These circumstances appertain, when 
conceptual oneness is applied as a criterion to the 
twinned formation which indicates them.112  Con-
ceptual oneness is the cancellation of the antinomic 
opposites "structural system/ontology", which is 
considered to be what lies outside the ambiguous 
space (i.e. infinitude).  When this conceptual 
oneness 113 is brought inside the ambiguous space 
and applied to it as the criterion for understanding 
what is happening in the ambiguous space (i.e. 
interpenetration), then the internal articulation of 
that space is clarified.114  Immediately the 
structural system takes on a different aspect from 
that of merely appearing either open or closed.115 
  
The possibility of an openly-closed systemll6 with 
static, impenetrable boundaries, yet with access to 
information about what lies outside its boundaries, 
appears.  The openly-closed system is the modeling 
of the ruse of the philosophers ll7 in terms of the 
structural system.  The singularity is the locus of 
access to the outside, without breaking the boundar-
ies of the system.  The singularities that appear in 
the openly-closed system are defined by the struc-
ture.  There is a concomitant transformation of the 
ambiguous space defined by ontology.  Where the 
structural system becomes fixed, the ambiguous space 
becomes purely transforming.  In this process the 
internal articulation of the framework, which is 
seen to hold Process-Being and Nothingness apart, 
appears, in which the definition of the possibility 
of the non-nihilistic distinction occurs.  The 
internal articulation of the framework is a 
vortex,118 of which the non-nihilistic distinction 
is the centre.  This vortex of the framework defines 
the non-nihilistic distinction without capturing it. 
This is a brief sketch of a necessarily complex 
argument.119  Without going into the intricacies of 
the argument itself, one may see from this that the 
very mechanism that produces erratic change is, when 
transformed by seeing its relation to ontology and 
conceptual oneness, the means of definition of 
the singularity, the source of information from  no-
where, and its opposite, the clear non-nihilistic 
distinction.  This is made possible by the precision 
of the definition of the structural system and its 
ontology, and by the use of this definition against 
itself through the application of conceptual 
oneness. 
The opposite of the question of how the world can 
stand in the face of the phenomenon of nihilism, is 
how can the world appear if everything is concept-
ually one.120  Nihilism and conceptual oneness are 
opposites.  The same system that produces nihilism 
implies that all the forms conceptually unite, in 
infinitude, beyond the ideational template (beyond 
the boundary of the ambiguous space).121  In this 
way there is an attempt by ideation to seal off the 
ideational template from anything outside it, by 
blurring what is outside it into a conceptual 
oneness left undefined until the embedding into 
finitude is attempted. 
The appreciation that the structural system is an 
image of the self-form, and that the ontological 
framework and its bubble of ambiguous space is an 
image of the ideational template, helps to make the 
esotericism of systematics and ontology more pal-
atable.  The ideational template responds to the 
information from the singularity, as the matching of 
narrated events to a monologue.  The self-form 
responds likewise to the clear distinction.  But the 
clear distinction only exists where erratic change 
is not projected.  So those within the ideational 
template have no access to the clear distinction. 
Once the self-form and the ideational template sepa-
rate from one another, and the means of rendering 
visible is externalized, then this access is cut 
off.  Yet the very mechanism that produces erratic 
change in a wider context, when turned against it-
self, rigorously defines the possibility of the 
clear, non-nihilistic distinction.  It is defined as 
that which the framework of presentation and with-
drawal covers over, and when the conceptual oneness 
is applied to that framework, it articulates itself 
internally, so as to point toward the non-nihilistic 
distinction, which it is covering over. 
The final stage of the argument concerning the 
nature of nihilism is to move from this systematic 
indication of the possibility of the nan-nihilistic 
distinction to an understanding of what the non-
nihilistic distinction is in relation to the anti-
nomic opposites.  For, strictly speaking, the clear 
distinction does not exist in any relation to them 
whatsoever:  it is not in the same universe of dis-
course.  Yet the universe of discourse in which 
antinomic opposition occurs may be transformed by 
using a part of it against the whole of it -- by un-
folding conceptual oneness back on to sytematics and 
ontology — into a pointer, indicating the pos-
sibility of the clear distinction that lies outside 
the ideational template.  Expressing the status of 
the clear distinction in relation to the antinomical 
opposites that it is disconnected from is extremely 
difficult.  This is ultimately because they are the 
same thing looked at differently.  The antinomic 
opposition covers over conceptually the opposite 
qualities that are clearly distinct from one 
another.  That which covers over the opposite 
qualities is ultimately based on them: it is a con-
ceptual distortion of them.  Making the distortion 
disappear is the nub of the matter: it is a matter 
of purification, as Socrates has said in the Phaedo. 
One way to express the relation between the anti-
nomies and the clear distinction that appears when 
erratic change stops, is by means of metaphor.  One 
metaphor is that of the 'potency',122 which is, in 
homeopathy, a progressive dilution, until there are 
no chemical traces of the original substance left. 
The 'potency' has an effect opposite to that of the 
chemical substance, from which it is taken.  Another 
metaphor is the diamond, which by compression is a 
transformation of coal into a radically different 
substance.  Both by compression and by dilution a 
process of purification takes place, in which some-
thing base is transformed gradually by stages into 
something fine, which doesn't seem to have any 
relation to the thing from which it comes, judging 
by the extreme differences in quality of the two. 
The point is that the clear distinction is not a 
mediation of the nihilistic opposites.  It is not on 
some other level of existence above or below 
them.123  Even to say that it is not in the same 
realm of discourse is misleading.  The non-nihil-
istic distinction is the same as the distinction 
between the antinomic opposites, yet different.124 
But it is so in a universe of discourse where same-
ness and difference 125 are not connected to the 
template of ideation.  The clear distinction is not 
conceptual.  It is recognized by the intellect; but 
when the intellect is used to solidify things, then 
the access to the clear distinction is cut off by 
the function that allows concepts to appear and be 
sustained in theoretical visibility.  That is the 
function of the structural system, that produces 
erratic change beyond the self-form.  It is the twin 
of it, i.e. ontology, which covers over the non-
nihilistic distinction.  Seeing the non-nihilistic 
distinction, instead of its being blocked, is a 
matter of recognition which is not conceptual. The 
understanding of man reaches beyond what language 
can express.  When the movement of language is 
stilled, and silent, cognition occurs, upon which 
action is based, then the ideational system is put 
out of play.  When language, of which the template 
of ideation is a technological externalization, is 
put into the service of silent cognition, then it 
expresses the truth.  Until this occurs, however, 
language merely blocks the way to silent cognition, 
and the ideational template is manifested, in which 
the internal monologue is matched to a narration of 
external event. 
CHAPTER 4 
This chapter is concerned with emergence.  It will 
complete the picture begun in the previous chapter 
concerning the structural system and its ontology, 
and develop the argument which is opposite that con-
cerning nihilism.  These two tasks go together, 
because one must first gain a complete picture of 
the effects of the ideational template, which will 
be seen in taking the structural system to its 
logical conclusion.  Then, it is possible to see at 
a glance the form of the ideational patterning 
device, and to distinguish the way in which, within 
the arena dominated by discourse, it brings forms 
into manifestation, from the way forms are 
manifested outside this arena.  In effect, there 
are, in the temporal working out of the structural 
system, discontinuities between patternings of the 
system in different periods l of its unfolding. The 
ideational template is the patterning principle,2 
that dictates completely the various patterns that 
the structural system may have.  The dismantling of 
the ideational template occurs by the institution of 
discontinuities between the three 
major elements which constitute its shell.  These 
discontinuities, between the segments of the shell 
of the template3, may be understood by analogy with 
the discontinuities between structurally patterned 
emergent phases of the unfolding of the system.4  It 
is for this reason that the argument concerning 
emergence is fitted into the outline of a 
discontinuous argument.5  However, there is a 
fundamental difference between these two types of 
discontinuity.6  The discontinuity between segments 
of the shell of the ideational template (that is, 
between opposites, so that only one may be seen at a 
time, or between the opposites and the single 
principle they indicate, so that if the opposites 
are seen, then the single principle is not seen — 
this prevents the imagination of connections between 
these three elements, fusing them  into one over-
arching unit) effectively prevents the arising of 
the formal system in the first place, and thus pre-
vents its entering a structural phase of develop-
ment.  When the shell of the ideational template is 
held in this sort of dislocation then it is possible 
to encounter genuinely emergent events in exist-
ence.7  If, however, the structural system has 
already been allowed to flourish, then the arti-
ficially-induced  emergent changes in the patterning 
of the structural system,8 which are marked by 
temporal discontinuities in the unfolding of that 
 system, might be mistaken for the discontinuities 
that prevent the structural system from arising in 
the first place.9  This chapter goes from an expose 
of how the discontinuities in the unfolding of the 
structural system appear, to an account of the 
unfolding of the form of the ideational template, 
stated in terms of a discontinuous argument.  It is 
intended by this means to get a clearer picture of 
the means of destructuring the ideational template. 
An account of the arising of the structural 
discontinuities gives a picture of the inner 
workings l0 of the ideational template.  It has a 
certain specific form of its own, which is under-
stood most completely when it has been shown, as it 
develops through time.  By seeing this unfolding, 
one gets a picture of the patterning template at the 
core of the ideational template, which dictates the 
movement between the disconnected segments of the 
ideational template's shell.11  This means that, 
when one moves from opposite to opposite, and each 
opposite disappears in such a way that the two 
opposites are never seen in conjunction,12 then this 
discontinuous appearing and disappearing, which 
never allows the formal system of connections to 
appear, is controlled by the same 'mechanism' that 
produces the discontinuities between emergent 
patterning phases of the structural system.13  In 
this way the completely developed structural system, 
as the full expression of the ideational template, 
sheds light on the destructuring of the ideational 
template.  Thus, it is possible to state the 
unfolding of the ideational template from the single 
source in terms of a dialectical argument.  The 
complete unfolding of the ideational template is a 
means to understanding its destructuring and 
dismantling. 
At this point a synopsis of the chain of reasoning, 
basic to this chapter will be presented. 
1. The ideational template's shell projects 
formal correspondences or connections 
within the ontological mould of acceptable 
standards of truth. 
2. These formal correspondences when 
considered as a whole, or as what Sartre 
calls a detotalized totality  in the 
Critique of Dialectical Reason, 
synergetically produce the formal system. 
3. The formal system needs a nihilistic back 
ground to be seen.  This back-ground is 
produced by the structural underpinning of 
the formal system as erratic change, 
noise.  A system that produces erratic 
change is inherently structural. 
4. The structural system and its nihilistic 
background form a gestalt.  The gestalt is 
diachronic as well as synchronic, i.e. it 
is a temporal whole, as well as a 
whole at any one time; it arises in 
quanta, or discrete units with specific 
duration. 
5. At certain, well defined points in time 
the entire pattern of the gestalt of the 
structural system and its background 
changes radically.  Changes in patterning 
are emergent events.  They require 
redefinition of the entire system at a 
formal level. 
6. The gestalt whole of the structural system 
and its background is only visible because 
emergent events occur. It renders these 
two visible in the same way that nihilism 
rendered visible the formal system. 
7. In order to understand emergent phenomena, 
it is necessary to see the relation of the 
structural system to its ontological 
foundations.  Structure and ontology are 
linked.  Ontology describes the 
deformation of the medium in which the 
structural system appears.  That medium is 
called 'Being'. 
8. This deformation has four specific phases 
discovered by contemporary ontology. 
These are described as four different 
kinds of Being, i.e. Pure Presence, 
Process-Being, Hyper-Being (the 
cancellation of Being and Nothingness) and 
Wild Being (pure deformation, equated with 
no 
deformation). 
9. The formal system redefines the 
deformation of the medium which contains 
it into a closed space which is analogous 
to the 
delay-period of ambiguity.  This is 
described as Process Being. 
 
10. Out of the closed space structure 
appears.14  It also has a quantal form 
describing the progressive deformation of 
the closed space.  This is described as 
Hyper Being. 
11. Progressive enfolding deformation of the 
closed space tends toward the limit of 
pure deformation.  This is described as 
Wild Being. 
12. One analogy for the progressive deformation 
of the closed space is the higher 
dimensional spaces of mathematical 
geometry.15 
13. The regular polytopes (geometrical figures 
with equal lines, faces & angles; also 
called polyhedra) both of three dimensions 
and higher dimensions, define the 
possibilities or motifs of structural 
deformation, 
and contain a mapping of the core 
patterning of the ideational template.16 
14. Structural pattern changes from one motif 
to another are based on these regular 'n' 
dimensional polytopes  which are 
geometrical indices for the basic patterns 
that all thought takes.17  They have a 
much deeper significance than mere 
mathematical 
or geometrical forms. 
15. The closed space is segmented by an 
enfolding on itself, coherently 
differentiated according to the specific 
articulation of these regular polytopes. 
Emergence is the movement from one of 
these segmented compartments to another. 
Each compartment is patterned on a 
different motif. 
16. Thus emergent events register deformations 
in the space/time continuum in which the 
structural system moves. 
17. The whole of this deformational process is 
described by the four states of Being. 
18. The centre of the core of the ideational 
template is the way of coming into 
manifestation described by the four states 
of Being.  This is the essence of artifi-
cial emergence.  The ideational template 
brings things into manifestation in a 
certain way, which is different from the 
way things are manifested in existence as 
genuine emergences. 
19. Seeing the core of the ideational 
template, which is the structure  of its 
deformational progression, and its centre, 
which is the way it brings things into 
manifestation, one has gained an overview 
of the entire template, through seeing how 
the formal system is projected, how 
structure appears in it and how this 
structuring defines the core and centre of 
the template. 
20. By studying these successive higher 
dimensional polytopes, one sees how 
formlessness l8 enters into the 
structuralization of forms — 
intrinsically,--so that it is possible to 
understand how formlessness can enter into 
the shell of the ideational template from 
the first by the logic of disconnection, 
20.  thereby preventing the arising of system 
and structure. 
This is the first phase of the chain of reasoning 
that is the basis of this chapter.  In this first 
phase a picture of the whole of the form of the 
ideational template is presented.  By understanding 
its form it is possible to dismantle it, in such a 
way that the primacy of the single source is indi-
cated.  This indication is contained in the argument 
concerning emergence, which is the object of the 
second phase of the argument.  The argument concern-
ing emergence concerns the distinction between 
genuine and artificial emergence.  It contains the 
arising of this particular non-nihilistic 
distinction. 
1.  The ideational template has a shell, core 
and centre: 
Shell:  the connection of opposites and their 
connection to the concept of the 
principle of a single source to form a 
triad.  From this operation the 
possibility of projecting the formal 
system arises. 
Core:   the progressive deformation of the 
formal system according to a specific 
series of structural motifs. When 
connection appears in the shell, then 
disconnection must appear from the 
core.  No-form enters from the core.  
No-form enters into the structural 
aspect of the system irrevocably as 
discontinuities.19 
Centre:  By taking the process of deformation to 
its logical conclusion,20 the four 
types of Being21 appear as a unified 
description of the type of 
bringing-into-manifestation peculiar 
to the ideational template, within 
the parameters set by the ontological 
mould.  This is a 
bringing-into-manifestation based on 
distortion.  Distortion is necessary 
because formlessness when suppressed 
enters surreptitiously into form. The 
way the template brings-into-
manifestation is an image of its own 
coming into manifestation.22 
2. The ideational template as disembodied 
discourse, is only one of the natural 
forms, among myriads of others in 
existence, but man has stretched it over 
all the others as a means of control and 
manipulation.  It is the form on which the 
generation of illusion takes place.  It 
arises like all forms in existence from 
the single source. 
3. Genuine emergence is the distortionless 
way of manifestation, by which all forms 
arise from a single source, including the 
form of the ideational template.  
Artificial emergence takes place as a 
manifestation of structure within the 
arena, the ontological mould, controlled 
by the template.  Men mistake the action 
of artificial emergence which they produce 
themselves (by applying the ideational 
template to everything) for genuine 
emergence - by this substitution men come 
to think that the forms of existence come 
from them, rather than from the single 
source. 
4. A description of genuine emergence must 
account for the arising of artificial 
emergence.  This is the point of the argu 
ment concerning emergence.  It begins with 
the single source and shows how the 
non-nihilistic distinction between these 
two types of emergence arises from the 
single source, and how thereby the single 
source is indicated more strongly than if 
it had never arisen. 
5. The argument concerning emergence has four 
steps or structurally disconnected 
compartments: 
A.  There is a single source (single 
disconnected principle). 
B. Everything — including the ideation- 
al template -- arises from, and re 
turns to that source (opposites of 
unfolding and collapse: 
disconnected). 
C. The distinction between artificial 
and 
genuine emergence arises from the 
source, i.e. connection occurs ac 
cording to the form of the ideational 
template giving the illusion that 
things are connected to each other 
rather than to their source.  This 
creates the web of artificiality and 
the form of emergence connected with 
it, as opposed to the genuine 
emergence from the single source.  
Things seem to come from ideation, 
instead of its being seen that even 
artificial things come from the 
single source (connection of 
opposites). 
D. The distinction between artificial 
and genuine emergence is necessary, 
in order to know the single principle 
more fully.  By the complete 
development of the structural system 
an image of disconnection is made 
possible, in order to understand what 
the disconnection of the ideational 
template's shell-segments would en 
tail.  Formlessness, denied by the 
unrestrained positing of completely 
connected forms by ideation, appears 
in the structural system as 
discontinuities.  By taking the 
positing of continuous formal systems 
to an extreme formlessness is better 
known. 
By carrying out the disconnection of 
the ideational template's segments, 
connection is moved to the core, 
instead of appearing in the shell. By 
this an undistorted view of genuine 
emergence as distinct from artificial 
emergence is gained. 
The point of all this is to see the 
complete image of the ideational template, 
and the wisdom of applying disconnection 
to it in order to escape it's tyranny.  If 
formlessness will enter into form, no 
matter how solidly one makes the 
connections in order to avoid it, then it 
is 
<BREAK> ion in order to avoid it, then it 
is wise to use form as merely a means of 
tracing the outlines of formlessness. 
7.  Pure disconnection of everything in ex-
istence from everything else, and recog-
nition of complete dependence on the single 
source, which entails that none of the 
things in existence are associated with it 
is pure connection since everything is 
connected in dependence on the source.  Pure 
disconnection and pure connection are 
opposites.  The opposites are held together 
in disconnection and noncontradiction.  In 
this way the single source is glimpsed. 
This chain of reasoning is necessary, only because 
in the western philosophical tradition men have 
become so lost in structuralism that they never 
stand back from its endless complexities to take 
account of their situation.  Only by taking struc-
turalism to its logical conclusion and getting an 
overview of its limitations, is it possible to with-
draw from this enthrallment, and take a 
fundamentally new direction. This new direction is 
toward a science of primary rather than secondary 
causation; genuine rather than artificial emergence. 
It is based on a critique of the way ideation is 
used as a means of forging connections, rather than 
as a way of moving between disconnected  opposites.  
The whole point of the above chain of reasoning is 
to point out the positive function of the ideational 
template, that appears when it is worked out com-
pletely and the results are re-applied to the shell 
of the template, in order to avoid going through the 
same routine over again.  Since disconnection cannot 
be avoided by applying connection to everything one 
applies disconnection to everything and by that con-
nection results.  This is the application of the 
wisdom that Socrates mentions at the beginning of 
the Phaedo, which if followed, would avoid the 
arising of the delay-period within which structure 
Manifests itself, from the beginning. By working out 
the form (i.e. shell, core and centre) of the 
ideational template completely there is established 
a firm foundation for exploring the possibilities of 
such a science of primary emergence (causation), 
because, whenever ideation appears, it will be 
recognized, without having to follow the forms in 
which it presents itself to their conclusions.  The 
whole of the mechanism of the ideational template 
indicate the possibility of a science of primary 
causation.  That is the recognition of the power of 
the single source in the perfect order/disorder of 
existence.  The application of disconnection to the 
shell of the template is the process that purifies 
the nihilistic opposites, so the non-nihilistic 
'potency' (distinction) results. 
So, as we work through the rest of the chapter, us-
ing this chain of reasoning in each of its two 
phases outlined above as a basis, it is necessary to 
keep the whole in mind.  Seeing the results of the 
working of the ideational template as a whole taken 
to its final conclusion, leads to the posing of the 
argument concerning emergence in a structurally 
disconnected outline, which in turn leads to the 
disconnection of the segments of the template, and 
to the positive view of its role.  It is positive in 
the sense that, if one works it out completely as a 
means of connection, one is led back to discon-
nection, and if one applies disconnection, in the 
first place, then the real connection of the 
principle of no secondary emergence appears. 
Emergence of new patterns in the working out of the 
structural system is the key to the approach to the 
phenomenon of genuine emergence, in which is seen 
that it arises from a single source.  Exploring the 
phenomenon of emergence is the basis for founding a 
science of primary causation. 
All emergence is seen in the western intellectual 
tradition primarily as a moment in the unfolding of 
the ideational template.  That is to say, that 
emergence is the positive aspect of the phenomenon 
of nihilism.  It cannot appear without the nihil-
istic background-effect, and after its newness wears 
off, it is seen to increase the general nihilistic 
ambience created by the application of the idea-
tional template.  Because of this aspect of the 
structural system which creates artificial 
emergences, a more genuine phenomenon of emergence, 
which appears in existence, gets covered over.  The 
exploration of the differences between these two 
different kinds of emergence, which may be called 
artificial and genuine emergence respectively, is 
the key-point in the argument that is the antinomic 
opposite to the argument concerning nihilism.  It is 
the key-point because it contains a non-nihilistic 
distinction.  To understand genuine emergence in a 
clear way, it is necessary to understand the artifi-
cial images of it, which are produced by ideation in 
order to obscure its real nature.  Genuine emergence 
is precisely what the structural system is designed 
to deal with, because it is the most dangerous op-
ponent to the ruse of ideation.  This ruse is denial 
of Time by the artificial simulation of time.  That 
is, the substitution of the delay-period for the 
genuine unfolding of the timing of Time itself. This 
substitution is made as a means of controlling the 
unfolding of events.  The ideational template seeks 
to impose its narration to the exclusion of all 
other possible narrations.  The genuinely emergent 
phenomenon breaks in on this artificially imposed 
sequence of events, and thereby, shows that the 
power of control is not in the hands of the ones that 
produce the narration, but instead belongs to some 
other power.  (i.e. the capacity of the single 
source to order existence in the best way.)  As 
Nietzsche says, 'It thinks' is not the subject.'23 
The subject which is beyond experience, is trans-
cendental, produces the narrative and is the 'con-
nection-maker' behind the scenes, with which the 
empirical subject identifies, and to which the 
external events that occur in the delay-period are 
matched; but this patterning is shattered when the 
genuinely emergent event occurs,24 that breaks that 
patterning in a significant way.  Ideation by means 
of the structural system produces various narrative 
scenarios, or motifs, simultaneously from the same 
patterning template, in order to cover the 
divergent possibilities of the timing of Time, that 
might intrude into the delay-period.  There occur 
shifts between these scenarios (motifs), and it is 
these shifts between different narration-patterns 
within the delay-period, that might be called arti-
ficial emergence.  It is as if the delay-period had 
separate spatio-temporal compartments, containing 
different narrational patternings.  (For instance, 
if Waiting for Godot and End-Game are recognized as 
different narrational patternings of the same play, 
then their relationship is an analogy for the 
separate spatio-temporal compartments, transform-
ationally related across an emergent disconti-
nuity.)  To shift from one to the other, one might 
think one had left the delay-period for another 
realm of genuine temporality, but in fact, 
one has only shifted perspective (from one motif to 
another) within the same delay-period.  The point is 
that these phase-shifts occur as a strategy of the 
ideational template's manifestation as a structural 
system, in order to cover over the effects of 
genuine emergence. 
This shifting of the patterning of the delay-period, 
in order to counteract the effects of genuine emer-
gence, makes it appear as if the delay-period has a 
temporality of its own, which artificially produces 
emergent phenomena.  However, this artificial 
emergent phenomenon is keyed to the structural 
underpinning of the system (detotalized totality) of 
diacritically-connected correspondences produced by 
ideation.  In other words, the structural system is 
temporalized, to produce a series of dialectically 
interrelated moments, which are the points of 
interest in the narration, but also there are dif-
ferent sets of possible narrations, and shifts may 
occur between narrational patterns as well as from 
one dialectical moment to another.25  Thus, 
artificial emergences merely reinforce narrational 
patterning, rather than breaking that patterning. 
Freedom is simulated, in order to render imprison-
ment more effective.26  Emergence which is 
artificially produced seems to be a release from the 
ambience of pervasive nihilism that is caused by the 
application of the ideational template.  In fact, it 
is precisely these artificial emergences that cause 
nihilism to intensify.27  Without emergences, 
nihilism would remain only a threshold-setting 
mechanism, to make theoretical visibility possible. 
Nihilism would quickly be recognized as such if that 
were the case -- i.e. as only the randomization 
necessary to make statistical patterns visible. 
Randomization is brought about by an ordered pro-
cedure.  The temporal aspect of the structural sys-
tem produces, in an ordered fashion, minimal erratic 
change, which makes conceptual objects visible to 
theoretical sight.  On the other hand, emergence 
takes that temporalization of the structural system 
a step further from mere threshold-producing dis-
ruption to a point where nihilism actually pene-
trates deeply into the disrupted natural forms of 
existence.28  Because the intensification of 
nihilism comes as an unrecognizable pattern, which 
must be grasped anew, and therefore interiorized 29, 
before being understood to be merely another image 
of the same thing, it allows the threshold of 
disruption to be pushed deeper into the bedrock of 
existence.30 This lowering of the threshold makes 
whole, hitherto-unseen sets of correspondences 
visible,31 so an illusion is created that some sort 
of advancement occurs, because the new narrative 
pattern restructures the sets of  
correspondences, when in fact, because the means 
of producing the correspondences (i.e. the 
ideational life-form) has not changed, nothing has 
really changed. 
The genuine emergence must therefore break the 
mechanism that produces the simultaneous different 
motifs of narrative patterns, which may be shifted 
back and forth within the delay-period.  Not only 
the disruptive effects of the use of the ideational 
template must be seen, but also what is presented as 
a move-away from those disruptive effects by the 
institution of a new regime (patterning motif) must 
be seen as a means of spreading disruption further. 
It is not until the ideational template itself is 
put out of play, by the logic of disconnection, that 
the disruptive effects are curtailed.  Whatever the 
regime, as long as it is based on ideational con-
nections, it will merely be an extension of 
corruption under a new guise.  The seeming necessity 
for a final genuine emergence 32 to put out of play 
the mechanism which produces simultaneous narrative 
scenarios (motifs), and then controls the functional 
shifts between them, makes the genuine emergent 
phenomenon appear as if it were an attack on the 
core of the ideational template's temporal func-
tioning.  This, in turn, is a distortion of the 
genuine emergent phenomena, by relating them to the 
illusion of the ideational template's functioning. 
The ideational template specifically produces 
artificial phenomena that cover over the real nature 
of genuine emergence.  Making it into something, 
that must put out of play the core of the ideational 
template, is a further extension of this covering 
over process.  However, genuine emergence can only 
be thought of in this way within the ambience of the 
ideational arena. Here genuine emergence may be seen 
as an artifact of (or reaction to) artificial 
emergence.  Artificial emergence is produced by the 
specific functioning of the structural system when 
it is temporalized, while genuine emergence might be 
described as the specific cutting-to-the-core of the 
mechanism that produces these artificial emergences, 
by the action of the timing of Time on artificial 
time.  The timing of Time is as much an artifact as 
the artificial time of the ambiguous delay-period.  
The view of genuine timing is built up from the 
realization of the distortions that appear within 
the delay-period (i.e. by a Negative Dialectic such 
as Adorno describes).  Thus there is a non-
nihilistic distinction to be made here between the 
effects of the ideational template's distortions and 
what exists outside the actions of those distor-
tions.  The process of separating these distortions 
itself introduces distortion, so that the point of 
distortionless distinguishing33 is never reached 
so long as the ideational template is functioning --
yet, on the other hand, without its functioning no 
distinctions would be made at all. 
The only way out of this dilemma is to picture 
genuine emergence in terms of the critical 
destructuring of the ideational-template itself.  
Because this template does have a specific form 
(specified in terms of its shell, core and centre), 
which, when read in terms of the principle of a 
single source that states there are no secondary 
emergences, by explicit disconnection takes one to 
the point, where the timing of Time's genuine 
emergence may be appreciated.  When the ideational 
template is disconnected, it freezes i.e. stillness 
is imposed on the action of endless connection, and 
pure distinction occurs in the separation of the 
segments of the triads of conceptual elements.  
Before it is possible to approach that point, it is 
necessary to understand the connection between 
artificial emergence and nihilism in terms of the 
structural system and its  ontology.  Only by this 
means may the artificiality of genuine emergence 
itself be glimpsed as a means of approaching the 
argument concerning emergence, which itself is 
stated in a way that portrays the physiognomy of 
artificial emergence in the guise of an argument.  
Once the form of temporalisation of the ideational 
template is understood, 
then it is possible to attempt to portray genuine 
emergence as pure distinction in terms of the freez-
ing34 disconnection of the ideational template's 
intrinsic form. 
The way ideation works is very simple in this con-
text.  It is a means of directing the attention of 
the observer from one point of interest35 to another 
in a series.  In order to create a seeming 
connection between the points of the series, a nar-
ration is added to tie the series together.36 The 
point is that for each presented 'point of interest' 
to be seen, it is necessary to create a particular 
gestalt patterning, to draw the attention of the ob-
server to the desired location.  The best way to do 
this is to set the background in motion in respect 
to the presented point-of-interest which is held 
still.  This renders everything else in sight ambi-
guous, and gives extra clarity to the point at which 
the attention of the passive observer is being 
directed.  Thus, the key-thing is to create an arti-
ficial disparity between foreground and background. 
This disparity between foreground and background is 
then made to shift in such a way, that the attention 
is moved from point to point.  The discontinuity 
that then exists between points is covered over by 
the addition of a continuous narrative, which 
creates the illusion of a continuity between the 
points.  The artificial disparity 'renders visible' 
the point of interest, which would otherwise be 
merely one of many things that the observer might 
observe.  The disparity exists in the over-intensity 
and clarity of the point-of-interest and in the 
blurring of the background.  A "gestalt" is created 
because the draining of clarity from the 
background, to give it a foreground, is a single 
dynamic process that unites the two.  What appears 
as the immediate result of this process is a smooth 
transition between points of interest in a series.37 
When this series appears in dialogue it might be 
called an argument.  The syllogism is the means of 
connecting statements which, because of the 
conceptual movement from specific to general or vice 
versa, is contrasted to the linear movement from 
statement to statement.  It is precisely the con-
nection between these two axes of movement that pro-
duces the illusion of continuity.  The movement from 
series of discontinuous repetitions to the illusion 
of continuity is the quintessence of the effect of 
ideation.38  This production of illusory continuity 
is based on the prior production of the disparity 
between foreground event and blurred background.  
That disparity is based on the production of minimal 
erratic change which creates the threshold, on which 
the point of interest or dialectical movement may be 
seen as supercharged with 
intensity. 
Once the general picture of how the shell of the 
ideational template functions is understood, then it 
is possible to see where artificial emergence fits 
into this picture.  Artificial emergence makes the 
gestalt of foreground/background disparity visible 
by contrasting it to other possible gestalt-patterns 
based on structurally-coded motifs.  The initial 
creation of this disparity is already a 
temporalization of the shell of the ideational 
template, which results in the illusion of 
continuous motion against the far background of 
erratic change, on which the discontinuities of the 
series of repetitions appear as the immediate 
background.  Artificial emergence is a further 
extension of this temporalization of the shell 
ideational-template to its core.  It is, in fact, a 
deepening of the initial disparity by the creation 
of a disparity between several simultaneous gestalt 
patterns or realized structural motifs.  This 
disparity first makes the gestalt pattern visible, 
just as the point of interest was rendered visible.  
It is one gestalt among several, which form the 
background on which the presently manifest gestalt 
pattern is seen. However, this disparity is embedded 
in the artificial time of the delay-period, so the 
gestalt pattern is given a temporal limit.  A 
particular
gestalt pattern39 may only exist for a particular 
quantum of time, then another gestalt pattern 
becomes manifest.  The arising of the complete new 
gestalt pattern is an artificially created emer-
gence.  The purpose of this emergence is that it 
renders visible the current gestalt pattern retro-
spectively.  This means that it is the possibility 
of structural rotation40 to another gestalt pattern 
that renders visible the current pattern in its 
temporally limited phase.  The other gestalt quanta 
are not manifested, but it is still the background 
of its possibility that makes the presently mani-
fested quantum visible.41  What is important here is 
the notion that it is not the new gestalt pattern 
that is important, but the patterning template at 
the core of the ideational template that produces 
simultaneous gestalt patterns, which are then pre-
sented in series.  The cluster of gestalt patterns 
(realized motifs) are produced all at once by a 
single template, but made to appear as if they arose 
successively.  Thus, it appears as if new patterns 
are being made manifest, when in fact there is 
merely a working out of the implications of an 
initial pattern-setting, which took place at the 
beginning of the delay-period.  The point is, 
further, that this initial simultaneous patterning 
is always merely the imaging of the core of the 
ideational template, within which all the possible 
structural motifs are encoded.  The initial pattern-
ing is the application of the ideational template 
to some aspect of existence.  As it is worked out 
it appears, as new things are discovered, in a 
succession of rearrangements of the gestalt.  In the 
final analysis, though, it is discovered that the 
ideational template has merely been embedded in that 
particular aspect of existence, and what has 
appeared are in fact images of the inner workings 
of the template itself.  What appears under the lens 
of the ideational template are only images of that 
template.42  It is only when that template's pattern 
is itself changed, by the logic of disconnection, 
that anything else appears at all. 
The gist of this approach to emergent phenomena is 
to show that almost all of what appears as new per-
spectives, new techniques, new developments of every 
kind in the western philosophic and scientific 
tradition are in fact merely a display of artificial 
emergence at work.43  That is to say that what 
appears as advance or progress is an ever-deepening 
of the exploration of the implications of the ide-
ational template.  That template operates in a 
specific fashion to produce periodic changes, which 
keep alive the interest in the outward technological 
project, and at the same time divert attention from 
what remains unchanging throughout all the changes 
no matter how radical, i.e., the template itself. 
This is the way the ideational template is used. 
The task of current ontology is to account for a 
specific type of change, which causes the whole 
tradition of incremental changes to be seen from a 
fundamentally new perspective.  This type of change 
is called by G.H. Mead, emergence.44 Other writers 
have called it 'Episteme changes'45, 'Epochs of 
Being'46, 'Paradigm changes'47. There are many names 
in literature for this phenomenon which has 
recently become the centre of the attention of 
philosophers of science and contemporary 
ontologists alike.  Different writers have 
different ways of stating the matter to themselves. 
The key point is that, at certain points in the 
development of a tradition, the methodology and 
conceptual schemata which are generated from the 
ideational template, there occur breaks which mark 
the beginning of the arising of a completely new 
approach to the subject matter in  question.  The 
move from Newtonian to Einsteinian physics is a 
famous example.48 Most studies of this phenomenon 
are historical in nature and for that reason cannot 
see that what is happening is intrinsic to the mode 
of conceptualization used by philosophy and science. 
Philosophy presents the attentive reader with dif-
ferent models of the process of conceptualization 
which is considered to be the core of the human 
being.  Each of the major philosophers has gone more 
and more deeply into the conceptual modeling of the 
process of conceptualization.  In that modeling 
process there occur emergent phases, in which deeper 
and deeper implications of the ideational template 
are brought to the surface.  The move from Hume and 
Berkeley to Kant and Hegel is an example, containing 
as it does just such a deepening of man's perspec-
tive on the process of conceptualization, by the 
move from the formal level to the structural-
dialectical level of modeling.  Contemporary onto-
logy moves to even deeper levels of modeling. 
However, in all this it is the same essential form 
which is being explored; and the effect of deepening 
and shifting perspectives with regard to it is an 
aspect of the temporal functioning of that form 
which, ironically, is being used to explore itself. 
The mirroring 49 is doubled,50 and ramification 
(interpreted by western philosophy and science as 
infinity) occurs.  However, even when ideation is 
used as a tool to explore other phenomena, such as 
those occurring in what is called 'nature',51 it 
still only manages to produce images of itself.  The 
same phenomenon occurs as appears in the tradition 
of philosophy.  Emergent events are discovered in 
nature, and in the tradition as it unfolds.  That 
is, emergent events occur in both.  This is seen by 
those involved in the tradition as a deepening of 
the understanding of the phenomenon, that is the 
topic of investigation, rather than as a prolifer-
ation of images of the tool being used.  The 
conceptual template, when it is used as a tool, 
either for self-exploration or the exploration of 
other phenomena, is set in motion or temporalized. 
The temporalization of the ideational template 
produces a very complex time-form, which, though 
definite, has so many facets, that it is difficult 
to grasp the whole of it at once, in order to see 
that it is one thing being imaged in many different 
ways. Emergent events are a particular feature of 
this complex time-form whose intrinsic temporality 
is that of the delay-period of ambiguity.  It is as 
if the delay-period were intrinsically shattered 
into several facets or compartments, which overlap 
spatially but not temporally.  These facets appear 
as fundamental shifts in conceptual perspectives. 
In all emergent events there is a shift in the 
conceptual way of looking at the phenomenon in 
question, which ultimately results in transforma-
tions of the phenomenon itself.  As 
conceptualization is reoriented, new aspects of the 
phenomenon appear.  However, this is eventually seen 
as the mirroring of the temporalized ideational 
template in the phenomenon being studied. If another 
hypothetical methodology were used, which was not 
based on isolated conceptualization, then whatever 
the form that underlay this other methodology would 
be mirrored back in the way things appeared under 
that methodology.  The principle of a single source 
is the only means of avoiding the distortions 
inherent in the movement of the methodological tool. 
It makes it possible to see the phenomena in 
question in terms of itself without an intermediary, 
so that what emerges when it is used as a means of 
considering phenomena is a genuine emergence in the 
true sense.  That is to say that, when the dis-
tortions caused by the use of the ideational tem-
plate as an intermediary between man and the world 
are put out of play, and artificial emergences 
cease, genuine emergence appears.  Genuine emergence 
in the true sense is not the way the timing of Time 
counters the artificial temporality caused by the 
introduction of the ideational template.  In the 
true sense, genuine emergence, is when there is no 
trace of the distortions of the ideational template 
to be countered. For this to occur, the principle of 
secondary emergences must itself cease to be an 
idea.  For that, it is necessary to move out of the 
conceptual realm into a realm of experience 
unmediated by the moving conceptual template.  In 
this paper it is only possible to indicate the 
functioning of the ideational template, as it is 
seen in 
relation to the principle of no secondary causation. 
Once it is known that men in the western tradition 
are trapped in the witnessing of this one existent 
time-form, that appears as a patterning device, 
which is mirrored back to them in an endless 
diversity of self images, in which specific patterns 
remain constant, then it is possible to attempt to 
disconnect one-self from that time-form of the 
ideational template, and to see the distortions that 
it introduces into perception by rendering percep-
tion theoretical.  In order to get at this view of 
the ideational template, it is necessary at this 
stage to capitulate to the process of modeling 
conceptualization, using conceptualization.  The 
modeling that will be given here is taken from the 
study of the history of philosophy's attempt to 
present a succinct model of the ideational template. 
Once one realizes that all philosophy is about the 
same thing in a very much over-determined manner, 
then a certain very definite pattern appears.  In 
terms of this pattern, the ideational template in 
its temporalization has two very definite aspects, 
which have a direct bearing on the phenomenon of 
artificial emergence.  These two aspects are the 
structural system, and its associated ontology.  It 
is as if; there were a medium — an 'ether'52 — in 
which forms produced by the ideational template 
appear.  If one looks in this analogy at the action 
of the 'ether' (Being) on the forms then one is 
dealing with ontology, whereas, if one looks at the 
movement of the forms themselves, one is dealing 
with the structural system. 
The forms become a system when they are considered 
as a whole, rather than as unrelated fragments.  The 
system is structural, when the movement of this 
whole is considered over time.  That movement is 
dialectical, and the form of the movement when taken 
again as a temporal whole seen all-at-once is the 
structure.  There is an interaction between the 
medium and the structural system that appears in it, 
such that the inner constitution of the medium dis-
torts the forms that appear in the medium.  The dif-
ferent types of truth which are necessary compen-
sations for these distortions specify the 
ontological mould.  Distortion occurs by changes in 
the consistency of the medium.  These changes in 
the consistency of the medium point to the 
fundamental features of the process of the coming-
into-being of the forms that appear as a result of 
the action of the ideational template.  To 
appreciate together these two dynamic aspects of 
the results of the action of the ideational 
template, is to approach to the core of it, which is 
indicated by the phenomenon of artificial emergence.  
Artificial emergence - 
indicates the action of the core of the ideational 
template.  If the phenomenon of artificial emergence 
did not occur, there would be no access to that 
core.  It is time that allows the forms in existence 
to unfold, so that their depth may be seen. 
The extent of the comprehension of the way of mani-
festation of conceptual or theoretical forms in 
contemporary ontology is staggering.  The attempt to 
give a picture of the core of the problem being 
wrestled with by the philosophers of the western 
tradition must, because of its complexity, first be 
schematic, and in this paper a schematic picture 
will be all that will be presented.53  A clear 
introduction to the problem of emergence is all that 
is necessary in this context.  Consider the position 
of a conceptual form (generally, an idea) which is 
placed in relation to other such forms, to comprise 
a theory of philosophy.  As thought develops other 
forms are posited, and the relationship between the 
forms considered as a whole changes, until the whole 
theory is discarded or a new whole is created, using 
some aspects from the old theory and other aspects 
newly added to make up another whole.54  This is a 
process that occurs over time, and which may have 
all sorts of constraints added to it, but essen-
tially it is the process, in which new theoretical 
forms appear as a result of the movement of thought 
working by application of the ideational template, 
that imagines connections between thought forms. 
These connections may be of the same logical type, 
or between elements of different logical type.  As 
the train of thought moves, applying the connection-
forging mechanism of the shell of the ideational 
template, then certain specific stages of develop-
ment appear in sequence.  This sequence indicates 
the dialectical form of thought.  When an image of 
the whole sequence is grasped, then in that appears 
the structure of the temporal whole of the chain of 
thought. 
Structure specifies the length and pattern of the 
dialectically evolving moments held together to make 
up a quantum, which turns into another, differently 
patterned, dialectical quantum at a specific point 
through an emergent event.  However, all this takes 
place in a specific medium, which is indicated by 
the term 'Being'.  When the formal system is first 
posited as a complex of interrelated elements, then 
it is, as it were, all laid out on a flat surface, 
and is purely present in all its aspects for inspec-
tion.55  However, when the system becomes too com-
plex to be seen at a glance, and it takes time to 
move from one set of elements to another within the 
formal system, then the system has been temporal-
ised.56   This temporalization becomes even 
more significant when, either parts of the system 
are considered to be moving (when it becomes a 
machine), or when something is to be considered as 
moving within the system (i.e., when a process is 
described).  But when the system itself begins to 
change and finally to completely transform itself, 
then temporalization is complete, because all the 
reference points within the system are considered to 
be changing.  The process of tracing these progres-
sive alterations is the concern of structuralism, 
because by means of it one is able to set up pro-
gressive transformations which allow one to move 
from one stage to another in this process of change 
of the system.57  Systems are constructed so that 
they are structural in their initial coding; then 
any changes in the system become more regular and 
predictable.  The ultimate level of structural 
patterning is that which will trace the transforma-
tion of the whole system across a threshold, in 
which the entire system is in a moment transformed 
into another pattern.  The only possible way to do 
this is if the system's structure is itself pat-
terned on the form of the ideational template.58 
Then the key to decoding the new pattern is the use 
of the ideational tool which is the one thing kept 
constant. Thus, it appears that the process of 
setting up structural systems, that will undergo any 
transformation and still remain intelligible, is a 
process of defining the core of the ideational tem-
plate's own differentiation of form, when the tem-
plate itself undergoes temporalization. 
When the flat, completely presented formal system is 
seen opposite some landscape of which it is con-
sidered an approximate mapping, then there occurs a 
certain distortion in the process of considering the 
relation of the mapping to the landscape.  Here the 
landscape may be internal to the system or some 
aspect of existence to which it is compared.  For 
instance, it may be an indexing system, which allows 
the movement between different parts of the system, 
that cannot be inspected simultaneously.  This dis-
tortion that appears, whenever there is some move-
ment with respect to the system, is a change in  the 
medium, within which the system is posited.  This 
distortion revolves around the difference between 
presence/absence.  One has to look between the grid 
and the landscape or between different parts of the 
grid of the system.  Then, one is constantly dealing 
with the presence and absence of elements in succes-
sion.  What is noticed is that presence/absence has 
a particular effect on the medium in which the sys-
tem is posited.  One may either merely invent means 
of referencing, which attempt to hide these dis-
tortions, or one may look directly at them them-
selves.  When one looks at them and the accumulation 
of indexing features that attempt to circumvent 
them, then it becomes apparent that the whole nature 
of the system must be different, in order to cope 
with them.  The set of distortions taken as a whole 
which appear, because of the movement between pre-
sence and absence, may be called the closed-
space.59 Heidegger has called this closed-space the 
'Clearing in Being' in Being and Time60. Once it is 
recognized, it is realized that it has completely 
different features from the medium, in which things 
are purely present.   It is the artificially-lighted 
space in which systematically defined processes 
occur.61  It is the space in which the temporal 
revolution of the system occurs.  The difference 
between Being as pure presence and Being as temporal 
process, which includes the rotation between 
presence and absence, must be recognized. The 
closed-space considered as a whole has certain 
features, which are specific to it, just as the 
formal system considered as a whole. In effect these 
features are the same as those of the delay-period 
of ambiguity.  From clarity of pure presence one has 
moved to the compensating ambiguous realm that 
underlies it.  In witnessing the movement of the 
closed-space as a whole, one sees that there is a 
function of presenting and hiding at work that has, 
so to speak, a life of its own.  This autonomous 
function, which allows some things to be presented 
in the closed-space only with the concomitant 
obscuring of others (which is what creates the ambi-
guity involved), is directly related to the 
functioning of the ideational template.  It allows 
gestalt-patterns to be presented all-at-once.  What 
does not fit the pattern is obscured.  The ambiguity 
of the closed-space is that several gestalt-patterns 
for the formal system are stored there at once, 
overlying each other.  The means by which they are 
over-determined in relation to each other is the 
structure.  The structure itself never appears, but 
may only be manifested, dialectically moving between 
different presented images within a gestalt-pattern, 
and between gestalt-patterns.  Structure can only 
appear over a period of time.62  structure is a 
composite image of the relation to one another of 
the dialectically related moments all at once. 
The point is that, as men get better at building 
structural systems that will undergo complete emer-
gent transformations, they approximate to the form 
of the ideational template more and more closely. 
Furthermore, they discover that this particular form 
had underlain all their thought from the beginning. 
In this way, structure appears out of the closed-
space of the ambiguous delay-period.  That period 
appears more fully as the length of the philo-
sophical and scientific tradition of the west, which 
makes more and more complex images of the ideational 
template.  In the tradition the images which appear 
come out in pre-structured gestalt- patterns which 
interchange as they emerge.  The images themselves 
more and more closely approximate to the structur-
ing, that underlies the whole period.  That 
structuring itself emerges from the closed-space in 
emergent quanta.  The 'quantization' of the 
structuring itself reveals a further kind of 
distortion to the medium in which the structural 
system appears.  It is necessary to extend the model 
of the structural system and its ontology further in 
order to explain the way, in which structure 
emerges, and the new kind of distortion that 
appears. 
There is a dialectic between the formal system and 
the closed-space of ambiguity, that allows the 
structural underpinning to appear in specific 
quantal steps.  The formal system is overly definite 
and precise, while the closed-space of ambiguity is 
in compensation unclear and vague.  The formal 
system must be considered as a whole, and the 
closed-space, which forms the background on which it 
appears, must also be taken as a whole.  The nature 
of the movement within the closed-space is erratic 
change, which makes the stationary formal system 
visible.  It appears over time that the formal 
system is projected on the screen of the whole of 
the closed-space.  Its transformations appear as the 
charting of the movement of that background as a 
whole.  It is a closed-space and as a whole it con-
tains the formal system, which may only appear in 
the 'clearing' it provides.  It is an artificially-
bounded arena, within which discourse may be carried 
on, and in which there is an artificial lighting, by 
which presented objects may be seen.  It is the 
Platonic 'Cave'.63  It is only when one considers 
the nature of the walls 64 of the cave itself, that 
one sees the whole of the closed space of ambiguity, 
and realizes that what happens in the cave (i.e. the 
relation between the sophist and the prisoner and 
the fire, barrier, objects, and images) is directly 
connected with what defines the space in which it 
happens (i.e., the darkness and its being an under-
world scenario).  The dialectic between the cave as 
scenario and what happens within it, is the means by 
which the structural underpinning is seen.  The 
basic elements of the cave of the 'Clearing-in-
Being' which provide the closed arena, within which 
the formal system appears and undergoes transfor-
mation, then disappears, are that an artificial 
boundary is set; that boundary circumscribes the 
arena of the closed-space completely, and within 
that boundary there occurs a minimal erratic change. 
The erratic change of the whole of the closed-space 
is determined by the structural level of the system, 
that appears within the closed-space.  The 'fire' 
that lights the cave in Plato's metaphor, is pre-
cisely this erratic change.  It is an artificial 
lighting.  Upon the background of erratic non-
random65 change, constant motions and stationary 
positions may be seen, which comprise the formal 
system.  On the background of continuous movement 
and constancy processes the becoming of the system 
(i.e., accelerations and decelerations of continuous 
movements), and emergent events as transformations 
may be seen. 
FIGURE 3 
Processes are transformational changes, bounded and 
controlled by the structural system, while 
'becoming' describes transformations that are 
changes in the system itself.  These transformations 
are emergent, when the whole of the patterning of 
the   system changes.  It is as if the structural 
system were a filter, by which the shimmering of the 
erratic change of the whole of the closed-space in 
which it appears may be seen.  The ambiguous erratic 
change is trapped by the bounds of the formal sys-
tem.  However, in order to contain it, the struc-
tural aspect of the system must appear in the 
changes of the system itself, as it attempts to con-
tain the volatile and erratic changes which it 
  
also attempts to track. The delay-period shows up as 
this tracking, which eventually means the entire 
system must transform itself into another patterning 
in order to continue tracking the changes in the 
whole of the closed- space.  The period of time 
between complete systemic pattern-changes is the 
emergent quantum.  It is the emergent quanta that 
show up the structure of the closed delay-period. 
In this way it is seen that the formal system and 
the closed-space comprise a whole which in its 
action over time reveals the underlying structure 
through dialectical moments, which taken together 
form a pattern.  The whole gestalt of the closed-
space formal structural system, which, by the posi-
ting of constant forms, allows the inaccessible 
physiognomy of the whole to be seen as changes over 
time, appears as a series of emergent events.  These 
emergent events, that trigger complete pattern 
changes, indicate the form of the pattern-dictating 
template. This ideational template lies behind the 
whole of the closed-space/formal-structural system 
gestalt, and its patterns that appear in the gestalt 
are deflections of the core patterning of the tem-
plate.  The changes in the patterning within the 
closed-space occur when the boundary of the closed-
space, which is like an asymptotic limit, is 
approached.  This is called the 'cusp' in Rene 
Thom's catastrophe theory.  It is as if one were in a 
room, and there were within it an invisible bound-
ary, which if approached and touched it, the entire 
pattern of the room would change completely, so one 
would think one had entered another room. 
FIGURE 4 
However, one has not moved at all; it is the same 
room, merely rearranged during the jump across the 
transformational gap that the boundary of the 
closed-space represents.  By watching the different 
patterns that appear, when one touches the boundary 
of the closed-space, it is possible to construct a 
picture of the template that produces the different 
patterns.  Thus, two things may be explored: the 
nature of the boundary of the closed-space, and the 
structures that appear when its boundary (cusp) is 
traversed.  The nature of the boundary is the 
subject of ontology, while the relation of the 
patterns that appear within the boundary to each 
other are the concern of the dialectical-
structuralism, underlying the formal system. 
Not only does the formal system's pattern change, 
but also, as structure emerges, it does so in 
quantal bursts.  Thus, the transformation of the 
structure itself, as it arises out of the dialectic 
between closed-space and system, must be considered 
 
closely.  Where the gestalt of closed-space / 
structural-system is in constant quantal transforma-
tional change, the structure which appears out of it 
is eidetically constant.  The basis of all 
ideational patterning is this constant unfolding of 
forms in precise quantal bursts.  Each of these is a 
precise description of the further warping of the 
medium, within which the presentation appears which 
then becomes the closed-space, and which folds in on 
itself in a specific pattern, so as to create 
pockets within the delay-period.  This means that 
the boundary of the closed-space not only provides 
an outer wall which encloses the formal system, but 
that this boundary folds through itself within the 
closed-space itself in specific patterns.  So, in 
order to understand the nature of the boundary of 
the closed-space, it is necessary to see how 
structural intra-folding is possible.  It is by 
structural intrafolding that the overdetermination 
that occurs within the closed-space is controlled. 
Each element within the closed-space has 
simultaneously a place in several possible gestalt 
patternings.  By the quantal changes from one 
patterning to another, composed of the same 
elements, this overdetermination which is the core 
of the ideational template becomes accessible. 
The quantal structural phases are the same for 
everyone.  They are eidetic in the sense that Hus-
serl's ideas, such as pi, are universal.72  It is not, 
however, because it is the structure of the 'mind', 
but because it is the inner differentiation of the 
core of the ideational template.  Man has in our 
time wholly identified himself with the life form 
of the ideational template, and thinks that it is 
his own core.  This structure is best known through 
mathematics, and appears there as the unfolding of 
the regular polytopes of 'N' dimensional space, 
sometimes called Platonic solids. The unfolding of 
higher dimensional spaces each with its own 
intrinsic structure, exemplified by the regular 
polytopes, which  come out of them, is the analogy 
for the closed-space's infolding on itself and its 
structural relations.  In this paper I will not go 
into an exegesis of these forms,73 but only point 
out that these mathematical icons are a representa-
tion of the intrinsic form of the core of the ide-
ational template.  Their meaning goes far beyond 
what the mathematical forms indicate.  Each form 
indicates a level of exegesis of the ontology of the 
structural system as an exemplification of the 
formation of the core of the ideational template. 
FIGURE 5 
The insight that what is described in philosophy as 
the closed-space in which the transformation of the 
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 structural system occurs may be described by the 
analogy of multidimensional space, and that the 
higher dimensional regular polytopes were the key 
eidetic forms, which indexed the unfolding of forms 
within the closed-space in a universal way, is what 
allows the precise exploration of the ideational 
template.  The extreme ambiguity of the closed-
space/formal- structural system gestalt is balanced 
by the extreme clarity and precision of the struc-
tural unfolding that appears within it.  Thus, 
another gestalt occurs between the presentation of 
eidetic structure and the background of the closed-
space/formal-structural system gestalt.  In this, 
the further warping of the medium of the arena of 
the presentation appears as a third kind of Being. 
This is called 'Hyper Being' by Merleau-Ponty.83 It 
is the Being of cancellation. Philosophically it is 
seen as the cancellation of Process Being84 (i.e. 
temporalized Being as a mixture of presence and 
absence) and Nothingness.85  It describes the 
transition points between different dimensional 
patterning templates.  The ideational template is 
not just one single patterning mechanism (template), 
but a range of unfolding patterning mechanisms, 
which come out of each other in an unending progres-
sion, which describes an indefinite number of stages 
of enfolding of the closed-space on itself.  This 
enfolding measures the penetration of formlessness 
into the formal system.  This series tends toward 
pure deformation of the closed-space, which is the 
final type of distortion of the presentational med-
ium.  Merleau-Ponty calls this Wild Being.86 Pure 
deformationS7 is the ideal, and is equated with non-
deformation,88 which would appear if the ideational 
template were never brought into play in the first 
place.  The relation between these four types of 
Being, described by modern ontology, is an exact 
description of the boundary of the closed-space, for 
in pure deformation every point of the boundary 
would, by virtue of complete enfolding and 
overdetermination, be the same point.89  The des-
cription of the manifestation of this single point 
which is the whole90 of the closed-space, within 
which the structural system appears, is the means of 
the complete ontological description of artificial 
emergence. 
The manifesting of the single point is diffracted by 
the endless series of distortions, so that the whole 
of the closed-space appears as a mirage, or an illu-
sion made up of myriad reflections of that one 
primal artificially emergent event.91  This occurs 
when one goes ahead or lags behind the timing of 
Time for an instant.  In that the closed- space, the 
delay-period of ambiguity, is generated with all its 
overdetermination by simultaneous patternings held 
apart by structural compartmentalization.  Struc-
tural over-determination registers the entry of 
formlessness into the arena of formal differen-
tiation.  The point is that in the timing of Time 
formlessness is the key element.  In the successive 
laying down of the pattern of the opposites there is 
an emptiness, because of their disconnection and the 
lack of distortion.  Thus the ontological descrip-
tion of genuine emergence is given in the discon-
nected ideational template, which registers this 
emptiness.  That emptiness is the absence of a 
medium to undergo distortion.  Space-time falls away 
as the ideational a priori filtering template is 
disconnected.  The difference between the finite 
realm of the closed-space and the infinitude, that 
lies beyond it vanishes.  The endless series of 
distortions occurs when infinitude is embedded into 
finitude.  By that the complete form of the ide-
ational template is seen, as it cancels itself out. 
In this process two models of coming into manifest-
ation appear: that of the fragmentation of Being 
which is the centre of the ideational template, and 
that of the disconnected shell of the template.  The 
former is the picture of artificial emergence that 
begins by giving Being to forms, and the second is 
that of genuine emergence, that registers the 
emptiness of form (its lack of Being) and indicates 
the primacy of the opposites over form. 
Seeing the difference between the disconnected shell 
of the ideational template, and the centre which is 
the four states of Being, is the central point of 
this chapter.  To make connection between the seg-
ments of the shell of the template is to attribute a 
connecting medium to sustain the connections.  If no 
connections are made, then no sustaining medium need 
be posited: the solidity of forms vanishes.  The 
positing of a connecting medium at the surface of 
the template makes necessary the fragmentation of 
that medium, when the depth of the template is 
reached.  The time-period between the first positing 
of the connecting medium at the surface and the 
reaching of the complete fragmentation of that 
medium in its depth, is the full explanation of the 
delay-period.  If no sustaining medium is posited at 
the surface, and thus no connections, then the 
delay-period is never entered.  Fragmentation of the 
surface of the template means the necessity of the 
underlying unity of the single source is preserved. 
Because fragmentation in depth follows the struc-
tural fault-lines that radiate through the delay-
period's closed-space, there is a differentiation of 
the sustaining medium into four interrelated kinds 
of Being.  The really interesting thing is not the 
qualities of these different kinds of Being, but 
instead how formlessness or qualitylessness 
(emptiness) enters into them as the interstices 
that separate them one from another.  This is the 
fundamental difference between the two types of 
manifestation, indexed by the disconnected shell and 
the centre of the core of the ideational template, 
called respectively genuine and artificial 
emergence.  In the former emptiness is precisely 
that which is brought to the fore and indicated, 
whereas in the latter it is hidden and suppressed. 
FIGURE 6 
What occurs in the fragmentation of the connecting 
medium is that a continuous medium is posited, where 
everything is purely present for full inspection. 
This is itself an artificial and unnatural 
situation.  The opposites are never both present for 
inspection at once.  In order to combat the effect 
of time on the creation of this unnatural state of 
affairs the set of opposites that are made fully 
present are built into twin antinomic constructs. 
This means that, since the two opposites cannot be 
held in vision together more than an instant, they 
are connected to other opposites rather than to each 
other.  This is also an artificial and unnatural 
state of affairs.  Connecting the opposites to each 
other is only possible conceptually.  It can only be 
artificially induced, and then only for an instant. 
To sustain the illusion of that connection, it is 
necessary to connect it to an imaginary set of 
  
conceptual opposites.  The conceptual opposites are 
held in theoretical vision as a stand-in for the 
opposites, that could not be held together for more 
than an instant.  Holding two opposites together 
means that the distinction between them is blurred. 
Thus, ambiguity occurs.  The conceptual twins are 
always connected to the 'origin', which is the ideal 
point where the pure presencing of all the opposites 
together is hypothesized to occur.  The temporal 
development within the delay-period is from one 
presencing of opposites from either twin together to 
another.  This supplies the dialectical moments of 
which the delay-period is comprised.  At the end of 
the delay-period the twins cancel each other.  In 
cancellation structure appears as the dead or 
finished dialectic.  Changes in the pattern of the 
distribution of opposites between twins during the 
working out of the delay-period are coded into the 
code-pool from the beginning. 
FIGURE 7 
The first distortion that occurs by the artificial 
juxtaposition of the opposites is compounded in the 
juxtaposition of the conceptual twins (grid and 
landscape).  This compounding is Process-Being.  The 
period of cancellation of the twins is prolonged by 
the coding of structure into them.  However, as the 
twins rotate through their dialectical moments and 
 
pattern phases, they work out their cancellation. 
The ideal of an endless delay-period is pure 
deformation, meaning infinity embedded within 
finitude.  This is Wild Being.  The possibilities of 
structural embedding are as endless as the number of 
higher dimensions.  Therefore, the delay-period may 
be extended indefinitely by appealing to ever deeper 
structural levels.  The crisis of overall cancel-
lation builds up and up. The ideal continuity of 
endless delay (immortality) appears as Wild Being. 
The series of dimensional shifts forms a series of 
repetitions, over which is spread the illusion of 
continuity, masking the crisis of cancellation. That 
is the ideal of pure transformation, in which all 
the systemic reference marks change at each moment. 
Surface continuity of pure presence is transformed 
into continuity in depth.  But this is only possible 
by the fragmentation of the medium of Being into 
four.  The entry of cancellation and process modes 
into continuity is necessary, in order to produce 
the illusion of continuity in depth out of the illu-
sion of surface continuity.  The surface continuity 
is temporalized; then made into quanta which are 
then made into a deep continuity again.  This is the 
process of the ideational template, being applied to 
itself.  It is the idealization of ideation.  The 
ideational template can never lead beyond itself. It 
can only produce images of itself. Michael Henry 
call this ontological monism,92 where the trans-
cendental movement of producing an illusory con-
tinuity is seen to ground itself.  This is not 
solved by introducing an idea of ontological 
dualism, as Henry does, which disconnects the centre 
of the template from its surface, but only by 
dismantling the surface, so that the depth of the 
fragmented centre does not arise. 
Through the first phase of the chain of reasoning 
detailed above, a picture of how the ideational tem-
plate is itself constructed as a patterning device, 
producing endless, possible patterns, is shown.  Its 
shell is the connection of opposites, which occurs 
in the medium of pure presence, which is an arti-
ficially constructed situation, where the illusion 
of simultaneous views of the two opposites is 
presented.  This continuity is created by using the 
background of the single source to connect the 
opposites conceptually.  The conceptual merger of 
the single source with the opposites has four 
stages.  First, the single source is used as a back-
ground for the connection of the opposites that are 
artificially held together.  The single source is 
interpreted in this context as Pure Presence (i.e. 
presence without absence).  Secondly, the 
impossibility of holding the opposites together on 
the background of the conceptualized single source 
appears as the shifting of the opposites in relation 
to the background, or in relation to each other. 
This is interpreted as the temporalization of the 
connective medium.  It is here that artificial time 
appears.  The first artificial juxtaposition of the 
opposites is only possible in a frozen moment of 
time.  It begins to deteriorate immediately.  In 
order to draw attention away from that 
deterioration, attention is shifted to another pair 
of opposites, held in a similar juxtaposition.  
There then arises the concept of 'twins', that 
serves to connect the series of opposites.  'Process 
Being' appears as this temporalization, or 
deterioration, of the series of juxtapositions of 
opposites.  Once the twins appear, there is the 
possibility of structural encoding which extends the 
delay-period of artificial time even further.  The 
single source is reinterpreted from being a spatial 
continuity (Pure Presence) into the temporal 
continuity of the delay-period (Process Being), and 
then reinterpreted again as discontinuity between 
patterned quantal phases (Hyper Being).  Once the 
discontinuities appear as regular eruptions of 
formlessness into the continuity of time, then the 
single source can be conceptually considered as this 
formlessness.  How-, ever, this is only a stage in 
the process of establishing
a depth-continuity, where the single source is seen 
as pure transformation, and the delay-period is seen 
as endless.  This is where the single source has 
been fully amalgamated with the series of opposites. 
It has become the foreground and the series of 
opposites, plus their different patternings, have 
become the background.  The form of manifestation of 
the ideational template, which is its centre, is 
merely the transformation of the concept of the 
single source from background into foreground 
continuity.  Deep continuity is where the 
repetitions are no longer seen — neither the repe-
titions of opposites juxtaposed in dialectical 
moments of contradiction, nor the repetition of 
movement from one dimensionality to the next in end-
less series.  This transformation of the concept of 
the single source from background to time, from the 
temporal continuity of the delay-period into form-
lessness, from formlessness into foreground con-
tinuity, is an attempt to capture and contain it 
conceptually.  This is the central task of the ide-
ational template. It brings forms into manifesta-
tion, only to capture formlessness.  It creates dia-
lectical moments and structural patterning phases, 
only in order to bring to the foreground the deep 
continuity of the illusorily endless delay-period. 
The disconnection of the segments of the shell of 
the ideational template by not positing continuity, 
gives Being to the single source alone, and because 
of this, Being is never fragmented.  The opposites 
are never seen together as connected.  When they are 
brought together, they vanish, and only the single 
source is seen.  Since the elements, that make up 
the shell of the ideational template, are never seen 
together, no distortion is produced by the movement 
of thought.  The stillness of thought is in the 
witnessing of each of the opposites, or of the sin-
gle source.  If one does not have this stillness of 
thought, then the closest one may come to apprehen-
ding the disconnection between the segments of the 
shell of the template within the universe of dis-
course (i.e. the delay-period) is to use the 
quantization of the structural aspect of the uni-
verse of discourse to display that disconnection in 
a conceptual way.  This is the object of the argu-
ment concerning emergence.  By giving a series of 
pictures which are related by structural dis-
continuity, rather than syllogistic continuity, one 
is using the feature of the delay-period, which is 
closest to the form of the ideational template's 
shell, in order to model it.      
In the argument concerning emergence, one begins 
with the single source, and works toward the un-
folding of the ideational template, which is the 
opposite direction from that taken in the argument 
concerning nihilism.  The argument concerning 
nihilism began within the universe of discourse, and 
worked toward the single source.  It could never 
reach it from that starting point, and the closest 
it could get is the positing of the non-nihilistic 
distinction, but such a distinction cannot be made 
in that ambience by the very nature of the ambi-
guity, which it contains.  The argument concerning 
emergence is, on the other hand, about the arising 
of a non-nihilistic distinction from the single 
source.  That distinction is ultimately between the 
use of the ideational template in disconnection or 
in connection.  When it is used in disconnection, 
genuine emergence is seen.  When it is used in 
connection, artificial emergence arises that 
obscures genuine emergence, turning that genuine 
emergence into something which comes into conflict 
with ideation and crushes it.  It becomes an image 
of the crisis of cancellation, inherent in the 
working of the ideational template itself.  The use 
of the ideational template in connection results in 
disconnection, as the use of it in disconnection 
results in the recognition of the inherent connec-
tion of the single source.  The disconnection that 
results from connection may be used to model the 
disconnection that results in inherent connection. 
Disconnection is sharp distinguishing.  So the sharp 
clear-cut distinctions, that occur within the 
structure of the closed-space, may be used as a 
model for the non-nihilistic distinction.  Those 
distinctions within the structure need the back-
ground of the nihilism of the closed-space of the 
delay-period to be seen; whereas the non-nihilistic 
distinction does not need the nihilistic background 
to be seen.  Thus, with the non-nihilistic distinc-
tion, one has gone out of the Platonic cave into the 
light of the sun.  The non-nihilistic distinction is 
not in relation to nihilism at all.  The nihilism 
does not arise, because the template is held in 
disconnection.  The pure distinction is between the 
opposites, that are never seen together, or between 
them and the single source. This distinction is 
made, based on the underlying pure connection of the 
single source: it arises directly from the single 
source. Such a clear-cut distinction, is the 
purification of the nihilistic opposites by the 
application of disconnection to the shell of the 
ideational template.  It takes the nihilism out of 
oppositeness, that occurs there, because of the 
ambiguity of the delay-period. The non-nihilistic 
distinction is like a 'potency' of the nihilistic 
opposites, because it presents pure oppositeness, in 
their disconnection from each other, and from the 
single source, upon which the opposites are still 
completely dependent, and which contains pure 
connection.  It is like a 'potency', because in it 
none of the nihilism, that results from the use of 
the ideational template for connection, is left to 
blur the distinction in any way.  The only thing 
approaching the clarity of the non-nihilistic dis-
tinction in the delay-period is the breaks between 
emergent quanta.  Therefore, these may be used to 
construct a model of the arising of the non-
nihilistic distinction.  This is, however, only a 
model, made up of a series of structurally related 
pictures.  Each picture has a different pattern. The 
clarity of the distinction between them rests on the 
production of a compensating unclearness and 
ambiguity.  Clarity of distinction, without this 
compensating ambiguity, is what is being modeled. So 
this means of understanding the non-nihilistic 
distinction is inherently flawed. 
Picture A:  There is a single source.  This state-
ment cannot be understood in the arena of discourse 
that is dedicated to the conceptual domination of 
the single source by capturing it descriptively and 
converting it into different sorts of Being.  The 
ideational template cannot capture the single 
source.  It comes from it, like all the other forms 
and opposites in existence.  The single source dom-
inates the ideational template.  The ideational tem-
plate's disconnection is only a means of indicating 
the single source.  One moves from opposite to op-
posite; from another opposite to its opposite; and 
again from yet another opposite to its opposite. The 
series is not tied together.  The opposites are not 
connected by anything, other than that, if one of a 
pair of opposites comes into view, then it is 
certain that its opposite will follow, as Socrates 
said at the beginning of the Phaedo.  If, in this 
process, one brings the opposites into disconnected, 
non-contradictory juxtaposition, then they both 
disappear (cancel each other out), and the single 
source appears.  When the formless appears, it does 
not mean that forms disappear.  This is the myth 
that all the misuse of the ideational template is 
based on.  The attempt to impose formless continuity 
on form makes the forms appear to disappear. 
Purification of forms by ideational disconnection 
allows the formless to be seen in the forms them-
selves.  No-form is the purified form, and not the 
absence of form as blankness.  The opposites of dis-
connection at the beginning, or at the surface, and 
connection in the end, or in the depth, are held in 
disconnected non-contradictory juxtaposition.  There 
is only the single source in existence. 
Picture B:  Everything (form, qualitative opposite, 
and oppositeness of things) arises and returns to 
the single source.  Genuine emergence is this 
arising and return, for in it the single source is 
continuously indicated.  Arising and returning are 
opposites.  They must be held together in discon-
nected juxtaposition.  They are surface (shell) and 
depth (centre of the core).  The second picture is 
of how the disconnected opposites constantly indi-
cate the single source in their disconnected suc-
cession.  Each laying down of a pattern of opposi-
tion within the clear register of the forms comes 
from the single source, and is timed by it.  This is 
the source's appearance as Time.  This is one of the 
many qualities of the source, which are indicated by 
the play of the opposites with respect to it.  Thus, 
whereas in Picture A, the formlessness of the single 
source was indicated, in Picture B, the laying down 
of the succession of opposite qualities within the 
transparency of the forms, which constantly indicate 
that formelessness, appears. 
Picture C: the distinction between genuine and 
artificial emergence arises from the source.  This 
distinction only becomes necessary when the forms 
are focused on, instead of the opposite qualities. 
Then the forms become muddy with ambiguity, and 
solidified by structuralisation.  This all comes 
from the attempt to connect the opposites, rather 
than realizing their essential disconnection.  Con-
necting the opposites is fundamentally the 
generation 
of an illusion.  Within this illusory ambience, in 
which connections are apparently sustained over 
time, disconnections between the patterning of 
emergent quanta appear.  These seeming appearances 
of new patterns are taken as an image for the laying 
down of new patterns of the opposites, which come in 
succession by the timing of Time.  Thus artificial 
emergences are made to stand in for the genuine 
emergences which are the timing of Time.  Artificial 
emergence covers over genuine emergence.  Within the 
realm of artificial time the non-nihilistic dis-
tinction between genuine and artificial emergence 
can only be indicated, because the single source 
cannot be reached, until the dislocation of the 
ideational template's shell occurs.  The ideational 
template is a form that appears from the source.  It 
is either used in connection or disconnection.  Ac-
cordingly, one either witnesses genuine emergence or 
artificial emergence. One cannot witness emergence 
until one changes the way that the ideational 
template is used.  The non-nihilistic distinction 
may only occur in experience, and cannot be 
approached in discourse, unless that discourse is 
based on the necessary change in experience.  The 
two uses of the ideational template, which produce 
the distinction between genuine and artificial 
emergence, are possibilities set in it from the 
first, i.e. since the ideational form comes from the 
single source, along with everything else, and this 
possibility of two uses is coded into it, then the 
distinction between genuine and artificial emergence 
comes from the single source. 
Picture D:  The distinction between artificial and 
genuine emergence is necessary in order to know the 
single principle more fully.  This means that the 
whole of the ideational template's complete elabora-
tion is necessary to strengthen the pointing of the 
opposites in disconnection toward the single source. 
If the opposites in disconnection were all that 
there were, and the template could not be used for 
connection, then the transition from the opposites 
in disconnection to the single source would never 
have been made.  The template used in connection 
points toward its use in disconnection.  The gross 
tool of power and manipulation points toward the 
subtle use, which comprehends the opposites, that in 
turn points toward the single source.  If the ide-
ational template did not have these two sides, then 
the single source could never have been seen. This 
is because there is not just a myriad of dis-
connected opposites, but the means of apprehending 
the opposites has two directions as well — from the 
surface connection to depth- disconnection or from 
surface disconnection to depth-connection.  There is 
a fundamental disconnection between these two 
directions.  If it were not for the disconnection 
between the opposite directions of the template, 
i.e. that the means of knowing opposites was itself 
in the form of disconnected opposites, then there 
would be no access to the single source.  The 
disconnection of the directions of the use of the 
template holds, no matter how it is used.  So, 
disconnection is coded into the template in such a 
way that, if any one looks deeply into it they must 
find disconnection.  If one connects, then one 
arrives at disconnection.  If one disconnects, then 
one arrives at the single source.  This is because 
disconnection is between the opposites and between 
the opposites and the single source.  It has two 
aspects.  These two aspects are connected.  The 
connection of the two aspects of disconnection is 
opposite to the two directions the ideational 
template uses. 
FIGURE 8 
The proof that the core of the ideational template 
still manifests itself, even if the template is used 
in the direction of disconnection, is that under-
lying 93 the number series is the binary harmonic. 
The number series, i.e. the natural numbers, is the 
means of indexing the series of repeated forms by 
attaching diacritical marks, distinguishing iden-
tical forms.  This series seems to be of indefinite 
in extent both directions from zero, whether they 
  
 
 
are interpreted as real numbers or not. When 
indefinite extent is interpreted as endlessness, 
then infinity becomes attached to the series. 
Infinity is the ramification,  the double-mirroring, 
of the mirroring of the number series at the zero 
point.  Thus, as Francis points out, zero and 
infinite are conceptual opposites.  Each element in 
the number series has an internal coherence, which 
is expressed by its associated dimension in the 
series of higher   dimensions.94 For instance, the 
internal coherence of the number four is the 
articulation of fourth-dimensional space.  The 
articulation of the internal coherence of each 
numerical value appears in the regular polytopes 
associated with its equivalent dimensional space. B. 
Fuller has shown that, underlying the number series 
is a cycle of eight moments (indexed by what he 
calls 'indigs' which are repeated summations of 
digits until only one remains).  This eight-fold 
cycle is the third level of the unfolding of a 
progressive bi-section, and the progressive bisec-
tion's unfolding may be shown to be tied to the 
levels of complexity exhibited by the regular 
polytopes of the third and fourth dimensions.  This 
typing of the stages of the progressive bisection to 
the series of regular polytopes of the third and 
fourth dimensions suggests that underneath the 
indefiniteness of the number-series is a definite 
articulation with a finite limit, so that the series 
of numbers is contrasted to the finite permutational 
matrices of its opposites in a remarkable way.  It 
is this permutational matrix, based on the binary 
harmonic, which will be used instead of the opposite 
forms, to form a contrast to the qualitative op-
posites in the logic of disconnection, that appears 
in the next chapter.  The progressive bisection is 
called harmonic, because of its dovetailing with the 
series of regular polytopes, that mark the levels of 
complexity of structure, limits the unfolding of the 
progressive bisection, which would otherwise be end-
less.  The levels of unfolding of structure become 
harmonic thresholds of complexity, in which its 
wave-length/quanta are dictated by the progressive 
bisection's form.  Basically, here the linear number 
series is contrasted with the underlying cyclical 
nature of the progressive bisection, and structure 
is contrasted with harmonics.  The core of the 
ideational template may be seen to face either 
toward 'Picture B' in which the binary harmonic 
manifests itself, or toward 'Picture C, in which 
the number series manifests itself.  The binary 
harmonic provides a complete context for the des-
cription of the interaction of the opposites in the 
laying down of the timing of Time.  That makes the 
contrast of the qualitative opposites with the 
opposite forms no longer necessary. 
The disconnection between the two directions of the 
template (i.e. facing toward Pictures A & B or to-
ward Pictures C & D) and the connection between the 
two disconnections (i.e., that between the opposites 
and between the opposites and the single principle) 
are twin images of the same thing.  The former is 
the basis of the fragmentation that appears in the 
centre of the template, while the latter is the 
basis on which the disconnection of the shell of the 
template works. The disconnection of the opposites 
and the disconnection between the opposites and the 
single source, is the sign of a strong connection of 
dependence between each of the opposites and the 
single source which is independent of the opposites. 
This strong connection is one of origination and 
dependence — not of relationship. The two direc-
tions have just such a connection.  Thus the direc-
tion of first connection (toward Pictures C and D), 
which makes the whole structural system arise, comes 
directly from the single source, and by it one goes 
into the ideational template endlessly.  Also the 
direction of the first disconnection (toward 
Pictures A & B), which lets one bypass the morass of 
the working-out the form of the ideational template 
to see other forms, comes directly from the source. 
By these two possibilities of going into the tem-
plate, or 'by-passing' it, as it is part of the 
means of knowing oppositeness itself, there is 
doubled oppositeness.  These are opposite ways of 
knowing opposites.  'Double oppositeness' (between 
opposites and between opposites together and single 
source) is opposite the doubled disconnection neces-
sary to disassemble the triads formed by the shell. 
Here we see two views of the same cognitive forma-
tion that appeared when the two separate cognitive 
modes based on oscillation and reiteration were 
discussed.  This fourfold formation96 is the 
cognitive model, that is the basis of the binary 
harmonic, which in turn is the basis of all numbers. 
By fourfold formation is meant, first, the primor-
dial establishment of disconnected opposites, such 
as inward and outward, and second, the interpre-
tation of those opposites on the basis of two dis-
connected cognitive modes.  The first mode sees only 
sensory information, i.e. pairs of qualitative 
opposites, and this is based on the ability to 
oscillate between reference points.  The second mode 
sees only indications of the single source in the 
meanings of these opposites, and this is based on 
the ability to circle around a single point.  By 
permutation the two primordially established 
opposites (i.e. inward/outward) and the two cogni-
tive modes combine to present a fourfold configura-
tion, which must be recognized as the basic model of 
cognition, when the illusion of the form of the 
ideational template is drawn aside.  The twin views 
of this formation is what makes it appear as the 
ideational template.  Twinning of the shell and the 
centre of the template happens around the templates 
structural core, which is the binary harmonic seen 
from one direction, and from the other direction is 
the number-series, standing also for the series of 
higher dimensions.  The ideational template results 
from the conceptualization of the fourfold form of 
cognition.  The four-fold form of cognition is the 
means of transition between opposites, which con-
tinually indicates the single source.  The con-
ceptualization of the four-fold formation occurs 
when the experiencer (transcendental subject) of the 
experienced (transcendental object) is withdrawn 
from the locus of cognition.  The four-fold forma-
tion appears purely in the realm of disconnected 
opposites.  When the opposites of experiencer/ 
experienced and oppositeness/single source are kept 
in disconnection, but recognized as the description 
of the same locus of cognition, then the four-fold 
formation occurs.  It is turned into the ideational 
template, if the opposites of the four-fold 
formation are connected. 
The set of structurally defined pictures (A, B, C, 
D) is a gross simulation of the four-fold cognitive 
formation, based on the full elaboration of the ide-
ational template.  The moments of the four-fold 
formation are not structurally related.  They are a 
description of the unified process of cognition, 
rather than a disconnected set of pictures of the 
unfolding of the ideational template.  A full 
exegesis of this unified process is not possible in 
the limits imposed by the structural model.  For 
that the possibility of a logic of disconnection 
must be explored, within which the spirit of the 
disconnection of the shell of the ideational 
template is represented.  Only then is it possible 
that the imaginary form of the template might 
disappear and the lattice of the four-fold 
cognitive function be seen fully. 
CHAPTER 5 
The argument concerning emergence and the argument 
concerning nihilism cancel each other out within the 
universe of discourse governed by ideation, which is 
used as a means of connection.  By their cancella-
tion the limit of the ideational template's use as a 
means of connecting opposites is reached.  In can-
cellation one is brought up against pure discont-
inuity.  Thought that begins by connection must end 
by confronting discontinuity as cancellation.  This 
is why antinomic opposition is the sign of pure 
reason, and why cancellation of antinomic opposites 
is the highest philosophical experience.  It is only 
reached by one whose thought undergoes a transforma-
tive process, so that it goes from one extreme to 
another.  When the two extremes are brought toget-
her, cancellation occurs.  However, in this case by 
taking emergence and nihilism as opposites, it has 
been possible to present a complete unfolding of the 
form of the ideational template within the transfor-
mative space between the beginning of the delay-
period and cancellation.  The recognition of the 
form of the ideational template leads to the recog-
nition, that it is possible to disconnect the 
elements of its shell from the beginning; and thus 
avoid completely the arising of a formal system and 
its structural elaboration.  So, at the end, there 
is a new beginning.  That is to say, that, if 
thought can incorporate disconnection from the 
beginning, then the end will not be cancellation. 
One will not enter the delay-period of ambiguity, 
and mixture of the opposites will not occur.  The 
task then becomes the construction of a 'logic of 
disconnection'.  In other words this study would be 
incomplete if it did not present at least an 
approach toward the alternative to the use of the 
ideational template in connection.  However, the 
development of a logic of disconnection entails the 
facing of the awesome situation that the disconnec-
tion of the opposites entails.  For the intellect it 
is the step out of the closed-space of the period of 
ambiguity and the safety of logical connections into 
an arena where an admission of incapacity is the 
first step. 
The logic of disconnection is embedded in the 
Platonic dialogues, and the study of the Phaedo in 
this essay shows how the logic of disconnected opp-
osites may be clearly differentiated from the mix-
ture of opposites by ideational processes.  There is 
no-where else that one may turn to within the 
western tradition for any enlightenment concerning 
these issues, all thinkers after Plato may be seen 
clearly to fall under the description of sophistry 
that Plato gives.  The westerners have read Plato 
for centuries, and then acted out the role of the 
sophist that he describes so clearly!  This is 
because they have all assumed that logic of 
connection was the correct methodological basis for 
thought.  Plato witnessed the results of the use of 
the logic of connection in his own time, and wrote 
his dialogues to display the social form that it 
takes.  One must learn and apply the methodology 
that Socrates displays in the dialogues, rather than 
listening to the ideas being discussed.  The method-
ology is the important aspect of the dialogues. The 
accusation that the citizens of Athens brought 
against Socrates was that he made the weaker 
argument overcome the stronger.  Socrates does not 
refute this.  The logic of connection seems out-
wardly strong, but is inwardly fragmented.  Dis-
connection seems weak and implausible beside the 
tremendous possibilities for control and 
manipulation contained in the logic of connection; 
but in the end it proves stronger, because it points 
to a deep inner connection, to which the logic of 
connection has no access.  Human wisdom, says 
Socrates, comes by holding on to ignorance and 
recognizing that 
wisdom belongs to God.1  The one who displays an 
outward show of wisdom is discovered to be really 
ignorant twice over, because he is unaware of his 
ignorance.  The seemingly weak argument is the one 
which holds to opposites and disconnects them.  The 
seemingly strong argument makes connections between 
opposites, and finally leaves them for a fascination 
with form.  Socrates does not make the weak argument 
overcome the stronger, but it is in the nature of 
existence that the strong, which does not move 
toward weakness by choice, is moved there by force, 
and ends up defeating itself.  Socrates questions 
his interlocutors concerning opposites, and dis-
covers that they contradict themselves because they 
mix up the opposites.  He is only seen to dismantle 
their systems of thought because he holds to the 
disconnection of the opposites in his dialogue.  The 
methodology of holding to opposites and their dis-
connection, when maintained in the context of the 
application of the principle of no secondary causa-
tion, gives a cohesive description of what a logic 
of disconnection must concern itself with.  Speaking 
about opposites in disconnection as a means of 
indicating the single source is the complete method-
ology for the destructuring of the ideational 
template. 
The exegesis of the Platonic dialogues is one route 
that one might follow, in the display of the logic 
of disconnection.  However, men in the western 
tradition have been reading these dialogues for cen-
turies, and still they have all become sophists. The 
problem is to realize the meaning of the difference 
between the logics of connection and disconnection 
in our own time.  Like Athens in Plato's time, the 
cycle of the logic of connection has gone full 
circle, and by looking at the place that 
contemporary ontology has arrived at in the 
fragmentation of the concept of Being, it is 
possible in this time to get a complete picture of 
the workings of the ideational template.  By 
recognition of that cycle that begins with 
connection and ends with fragmentation, it is 
possible to explore what the movement in the 
opposite direction would entail.  Somehow, the men 
of the western tradition cannot make the connection 
between what they read in the Platonic dialogues and 
what is happening in their own time. This is 
because, somehow, men have disappeared, and all that 
is seen is the conceptual system.  To speak of 
philosophers being sophists is somehow inadequate, 
when they are completely overwhelmed by, and have 
become slaves to, the dialectical unfolding of the 
ideational template.  The recognition of the 
description of the master/slave dialectic between 
sophist and his dupe, the prisoner in the cave, 
which Plato describes in such detail and which 
appears in the western tradition as the difference 
between the subject and Dasein2 for instance, or in 
the difference between scientist and Bricoleur3 as 
another example, is submerged under the slavery of 
both to the ideational template, that produces the 
cave, in which they are both trapped.  (As in 
Waiting for Godot by Beckett,4 Pozzo and Lucky 
reappear, with the slave leading the blinded master. 
The inevitable exchange of roles occurs, and seems 
funny in the landscape of complete nihilism that 
Vladamir and Estragon face.5)  Thus a view of the 
structural system and its ontology is more important 
at this time, than a view of the sophist and his 
ruses.  The vehicle, by which the show of knowledge 
was made, has taken on a life of its own, and the 
men have been lost sight of completely.6  Men have 
become merely the vehicle for the self-transforming 
of the structural system, that is the product of the 
ideational template.  When disconnection of the 
shell of the template occurs, then the whole of the 
mirage produced by the ideational template disap-
pears, and only men are left.  They appear naked. 
When one looks at the men themselves, it is clear 
that they have been debased instead of exalted by 
their slavery to the conceptual system, that has 
completely engulfed their existence.  In order to 
make the necessity of a logic of disconnection clear 
to men such as these, it is necessary to present it 
in terms that they will understand in this time. 
The place to begin is with Hume, for by taking his 
argument further than he himself did, one comes up 
against disconnection.  It may be that there are no 
a priori synthetic judgments, as Kant would call 
them.  If this is true, i.e. if the ideational tem-
plate does not function as a prototypical connecting 
device before experience, if there is no noumenon 
that acts as a model for the construction of all 
objects to be presented to the understanding as a 
filter for sense-experience, which makes it conform 
to the projected (a priori) model, then the situa-
tion is that one is awash in sensory stimuli, and 
chaos would seem to have to be the final outcome. 
This distinction between the alternatives of the 
prototypical use of the ideational template for con-
nection and for chaos is obviously nihilistic. Chaos 
is, in fact, a specific kind of order.  It is the 
order of erratic change.  It is the ideational tem-
plate that turns all sensory experience filtered out 
by it into chaos, in order to have a background upon 
which to see the structural system which results 
from the use of the ideational template to make a 
priori synthetic connections.  If a priori synthetic 
connections are rejected, then understanding and 
sensory experience must be seen in a completely new 
light.  One is faced with the stopping of all 
thought by the disconnection of the shell of the 
ideational template.  In the face of this contin-
gency, which causes the whole philosophical and 
scientific edifice of the western tradition to 
evaporate, the men of the western tradition have 
shrunk back.  Why is it that no one has taken Kant's 
extreme positing of the Humean argument of discon-
nection, and explored it?  It is set out clearly by 
Kant himself.  Why have all the philosophers since 
Kant operated within the problematic, that he has 
defined, instead of directly questioning the 
position on which that problematic is based.  The 
denial of a priori synthetic judgments brings us 
face to face with disconnection of the shell of the 
ideational template in its strongest form. 
Therefore, let us begin with the denial that a 
priori synthetic judgments are possible.  This means 
that the opposites are disconnected, and further 
that the opposites are disconnected from any third, 
either on the same or any higher or lower plane of 
existence.  This immediately puts out of play the 
developments of the philosophical tradition since 
Kant, which are basically transformations of the  
arena of philosophical discourse that he defined.  
Kant idealized the syllogism, and made it a priori.  
From that point on, the formal system became 
autonomous and men lost control of it.  All 
the developments of the structural system and its 
concomitant ontology recorded in the works of sub-
sequent philosophers are completely dependent on 
this deification of the logical process, represented 
by the syllogism.  By denying the possibility of a 
priori synthetic judgments, one is freed from any 
reference to the rest of modern and contemporary 
philosophy, which merely explores the ramifications 
of the positing of their possibility.  One has 
recognized the form of the ideational template's use 
as a means of connection, and turned away from it. 
The denial of the possibility of a priori synthetic 
judgments makes the two sets of distinctions between 
a priori/a posteriori and analytic/synthetic 
evaporate.  This is because, as he points out 
clearly, all analysis is based on prior synthesis. 
If no synthesis occurs, then analysis is impossible. 
Analysis before experience is impossible; it is a 
blank category.  An a priori synthesis is the basis 
of both a posteriori analysis, and synthesis.  If 
the a priori synthesis does not occur, then these 
two latter processes of the intellect cannot either. 
It is that a priori synthesis is the first 
connection of the opposites, which begins the delay-
period.  If this primary connection does not happen, 
then all the separation and connection of the opp-
osites within the delay-period does not occur.  In 
fact, the empty category of a priori analysis, which 
for Kant is impossible; is the indication that, 
lurking behind the show of a priori synthesis, is 
its opposite -- a priori disconnection.  A priori/a 
posteriori may be interpreted to mean outside and 
inside the delay-period.  A priori analysis, if it 
occurred, would mean that the delay- period could 
not exist.  With a priori analysis the spectre of 
the use of the disconnection of the ideational 
template appears.  What is being deemed here is that 
the transcendental subject is the source of a priori 
synthesis.  If the subject assumes as its role a 
priori analysis (Kant's impossible category), then 
the source of a priori synthesis shifts immediately 
to the single source. 
If a priori synthesis is denied and one looks for 
the meaning of a priori analysis in the formation of 
a logic of disconnection, then where should one 
begin?  Again, it seems that Hume has hit the mark. 
He says, that the greatest mystery of the universe 
is found in one's own body.  When you make an 
intention to move a limb, and it moves, there is no 
access to the power by which that movement takes 
place.  The intention or will, and the movement of 
the limb, are essentially disconnected.  The 
intention is inward, and the movement is outward. 
These are opposites.  In the human being they are 
essentially disconnected.  Merleau-Ponty speaks of 
this disconnection in terms of the 'chiasm' of 
touch/touching.7  The power which connects the two 
is never seen.  Now, when one speaks generally of a 
power, then it seems to be a third thing between the 
intention and the movement.  Let us begin by apply-
ing the rule of the disconnection of the opposites 
and the principle of no secondary causation to this 
situation.  When disconnection is taken as the rule, 
then man must immediately refer to his own experi-
ence, because everything else is blown away.  By 
denying a priori synthesis it is not possible for 
the power which moves the limb to be some connection 
outside our experience.  A priori analysis comes to 
mean the facing of the counter intuitive disconnec-
tions, that appear in our own experience.8 
The inward and the outward are essentially discon-
nected.  This is because in our own experience we do 
not know how we move our own limbs, except that we 
have secondary explanations concerning neurons and 
muscles, etc.  These explanations merely beg the 
question, by bringing in matters that we have even 
less access to.  Now, if we accept that we have no 
access to the power by which we move our own limbs, 
then we may either assume a priori synthetic connec-
tion, or convert the power into a mystery, as Hume 
does.  The methodology of the logic of disconnection 
is to first recognize the disconnection between the 
inward and the outward.  Then, to disconnect these 
opposites from the power, which is beyond experi-
ence, but whose power may be seen in the coordin-
ation of inward and outward effects.  Once the 
disconnection between these three elements has been 
undertaken, then the principle of no secondary 
causation may be applied.  This principle indicates 
that everything is conditioned (i.e. arranged for 
the best) by a single source, and thus utterly 
dependent on the single source.  It is the single 
source that gives rise to both the intention to move 
in the inward, and the movement in the outward. Now, 
the key point is that, either one looks at the 
inward intention (the subtle), or the outward move-
ment (the gross).  Both cannot be seen at once. 
Likewise, if the opposites of inward or outward are 
being looked at, then the single source cannot be 
seen.       In terms of this very situation let us 
look at the fact that what appears are two opposite 
realms of inward and outward.  Within these two 
realms appear another set of opposites of intention 
and action. Thus, there are two sets of opposites 
involved here. One set defines in its disconnection 
the locus of experience and the other set also 
appears within that locus as disconnected.  The 
locus and the pattern of opposites, that appear 
within it, are 
essentially disconnected from each other as well. 
One must look more closely at the locus and at its 
nature.  As Hume points out the greatest mystery of 
the universe appears there.  Now, by the application 
of the disconnection of opposites and the principle 
of the single source, we have a way of looking at 
this mystery, that avoids both the pitfalls of Kant 
and Hume's explanations of the situation.  Positing 
a priori synthesis, or converting the power into a 
mystery, are nihilistic and conceptual opposites, 
which deny human experience of this mystery.  The 
mystery disappears, when it is realized that the 
opposite realms of experience are disconnection, and 
what appears in both of them arises from the single 
source. 
Kant attributes to man three faculties:  sense, 
understanding and reason.  Reason is either practi-
cal or pure, i.e. applied to understanding, or not 
applied to understanding.  Reason is the faculty of 
making connections, using logic.  If we deny the 
possibility of a priori synthesis, then both reason 
and understanding are attacked and, as Hume says, 
they are converted into a merely useful illusion. 
This is precisely what they are.  For Hume, then, 
one is left with just sensory experience and illu-
sory connections, based on the seeming continuity of 
experience.  These are again nihilistic opposites. 
The application of the disconnection of the 
opposites and the principle of the single source to 
Hume's recognition of the awesomeness of the human 
being's capacity to experience the movement of his 
own body by will allows a different picture of human 
faculties to appear.  By disconnecting opposites, 
then affirming the single source, one has already 
thereby divided human experience into two realms, 
the experience of the opposites, and the affirmation 
of the oneness, which cannot be seen at the same 
time as the opposites.  The first might be called 
sensory, and the latter meaning.  The whole of the 
description of the human mystery pointed out by Hume 
can be contained in the division of the locus of the 
appearance of that mystery into inward/outward and 
sensory/meaning.  Intention is meaning.  Movement of 
the limb is sensory.  The intention points to the 
wholeness of the movement as a complete action. 
Thus, it points to the single source.  The opposites 
of intention and action are in another way both 
sensory, and meaning is the power that moves them 
both.  Sensory is the experience of, or information 
about, the disconnected qualitative opposites, and 
meaning is the indication of the oneness, that con-
ditions or lies behind these opposites.  Inward/out-
ward and sensory/meaning permutate with each other, 
to make up what may be called a four-fold cognitive 
formation,9 which is the core-description of the 
 locus of experience of the manifestation of the 
power of conditioning of the single source, as it 
appears to the human being.  The logic of discon-
nection is based on the recognition of formation of 
this locus, by means of the binary harmonic, and the 
appearance within its context of all the other 
opposites, which man experiences. 
This description is essentially different from that 
of Socrates, given in the Phaedo, because the quali-
tative opposites are contrasted to the formation of 
the locus in which they appear, rather than to 
opposite forms.  This maintains the uniformity of 
the process of disconnection, and gives a firm foun-
dation for developing a logic of disconnection.  The 
point is to avoid the fascination with forms, which 
is the means by which the delay-period is conjured 
up.  The connection of the opposites in terms of 
forms leads to a giving of primacy to form, and the 
attempt to hold on to forms.  All this is avoided by 
the rigorous application of the disconnection of 
opposites, and the principle of a single source to 
the human experience.  Then the contrast that is 
necessary between qualitative opposites and opposite 
forms, in order to see the discontinuity between 
qualitative opposites, clearly disappears, because 
the contrast of the locus and the opposites that 
appear within it is substituted.  This is a much 
stronger intellectual statement, since it leaves 
form altogether.  It puts at the centre of experi-
ence the power that determines and moves everything. 
Hume points out that this power of the single source 
manifests itself in the mind in the connection of 
thoughts, in our bodies and in the universe.  Since 
the realm of thought has been traced to the use of 
language as a control-technique, which appears as 
the syllogism, and when applied to existence as a 
means of generating specific control techniques 
manifests as the ideational template.  The discon-
nection of the syllogism that is an icon of the 
shell of the template, which creates conceptual 
triads as the basis of formal systematics, immedi-
ately brings thought up against the problem of 
disconnection.  Thought as a separate realm, or a 
third thing, separating the body's experience of 
power and the experience of that power in the 
universe, vanishes.  The self appears as opposite 
the universe.  The fourfold formation of the locus 
of cognition applies to both.  That is to say, that 
one recognizes that the locus of inward/outward and 
sensory/meaning are the realms, in which both the 
self and existence come into manifestation as a 
patterning of qualitative disconnected opposites. 
Just by looking carefully at what Hume has said, and 
applying the disconnection of opposites and the 
principle of a single source gleaned from the study 
of the Socratic dialogue, the Phaedo, there is 
already a firm basis for a construction of a logic 
of disconnection.10  The outline of this logic will 
be presented in a set of 81 pictures, to which 
commentary will be appended.  In the development of 
the logic of disconnection from the recognition of 
the form of the locus, and the pattern of opposites 
that appear within it, there are four crucial steps. 
Each step is in fact an elaboration of the form of 
the four-fold cognitive formation of the locus. 
First there is the positing of the permutations of 
the pairs of opposites, which does not mix the 
opposites of the pairs themselves, that constitutes 
the locus.  Secondly, there is the addition of 
another set of opposites, that give further defini-
tion to the locus.  These are the opposites some-
where/nowhere.  Third is the idea that there is an 
instantaneous, or more properly, out-of-time inter-
change of the opposites.  Fourthly, there is the 
constant indication of the single source at every 
step in the process of the recognition of inter-
change.  Each of these steps appears from the con-
sideration of what the disconnection of opposites 
and the principle of the single source means. 
Therefore, before presenting the outline of the 
logic of disconnection and its commentary there will 
be a brief exposition of these four points. 
Consider the locus of the experience of the power of 
the single source.  It is made up of the discon-
nection of the realms inward/outward, and the dis-
connection of the types of experience that appear in 
these realms, into sensory/meaning: that is, infor-
mation about qualitative opposites, and indication 
of oneness.  Both these are language processes. 
Therefore it might be said that the disconnection of 
the shell of the ideational template allows language 
to cease to function as a technique for forging 
connection and controlling the experience of time, 
and lets language function on a more basic level, as 
the means of recognizing and distinguishing 
opposites, and of indicating the single source.  In 
the beginning of the Apology, which is the opposite 
dialogue to the Phaedo, Socrates differentiated 
between the language of the open spaces of the city 
and the rhetoric of the court.  He says he will 
speak the first thing that comes to him, and that 
will be the truth.  The control of language by 
thought is differentiated from spontaneous language. 
For Socrates spontaneous and truthful language is 
that which holds to opposites and which indicates 
meanings.  Once language is re-evaluated, being no 
longer a means of control of experience, but instead 
a means of recognizing and holding apart the 
opposites and of indicating oneness, then the 
impossibility of separating man's experience from 
language becomes clear.  The creation of the realm 
of thought is just such a separation.  It creates a 
completely artificial realm, which is the universe 
of discourse, in which artificial speech (rhetoric) 
and artificial connections (logic) are produced. 
Spontaneous, true speech completely fills the locus 
of the experience of the power of the single source. 
This complete filling-up manifests itself as the 
permutation of the two sets of opposites inward/out-
ward and sensory/meaning.  This permutation gives 
the locus its form because the separation of the 
opposites must be rigorously maintained.  It is of a 
fundamentally different kind from that which pro-
duces the twins of nihilistic opposition.  Permuta-
tion points to the fact that the locus is a single 
place of the manifestation of the power of the 
single source, which appears as a set of opposite 
realms, in which manifestation of that power can 
occur.  One must not forget that it is the 
individual man who is the locus of the experience of 
the single source. 
The permutation of the opposites outward/inward and 
sensory/meaning must rigorously maintain the dis-
tinction between the opposites.  It is emphatically 
not the mixture of the opposites themselves, which 
would inaugurate the delay-period of ambiguity. This 
permutation of the two sets of opposites is the 
unfolding of the four-fold formation of the locus, 
which allows the opposites to be brought together in 
this way.  Permutation, while rigorously maintaining 
distinction, produces an alternative to the grid of 
correspondences, that appears in the grid-landscape 
model of the formal system. 
That this alternative describes the locus of 
experience, rather than form and the essence (i.e. 
core attributes) of forms, is a major step away from 
the fascination with form that is so dangerous. This 
permutation is a way of exploring the meaning of the 
description of the locus of the experience of the 
power of the single source by these two oppositions.  
It allows the locus to be seen as 'single', with all 
its aspects interrelating, though distinction 
between opposites is rigorously maintained. Inward-
sensory in the example given, taken from Hume, is 
the appearance of the intention.  Outward-sensory is 
the apprehension of the movement of the limb.  
Inward and outward meaning are the ways these events 
indicate the single source, whose power they 
exemplify. 
Since the mixture of the opposites in the locus  
produces a further set of opposites, not all of 
these may be apprehended at once.  Only one of a 
pair of opposites isolated or permutated may be seen 
at once.  A further distinction is necessary to make 
this clear in relation to the locus of permutated 
opposites.  The distinction between somewhere/ 
nowhere will represent this situation, that arises 
only with the permutation of opposites.  When the 
inward sensory is 'somewhere' then outward meaning 
is 'nowhere' and so on with all the four realms of 
manifestation of experience.  The whole of the locus 
then becomes a further permutation of all these 
opposites.  Permutated opposites are not merely 
disconnected, so that either one opposite or the 
other is seen, but rather the distance across the 
quadrant of permutation must be represented.  This 
is because there is a set of oppositions transversal 
to whatever permutation of opposition-in-mixture is 
being considered.  The two transversal opposites 
that cut across the locus (i.e. IS/OM or OS/lM) are 
such, that if one of a set is being considered (is 
somewhere), then the other is nowhere — out of 
sight or in absence.  Either the opposites opposite 
each other in the locus are somewhere/nowhere, and 
the two sets of opposites are disconnected, or the 
two sets of opposites are somewhere/nowhere and the 
opposites opposite each other are disconnected.  In 
this way the two versions of the 
locus which are numbered "3" and "4" in what 
follows, are forged into a single picture of the 
locus. 
Once the programme of permutation of the opposites 
of the locus has been understood, then it is necess-
ary to go on to the next step, which is the intro-
duction of the concept of the out-of-time instanta-
neous interchange of opposites.  That is to say, 
that whatever opposite appears as part of the locus, 
or within the locus, it inevitably turns into its 
opposite, in such a way that the disconnection 
between the opposites is maintained, and the single 
source is indicated.  This is a key point, because 
in terms of a logic of disconnection the single 
source is indicated by the interchange between the 
opposites.  It is indicated because the opposites 
remain disconnected in their interchange:  there is 
no continuum.  The change to the opposite involves 
the complete discontinuity of the two opposites, 
which change into each other without that disconti-
nuity being crossed in any way.  Since the  discon-
tinuity is not "crossed" this means that, when one 
opposite is being withdrawn and the other is being 
substituted this must occur in some way 'out-of-
time', i.e. with complete discontinuity.  This with-
drawal and substitution indicate the single source, 
because only the single source has continuity, which 
goes on through the appearance of the complete dis-
continuity of instantaneous interchange.  It means 
in some way, that underlying every qualitative 
opposite is its opposite.  The opposite of every 
opposite is its truth, because it will inevitably be 
inter- changed for it instantaneously (out-of-time) 
through the appearance of a discontinuity that 
indicates the source.  The logic of discontinuity 
models this process of interchange. 
An example of interchange may be seen modeled in 
the Apology.  Meletus admits that he thinks that 
everyone but Socrates does the young of Athens good, 
and that only Socrates does them harm.  Socrates 
points out the ludicrousness of this on the analogy 
of horse trainers, and says that the truth must be, 
that few people do the young good in terms of train-
ing them, and many do them harm.  Socrates says that 
what Meletus says indicates that he never gave any 
thought to the education of the young at all.  This 
is not the best possible example of the interchange 
of opposites, but I have used it, because  it 
appears in the Apology, which is the opposite of the 
Phaedo.  The point about the example is that Socra-
tes allows the position of Meletus to become mani-
fest and then, by appeal to the analogy of the horse 
trainer, turns it over, to indicate the truth.  The 
truth is indicated by moving to the opposite  
position.  The appeal to analogy allows the 
interchange to occur and the truthfulness of the 
second position, that becomes manifest in that 
interchange, indicates the single source. 
In the Phaedo opposites are said to come from 
opposites and there are two processes of generation 
between them.  The dead gives rise to the living, 
and the living to the dead.11  But the process of 
going from dead to living is separated from the 
process of becoming dead for something living. 
According to the logic of disconnection the change 
in these processes from one opposite to the other 
is, however, not continuous.  The change is an out-
of-time interchange.  Death comes at a certain 
instant, and life comes at a certain instant.  The 
appearance of continuity must be broken by the 
knowledge that discontinuity is the rule.  This is 
marked in the Tibetan Book of the Dead by the 
appearance immediately after death of the Great 
Straight Upward Path i.e. the route out of the cycle 
of birth and death back to the single source.  This 
may be interpreted as the point at which out-of-time 
interchange occurs. 
The interchange occurs by one of the opposites being 
withdrawn, and the other appearing when the condi-
tions are correct.  The bringing together of the 
conditions gives the impression of continuity in the 
two processes of generation.  This is registered by 
discontinuity between the two processes of genera-
tion.  One is either going in one direction toward 
life, or the other toward death.  If one switches 
direction, then it is as if one process of 
generation is withdrawn and the other substituted. 
What is true for the two directions of generation is 
true for the opposites interchanged in those pro-
cesses of generation.  It is as if the moment of 
interchange were out-of-time.  The single source is 
indicated.  Each opposite 'runs into' the single 
source separately, rather than adjoining the other. 
But that running-into makes the opposite disappear 
and its opposite appear.  It is like a folding fan, 
which is closed one way then opened the other, keep-
ing the one edge of the fan still.  The logic of 
disconnection concerns the witnessing of this inter-
change, as it occurs in existence by the appearance 
of the opposites in the locus.  The object of the 
logic of disconnection is to give an adequate 
descriptive device, so that this witnessing may be 
facilitated.12 
The whole point in seeing the interchange of discon-
nected opposites is, that by it the single source is 
continually indicated.  Since there is, at every 
moment, an interchange between one opposite and its 
opposite, there is continual indication of the 
single source. It is becoming aware of this 
indication, which is the important point.  The fact 
that opposites are constantly interchanging means 
that the single source is always present in some 
aspect.  If one follows the interchange of opposites 
to see the opposites, then they are all that is 
seen, but if you follow the interchange, in order to 
see the constant indication of the single source, 
then that is what will appear.  All the use of the 
ideational template for connection, as if the 
synthetic a priori were true, indicates the logic of 
disconnection, and the logic of disconnection 
indicates the possibility of constantly being in 
tune with the manifestation of the single source. 
What follows is a condensed presentation of the 
logic of disconnection.  It is presented in a set of 
81 pictures.  At the end of this set of pictures is 
a commentary, which will explain the points more 
generally.  The set of pictures presents more con-
cretely the four steps of the development of the 
locus, that have just been explained. 
0. One 
1. inward/outward 
2. sensory/meaning 
3. inward-sensory/outward-meaning 
or 
inward-meaning/outward-sensory 
4. inward-sensory/inward-meaning 
or 
outward-sensory/outward-meaning 
5. nowhere/somewhere 
6. inward-sensory-nowhere/inward-sensory-somewhere 
inward-meaning-nowhere/inward-meaning-somewhere 
or 
outward-sensory-nowhere/outward-sensory- 
 -------  somewhere 
outward-meaning-nowhere/outward-meaning- 
somewhere 
7. ISn 
IMn OSn 
OMn 'LOCUS' ISs 
IMs OSs 
OMs 
8. One locus 
9. Each term in the locus is the opposite of what 
it appears: (-->) 
 
ISn-->OMs OMs--
>ISn
IS—->OM I-->O 
IMn-->OSs OSs—->IMn IM-->OS O-->I 
OMn-->ISs ISs--
>OMn
OS-->IM  
IMs-->OSn OSn—- OM—->IS  
10. The one locus is made one, by the interchange of 
opposites without movement across boundaries. 
11. This interchange occurs at every level of the 
unfolding of the locus of oppositions. 
12. The one locus made one by the interchange of 
opposites points to the One. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
There is only the single source. 
The locus has two directions: toward greater or 
lesser differentiation. 
Differentiation occurs by the binary harmonic, 
that underlies the number system, and appears 
in thresholds of complexity according to the 
regular polytopes of each dimension. 
The thresholds of complexity mark the point 
where interchange of opposites without movement 
occurs.  The first such node of interchange oc-
curs at the fourth level. 
 
17. one 
18. high/low 
long/short 
fast/slow 
fine/gross 
light/dark 
etc. 
19. inward=(dark)/outward =(light) 
20. inward-sensory =(dark)/outward-meaning=(light) 
21. inward-sensory-nowhere =(dark)/outward-meaning- 
somewhere=(light) 
22. opposites appear in opposite segments of the 
locus at each level. 
The pattern of disconnected op-
posites is laid down by the tim-
ing of Time in each moment. 
23. The laying down of the pattern of myriad  
opposites in the locus at each instant is the 
action of the single source. 
24. The pattern of disconnected opposites is a 
single pattern. 
25. This one pattern is made one by the interchange 
without movement of each of the opposites 
within it. 
high  --- > low low  ------ > high 
long  --- > short short  ---- > long 
fast  --- > slow slow  ---- -> fast 
fine  --- > gross gross ----- -> fine 
light --- > dark dark  ------> light 
etc. etc. 
26. The locus, differentiated by the binary 
harmonic, and the pattern of opposites which 
have the form of a 'swarm' are opposites.  One 
is harmonic disconnection, whereas the latter 
is pure disconnection. 
27. The interpenetration of these two kinds of 
disconnected opposites (loci and pattern) 
indicate the one in stillness and movement. 
28. The one locus made one, and the one pattern 
made one, together indicate the one more 
strongly than the locus did alone. 
29. There is only the single source in existence. 
30. Forms appear in the interpenetration of these 
two kinds of disconnection, which are pure 
transparency.  Forms appear by seeing 
boundaries instead of opposites. 
31. The pure transparency is the connection between 
the two kinds of disconnection.  The 
disconnection of the locus which is ordered, 
and the disconnection of the pattern whose 
order is not apparent, i.e. not determined by 
the ideational template, shows the progressive 
entry of formlessness into disconnection.  The 
formless disconnection of the pattern is the  
analogy for the disconnection between the 
single source and the whole realm of the 
opposites. 
32. If the forms are focused on, instead of the 
two sets of opposites, and one attempts to hold 
on  to the fleeting vision of the forms, 
instead of looking at the transparency within 
which they occur, then formalization occurs. 
The delay-period appears. 
33. G. Spencer Brown describes the development of 
the formal system in Laws of Form.  He begins 
by introducing the connection of the opposites 
(inward and outward) and the crossing of the 
boundary which differentiates the connected op-
posites.  In this model the ideational tem-
plate used for connection appears. 
34. Structuralization occurs when the formal system 
is temporalized.  This means when the time of 
the delay-period enters into the formal system 
that appears within it. 
35. Structural system and it's ontology give a 
complete picture of the working-out of the 
forms, projected by the ideational template. 
36. All this is dependent on the transformation of 
the transparency of the disconnection of 
opposites into the closed-space of the delay- 
period.  The binary harmonic appears there as 
the enfolding of higher dimensional spaces. 
37. The four types of Being describe the complete 
coming into manifestation dictated by the 
ideational template within the closed-space. 
38. This can only be remedied by the disconnection 
of the shell of the ideational template, i.e. 
disconnecting opposites from each other, and 
from the single source.  And by the return to 
the four-fold formation of cognition, which is 
seen in the meeting of the locus of opposites, 
and the pattern of opposites that appears 
within it. 
39. one 
40. l--inward 
41. l--outward 
42. l--inward=(high) 
43. l--outward=(low) 
44. l--inward-sensory=(dark) 
45. l--outward-meaning=(light) 
46. 1—inward-sensory-nowhere=(fine) 
47. l--outward-meaning-somewhere=(qross) 
48. 1—inward-sensory-nowhere=(fine—>qross) 
49. 1—inward-sensory-nowhere=(—>gross) 
50. 1—inward-sensory-nowhere—>outward-meaning- 
somewhere^(—>-gross) 
51. 1—outward-meaning-somewhere=(—>gross) 
52. 1—outward-meaning-somewhere=(gross—>fine) 
53. 1—outward-meaning-somewhere=(—>fine) 
54. l--outward-meaning-somewhere=inward-sensory- 
nowhere=(—>fine) 
55. 1—inward-sensory-nowhere=(—>-fine) 
56. Complete interchange without movement shows 
that the opposites within the locus and the 
pattern are one, without bringing them together 
artificially. 
57. This interchange occurs on each level of 
differentiation of the locus. 
58. l--inward-sensory=(dark—>light) 
59. 1—inward-sensory=(—>light) 
60. 1—inward-sensory—>outward-meaning=(—flight) 
61. l--outward-meaning=(—>light) 
62. l--outward-meaning=(light—>dark) 
63. l--outward-meaning=(dark) 
64. 1—outward-meaning—>inward-sensory=(—^dark) 
65. 1—inward-sensory=(—>-dark) 
66. 1—inward-(high—>low) 
67. l--inward-(—>low) 
68. l--inward->outward=(—>low) 
69. 1—outward = (—>low) 
70. 1—outward = (low—>-high) 
71.* 1—outward=(->-high) 
72. 1—outward—>inward=(—>high) 
73. 1—inward=(—>high) 
74. 1—inward = (high)—>-outward = (low) 
—inward-sensory=(dark)—>-outward-meaning= 
(light) 
—inward-sensory-nowhere=(fine)—>outward-
meaning-somewhere=(gross) 
75. And so on, with all the pairs of opposites in 
the locus, and all the opposites of the pattern 
of opposites that appear in the locus at all 
levels. 
76. By this the opposites in their interchange 
point to the single source. 
77. Constant referral back to the single source is 
the only way to maintain the purity of the 
formation of the cognitive locus. 
78. Terms of the form "1-X=(a)" can only be seen on 
the background of terms of the form "X/Y" and 
"(a)/(b)".  The difference between the two 
types of terms epitomizes the disconnection of 
the opposites from the single source. 
79. Single source cannot be contained by any 
description by conceptualization. 
80. There is only the single source in existence. 
0.  One 
COMMENTARY: 
0. Underlying this whole series is the indication 
at every step of the one, the single source.  The 
series itself arises and returns to the one.  Every 
step says "one!" However, the development of a way 
to say one, without meaning something other than the 
single source, depends on beginning with surface 
disconnection.  Thus, we register in the beginning 
the one, the indication of which will be approached 
successively throughout the series of pictures. 
1. This series of pictures stands in opposition to 
the formal system.  The best example of a formal 
system is the model G. Spencer Brown makes of one in 
Laws of Form.13  There he says that all form is 
based on there being a boundary with an inside and 
an outside and on the crossing of that boundary.  In 
this way he simplifies the formal system down to its 
basic constituents.  Here the formal system does not 
arise, because the emphasis is on opposites rather 
than form.  The opposites are in pure disconnection, 
and the boundary of their artificial juxtaposition 
never appears.  Since the boundary never appears, 
there is no crossing of the boundary. The pure 
disconnection of the opposites is marked by the 
symbol "/".  Inward and outward appear in reference 
to the locus of experience, described by the four-
fold formation of the centre of cognition. The 
centre of cognition registers either inwardness or 
outwardness primarily.  This is not the inside or 
outside of forms, as in G. Spencer Brown's model of 
the formal system, but inward or outward of the 
centre of cognition. 
2. There is the disappearance of the disconnection 
between inward and outward, and the appearance of 
sensory/meaning.  It may well have been written as 
follows: 
1.     inward/ 
2.         /outward 
3. sensory/ 
4. /meaning 
These four represent the form of the locus of 
cognition in its four-fold pattern.  The four-fold 
pattern means a pair of opposites-disconnected 
together in disconnection with another pair of 
opposites-disconnected.  Only one of the elements of 
a pair may appear at once.  The point of the four-
fold form of cognition, is that it allows the per-
mutation of opposites without the connection of the 
opposites. Inward may be juxtaposed with meaning or 
with the sensory; but it may never appear mixed with 
the outward.  Sensory means the information about 
pairs of opposites.  Meaning means the reference 
of those to the single source.  Outward means 
surface, and inward means depth.  Thus it is seen 
that the four-fold model of cognition is a descrip-
tion of the disconnection of the shell of the 
ideational template.  This formation does not 
produce a net of connections like the formal system, 
but instead a disconnected set of juxtapositions. 
There is no imaginary set of nihilistic twin con-
cepts, to which the opposites are attached. 
3 & 4.  The field of juxtapositions is a free-
flowing lattice, instead of a set of static corres-
pondences. These (i.e. pictures 3 & 4) are two 
images of this free-flowing lattice.  Free-flowing 
means effervescent, in their appearing juxtaposed in 
different ways through disconnection. 
5.  In the free-flowing lattice of juxtapositions 
that make up the locus of cognition, there is only 
the positions of juxtaposition as they appear.  When 
they are not manifest they are 'nowhere', i.e. 
absent and inaccessible, and then, when they mani-
fest, they become 'somewhere'.  The lattice of 
juxtaposition spontaneously ripples between being-
nowhere and being-somewhere.  That is in spacetime/ 
timespace and out-of-spacetime/timespace.  When it 
is out-of-spacetime, it has returned to the single 
source.  Somewhere is juxtaposition; nowhere is 
 disconnection. 
6. With the addition of the disconnection between 
somewhere and nowhere, the free-flowing lattice is 
increased in the number of its juxtapositions. 
7. If the free-flowing lattice were to be seen 
all-at-once, then it would be seen to be a single 
locus of treble juxtapositions of terms.  That locus 
appears as disconnected realms of manifestation of 
opposites to the centre of cognition. 
8. That locus is one in it's depth.  It's depth 
oneness is the single source, which is first 
indicated statically by the oneness of the free- 
flowing lattice, described as if it were seen all- 
at-once as a locus of realms of possible 
manifestations.  Seeing the locus as one is a 
conceptualization.  All that appears is the 
disconnected 
realms of manifestation, identified by the field of 
juxtapositions.  This is the unfolding of the four 
fold pattern of cognition, that occurs when the 
ideational template is used strictly in 
disconnection. 
9. Now the key is, that there is an interchange 
between the points of juxtaposition, without 
movement or transcendence of the boundary between 
opposites (either straight-forward or 
surreptitious). 
This happens by the deep connection of the opposites 
in the locus through the single source.  This means 
that, if you begin at one point in the locus, it may 
interchange instantaneously out of timespace/space-
time for its opposite in the next moment.  Whichever 
of the opposite realms appears, it becomes its 
opposite.  Interchange without movement is the means 
by which the single source is dynamically indicated 
in the free-flowing lattice of juxtapositions.  The 
principle of interchange without connection-movement 
or transcendence, whether straight forward or 
hidden, is the key to existence. It is stated by 
Socrates in the Phaedo, as has been seen.  It makes 
possible a viable explanatory science based on the 
principle of no secondary causation.  The dynamic of 
the interchange is the way Time times everything in 
existence.  Traditional western science, lost in the 
ideational sleep, still discovers this principle 
over and over, — but has no means of modeling it 
adequately.  It is said that light is particle or 
wave.  It is said that the observer can measure 
velocity or position.  These   are examples of 
nihilistic oppositions.  However, what they point to 
is interchange across pure discontinuity, and the 
locus of that discontinuity is within the observer, 
that is, within the locus of cognition.  This 
instantaneous interchange occurs when any opposite 
is referred to the single source.  By that reference 
the opposite in hand is interchanged for its 
opposite. 
10.  By instantaneous out-of-timespace/spacetime 
interchange between opposites, the synthetic oneness 
of the locus is made one, or is given effective 
unity.  This would be the description, if what we 
were dealing with was the formal system.  Synthesis 
and unity are Kant's terms.  What is being described 
here is different because the whole lattice is frag-
mented by pure discontinuity.  Instead of synthesis, 
there is the field in which the free-flowing lattice 
of the nodal points of the locus cluster.  Instead 
of unity, which takes place in time, there is the 
out-of-timespace/spacetime of interchange of 
opposites, which occurs because the opposites, by 
which Time is discriminated, are each referred to 
Time itself.  The one locus is never synthesized, 
but always remains a cluster.  Synthesis is spatial 
continuity and contiguousness.  The one locus has 
the oneness of clustering, where the actual space-
time/timespace, that envelops the different realms 
of the cluster, is articulated into many separated 
envelopes.  The one locus is made one by the inter-
change of opposites between realms in articulated 
envelopes that fragment timespace/spacetime.14 This 
occurs by the reference directly to the single 
source.  The fragmentation of the cluster is not 
smoothed out by this reference to the single source. 
There is no substratum or meta- level, by which 
passing between the clustered fragments is made 
possible.  The interchange is instantaneous and out-
of-time.  The out-of-time is a concept that does not 
make sense in the western tradition, based as it is 
on the use of the ideational template for 
connection.  The out-of-time is pure disconnection 
in spacetime/timespace, which is connection by the 
single source.  Out-of-timeness is the nature of 
Time itself.  As Heidegger rightly says, Time is 
itself not temporal.15 
11. The process of making one appears at every 
level of the unfolding of the locus by interchange 
at each of those levels. 
12. The complete process of reference to the single 
source at each of the levels points dynamically to 
the single source. 
13. The statement, that there is only the single 
source in existence, returns the whole process of 
the unfolding of the locus and its being made one, 
to the single source.  The locus and the interchange 
of opposites only exist as a surface fragmentation, 
which points to depth-oneness.  That pointing is 
dynamic, but in direct contradiction to the 
processes 
of synthesis and unity, which are the means of 
making spatial and temporal connections respectively 
in the structural system. 
14. The locus has two directions: one direction is 
that of its unfolding according to a binary 
progression, and the other is that of the 
progressive condensation of interchange between 
opposites.  By unfolding and then enfolding through 
interchange, the one from which that unfolding comes 
is indicated. These two directions are not the same 
as the two directions in the use of the ideational 
template. Those two directions were toward 
connection or toward disconnection.  Once the 
direction toward disconnection has been taken, then 
the locus appears according to binary 
differentiation.  Interchange of opposites is not a 
form of connection.  It maintains disconnection by 
dynamic transformation through reference to the 
single source. 
15. In the use of the ideational template, it is 
seen how the closed-space enfolds according to the 
differentiation of higher dimensional spaces, and 
that how that succession of higher dimensional 
spaces is the full meaning of the number series 
(i.e. the number is the external coherence of the 
internal coherence of the dimensional space).  Each 
number of the number series is essentially 
disconnected, so mathematics collapses.  The. 
internal articulation of the series of higher 
dimensional spaces is the series of regular 
polytopes and underlying the number series there is 
a binary harmonic. The series of regular polytopes 
shows the harmonic nature of the binary progression. 
If the binary progression arises through 
disconnection, then that harmonic, which is seen in 
the regular polytopes still underlies that 
progression.  The nodes of the binary harmonic are 
the points, where the backward flow of interchange 
between opposites begins.  The first harmonic node, 
where interchange occurs, is marked by the 
icosahedron-dodecahedron pair in the third dimension 
and the pentahedron in the fourth dimension.  The 
icosahedron-dodecahedron pair are the external 
coherence and the pentahedron (i.e. the fourth 
dimensional simplest regular polytope) is the 
internal coherence of the same node or threshold of 
complexity, where instantaneous interchange occurs. 
The binary harmonic progression only appears by the 
use of the ideational template in connection.  When 
it is used in disconnection, this underlying 
harmonic remains hidden.  However, it is the 
explanation of how the locus ends at eight realms, 
and why interchange between these realms is the next 
harmonic level. 
16.  Understanding the interchange of opposites at 
the binary harmonic node of 16 positional 
differentiations is the key to understanding how the 
locus does not go on to become an unending progres-
sion.  Its only reason for arising is the dynamic 
indication of the single source.  The first node 
where the backward flow of interchange occurs is at 
the point of minimal necessary differentiation for 
that indication to occur. 
17. Now a new phase of unfolding from the one will 
begin.  In this phase there will appear a means by 
which the one may be even more strongly indicated. 
18. A new series of opposites now appears.  These 
opposites are not in the form of the locus as a 
progressive, disconnected mixture.  Rather they are 
all disconnected one from the other.  They make up 
the pattern of disconnected, qualitative opposites 
laid down in each moment by the timing of Time.  
This swarm of patterned opposites may be of 
unlimited number.  Since it is a swarm it is not 
possible to know how many there are.  They are by 
their nature uncountable. 
19-22.  The pattern of swarming opposites appears in 
the realm of the locus of cognition.  If at any 
level of the locus' differentiation there appears 
one opposite, then it’s disconnected opposite falls 
automatically in to the opposite realm of the 
locus. 
23. The action of the single source is the laying- 
down of a pattern of opposites, swarming within the 
locus.  The swarm of opposites therefore indicates 
the one in a different way from the locus.  The 
swarm indicates the single source by the fact that, 
whatever the pattern is within the locus at that 
moment, it has come from the single source. 
24. The swarm of the pattern is one.  As the locus 
was one.  Except the oneness of the locus is by bi 
nary progression, whereas the oneness of the pattern 
is formless.  The binary progression in dislocation 
is the simplest form.  The oneness of   the pattern 
is beyond that simplest formation.  It is one only 
by virtue of the oneness of the single source. 
25-27.  The pattern of opposites that swarm in the 
locus also undergoes the interchange of opposites. 
The interchange of opposites in the pattern and in 
the locus complement each other.  By it the formless 
oneness of the pattern is made one.  This indicates 
the formlessness of the single source.  The lattice 
of the locus is only there to indicate the formless-
ness of the swarm.  The making-one of the pattern 
drives the indication of the single source deeper. 
One might say that the one is indicated by the 
stillness of the locus, and by the movement of the 
pattern.  The formlessness of the disconnection of 
the pattern is only comprehensible by the binary 
form of the locus.  Disconnected interchange is not 
dependent on the binary positioning of the locus — 
it can occur without any positioning. 
28. The oneness of the single source is indicated 
more strongly by the formlessness of the pattern 
being made one. 
29. In this way we return again to the single 
source, even more strongly than we did in the first 
place.  The continued coming back to the single 
source by ever stronger indications is the whole 
point of this exercise. 
30-38.  These pictures concern the arising of form 
within the area made transparent by the inter-
penetration of the two kinds of disconnection 
between loci and pattern.  Since the entry-into-form 
is the province of the ideational template used in 
connection, it has already been explored in depth in 
the preceding chapters.  These pictures are only 
here to show how quickly the devolution of the 
disconnection occurs. 
39.  The last phase of the development of the logic 
of disconnection occurs beginning with the one. 
40-56 and 57-80.  Here is presented a modeling of 
the revolution of the entire locus, and its 
patterning, by interchange of the opposite realms of 
the loci, and the pattern of opposites they contain. 
The key-feature here is that every picture is ref-
erenced to the one.  This referencing to the one at 
every stage of unfolding and interchange by the 
notation "1..." is the main point.  This form of 
constant referencing may only be undertaken on the 
background of the opposites of the locus and pattern 
It is the model of the disconnection between the 
opposites  and the single source.  In this a full 
picture of the use of the ideational template in 
disconnection has been given.  Continual indication 
of the one is what gets covered over by the emphasis 
on form, when it appears in the transparent realm 
between the loci and pattern.  Constant indication 
of the one, plus disconnection of opposites, plus 
interchange out-of-time gives a powerful means of 
indicating the single source through the appearance 
of the qualitative opposites in the loci.  The loci 
are emphasized instead of the opposite forms, as in 
Plato's presentation.  In this way the pitfalls of 
concentration on form are avoided completely. 
Notice the difference between the loci and pattern, 
and the grid-landscape model from the ideational 
template used in connection.  The former are com-
pletely based on disconnection, whereas the latter 
is completely based on connection.  From the latter 
there is the unfolding and then enfolding of the 
closed-space, and by that the arising of structure. 
Here, because disconnection is rigorously 
maintained, one avoids formalization, and goes 
directly to the indication of the one.  Continual 
indication of the oneness of the single source is 
the highest function of cognition.  Conceptual 
descriptions of it are not possible, so long as the 
ideational template is maintained in disconnection. 
Only continuous indication without conceptualization 
gives the correct view of the processes of the 
manifestation of opposites in existence, and their 
instantaneous interchange out-of-time. 
0.  The whole of the series of pictures indicates 
the one, and returns to the one. 
What has been presented above is an image of a logic 
of disconnection, which gives an in-depth view of 
how the ideational template is used in disconnec-
tion.  It is, in fact, the alternative to the 
grid/landscape model, constructed of disconnected 
opposites instead of correspondences.  Neither 
nihilism nor emergence appears in the logic of dis-
connection.  The laying down of the pattern of 
opposites is genuine emergence.  There is no need 
for interference phenomena to be generated for the 
disconnected opposites to be seen.  And each of the 
distinctions between opposites is clear, and 
furthermore, because there is no nihilistic back-
ground effect, they are non-nihilistic.  Artificial 
time is not generated, and structural discontinu-
ities that produce emergent events do not occur. 
Radical surface fragmentation indicates depth-
connection of the single source.  The intellect is 
led to see the single source in everything.  Causal-
ity drops away because the single condition, upon 
which every existent is based, is brought to the 
forefront.  Genuine emergence is the appearance of 
that single condition in every phenomenon.  This 
appearance occurs in the logic of disconnection as 
the arising between the opposites of locus and 
pattern of the referencing of every term to the 
single source.  This referencing indicates the 
disconnection/connection of the single source  (the 
independent) from/to every existent thing (the 
dependent). 
The general form of the logic of disconnection is as 
follows: 
1--The opposites manifest themselves in discon-
nection.  1--From between disconnected opposites, 
when they disappear, appears the indication of the 
single source.  1--There is only the single source. 
The time-form of man is seen in the disconnection of 
the ideational template.  When the template is dis-
connected, the four-fold formation of cognition 
appears and the logic of disconnection follows 
axiomatically.  By appreciating the logic of discon-
nection, a picture of the time-form of man appears. 
Man is the indication of the single source.  Man's 
time-form is the reception of the timing by Time. It 
is not that the observer somehow interferes with the 
observation of phenomena, but that all science must 
be the science of the locus of observation. The 
imprecision of a science based on ideational 
connection, that verifies the split between observer 
and observed and focuses on the observed forgetting 
the observer, must be replaced by the precision of 
the logic of disconnection, which does away with 
this split.  In that logic of disconnection the 
time-form of man, rather than the time-form of the 
ideational template is seen.  The time-form of the 
ideational template is subsidiary to the time-form 
of man.  The former is limited, and tied to the dif-
ferentiation of form, whereas the latter is more 
expansive and undifferentiated, in tune with the  
manifestation of formlessness.  It might be said 
that the time-form of the ideational template comes 
from the disconnection of man from language.  By 
this disconnection, language is turned into 
technique.  From that unfolds artificial time. 
When man identifies himself with language as some-
thing outside himself, then he becomes trapped into 
thinking that there is a difference between the 
timing of language (logos) and the timing of nature 
(physos).  Instead the time-form of language is only 
part of the differentiation of man's time form.  By 
it the opposites are recognized, and the one is 
indicated.  Yet, by using language in such a way to 
indicate the single source, man faces toward the 
out-of-timeness, which enters into his own time-
form.  This he recognizes, because of the undiffer-
entiated part of his being.  He is much more than 
Dasein (being there).  He is being-no-where, as 
well.  Only the logic of disconnection uses language 
to chart this openness.  Otherwise the timing of 
discourse comes to the fore, when it is placed as a 
grid over the external events, then the artificial 
delay-period is entered. 
However, when man turns to the vastness of his own 
time-form, away from the narrowness of the time-form 
of mathematised or technicalised language (which 
even though it can describe time in so many ways, 
cannot but indicate the out-of-timeness by which 
Time is indicated) he sees that all the connections 
he made become like particles of dust.  Man retreats 
within the cave of the delay-period because the 
vastness of the sea of disconnection, on which there 
are no way-marks, is too much for him.  The 
precision of the logic of disconnection is balanced 
by the awesomeness of the open-spaces in which 
conceptualizations are blown away.  Man is left with 
his (lived) biological time, and its relation to the 
incomprehensibility of cosmological time.  This 
incomprehensibility of the vastness of the interplay 
of all the separate time forms in the cosmos is the 
analogy for the vastness of formlessness within 
man's own time-form.  Man, with the physical 
sciences, based on the narrow connecting-template, 
discovers that the cosmos is made up of dust:  the 
dust of the atoms and the dust of the stars.  The 
correct vehicle for understanding the dust of 
existence is the logic of disconnection.  But it man 
realizes that the clouds of macrocosmic and micro- 
cosmic dust do not just occur at the extremes of 
size, but that the creation is shot through and 
through with disconnection.  The logic of discon-
nection discovers precisely this same pattern in 
life, in man's direct relation to existence.  Man's 
direct relation to existence is qualitative.  That 
direct experience is of the myriad forms, and the 
endless swarm of opposite qualities.  The logic of 
disconnection, based on the binary harmonic, 
addresses man's own experience of the universe by 
differentiating the levels of complexity of the 
interaction of opposite qualities.  The logic of 
connection, on the other hand, is the basis of the 
science of dust (micro- & macro-cosmic), which is 
remote from direct experience and is founded on the 
differentiation of the number series.  Micro- and 
macro-cosmic fragmentation into dust points, if 
understood rightly, to the deep connection of the 
single source.  If man is caught in the middle 
between these, and pursues a programme of ideational 
connection, then he misses the point that the whole 
of the universe is out to indicate.  Man must 
instead pursue a programme of disconnection in which 
he constantly indicates and watches the indication 
of the single source.  In this way he is in harmony 
with the universe.  Even quantitative science based 
on ideational connection discovers cosmic discon-
nection.  Existence does not change at its midpoint. 
It is just as disconnected there in Man's direct 
experience, even though this may not be intuitively 
obvious.  Man does not see clouds of dust; he sees 
either opposites or forms.   If he sees opposites, 
and holds them in disconnection, then the indication 
of the single source arises between the opposites. 
If he sees forms, then structuralisation occurs that 
eventually leads back to disconnection by separation 
of emergent phases. 
Disconnection is the rule because everything in 
existence points to the single source.  This is seen 
clearly in man, because the greatest mystery in the 
universe is how man can move his own body.  Hume 
notes that we have no access to the power by which 
we move our own bodies.  If we say that we do it, we 
are connecting ourselves to the movement by a 
speculation.  Nietzsche in turn says 'It' and not 
'I' thinks.  So, intention and movement both have an 
unknown source.  If we want to study existence, then 
it is necessary to begin with this fundamental dis-
connection between our awareness of the movement of 
our bodies, and our intention to move them by 
willing their movement.  The intention is inward, 
and the awareness of movement is outward.  These two 
realms must be held in disconnection. Inward/outward 
is the primary distinction of the human creature in 
relation to that power by which movement is 
effected, and by which intention arises.  The dis-
connection between intentions inwardly and movements 
outwardly is one of the most awesome matters in 
existence.  This is because, despite the disconnec-
tion, there is perfect harmony between what appears 
inwardly and outwardly.  There is the illusion that 
I move my hand, although I do not have access to the 
power by which it occurs.  Disconnection here allows 
freedom, because the single source is indicated by 
the harmony between what appears inwardly and 
outwardly.  This is completely different from the 
attempt to connect the subject and object surrepti-
tiously, as Kant does by constructing a mythical 
transcendental realm.  If straightforward and 
surreptitious connections are avoided, then the 
single source is indicated constantly. 
The inward and outward are sensory realms, in which 
opposites appear.  Their meaning is that the single 
source is indicated by every movement in the harmony 
between inward and outward.  In just the same way 
every opposite that appears, inwardly or outwardly, 
is an indication of the single source because of 
precisely the same inability to experience the power 
that connects them in every case.  Yet the harmony 
of the interchange of the opposites is experienced, 
maintaining disconnection at every point, when this 
harmony makes one think that connection would be a 
valid assumption giving freedom and an open space to 
witness the miracle of the manifestation of the 
single source's deep connection.  The speculation of 
connection, based on harmony, without access to the 
power by which connection is made, gives a false 
view of existence that leads to inner fragmentation. 
Maintaining the fragmentation of the opposites in 
disconnection leads to the realization that there is 
a real connection that underlies the harmony that 
appears in the inward and outward and between the 
opposites that appear there. 
In the western tradition the only place that the 
science of opposites appears at all is in the 
Platonic dialogues.  Most of these dialogues are 
commentaries on the nihilistic conditions, that 
result from the connective use of the ideational 
template.  The places where the pure doctrine of 
opposites appears are very scarce and usually 
couched in metaphor.  Once, however, one realizes 
the possibility of the disconnection of the idea-
tional template, then it is a simple matter to 
construct the logic of disconnection.  This logic 
has been worked out to a fine science by the ancient 
Chinese, and is presented in the Tao Te Ching and 
the I Ching.  Using these Chinese texts as models it 
is relatively easy to recognize the science of 
opposites in Plato's works when it appears.  The 
greatest teacher of the science of opposites is, 
however, existence itself.  If one begins with 
oneself and the disconnection between inward / 
outward, then whatever opposites that are seen 
follow the pattern of disconnection, interchange, 
and indication of the single source.  The laws by 
which existence works are incontrovertible and 
everywhere displayed.  It is only by man's producing 
an artificial world, wholly based on the temporality 
of language that disconnects that temporal form of 
the ideational template from all the other time-
forms and imposes it on all of them, that he loses 
sight of the science of opposites. 
CONCLUSION 
In this essay a beginning has been made in the move 
toward the destructuring of the ideational process, 
based on a recognition of its depth consequences. 
This destructuring depends on the use of the embed-
ded ideational template in an entirely different way 
of handling opposites.  The recognition of this dif-
ferent approach to opposition leads to the  institu-
tion of a scientifically precise modeling of primary 
causation.  The Science of Quantity is replaced by a 
Science of Quality, which makes the roots of Greek 
science comprehensible again.  In that science there 
were four basic states of hot, cold, wet, and dry, 
and four basic elements that occurred from the 
combination of these states called earth, air, fire, 
and water.  It is clear from the writings of Aristo-
tle, that these 'elements' did not refer to sensible 
aspects, but instead to unseen archetypes which gave 
rise to the qualitative differences recognized in 
sensible phenomena.  The point is that quantitative 
science rests on the manipulation of the number-
series, interpreted as a 'Real number continuum'. 
This continuum is reflected or mirrored at the point 
zero, which gives rise to twin-images that cancel 
each other out.  Further, the mirroring is itself 
mirrored and ramified by the concept of infinity, 
which delays the cancellation, and provides 
structured underpinning.  Infinity is a conceptual 
mask which covers over the pure discontinuity of the 
out-of-timeness, that fragments the series of 
natural numbers.  By applying discontinuity as a 
principle to the number-system the science of mathe-
matics collapses.  The number series can only be 
viewed as a disconnected series, which it is impos-
sible to move along or manipulate. 
At that point one is thrown back to the binary 
harmonic, which underlies the number series which 
survives the impact of disconnection.  The binary 
harmonic suggests a cluster of qualitatively dis-
tinguished permutational nodes.  With respect to the 
development of the logic of disconnection, the 
cluster of nodes at the level differentiation into 
eight has been identified with the locus of experi-
ence in man, by means of the working out of conse-
quences of the four-fold cognitive formation.  The 
differentiation of the cluster of disconnected nodes 
at the level of four might be identified with the 
four states and four 'elements' of Greek classical 
science.  Because this level of differentiation may 
be identified with the geometrical icon of the 
tetrahedron, which has articulation of components in 
the order of 4 (points) 6 (edges) and 4 (sides), it 
is possible to see the transformation, via the 
mediation of the six bipolar degrees of freedom, of 
4 states into 4 elements at this level of articula-
tion.  Recognition of different qualitative states 
within the swarm of qualitative opposites that 
appear within the locus of experience is a higher 
and more precise expression of experience scien-
tifically than the quantitative description of 
cosmic dust's interactions, based on the continuity 
of the number series.  The western scientific and 
philosophical tradition has lost contact with its 
own Greek roots, in which may be seen the 
archaeological remnants of what may be a more 
sophisticated and experientially-grounded science 
than that we possess today.  These archaeological 
remains are considered quaint proto-science, because 
the deep metaphysical principles on which they are 
based are no longer appreciated.  The recovery of 
qualitative science may take place only by the use 
of the ideational template in disconnection, which 
makes quantitative science vanish as a possibility. 
It is only qualitative science which addresses 
phenomena at the level of man's experience of them. 
The swarm of disconnected opposites that appear in 
the locus of experience cohere according to the 
articulation of the four states and the four 
elements.  This means that the four-fold cognitive 
formation, which gives rise to the locus, is mirrored 
in the coherence of the swarm of oppositions, 
according to states and 'elements', that appears in 
the locus.  In this manner the logic of discon-
nection constructs a formation for a revival of the 
science of qualitative opposition.  Qualitative 
science is based on the recognition of organically 
appearing differences.  Many of the seeming counter-
intuitive effects currently being explored in 
Relativity Theory and Quantum Mechanics actually 
appear natural implications at the level of human 
experience, when the logic of disconnection and the 
archaic science of qualitative differences are 
applied as explanatory devices.  That is to say, the 
effects of depth discontinuity appear at the surface 
of human experience when the ideational template is 
applied in disconnection by the recognition of the 
usefulness of the binary harmonic.  The exploration 
of the archaeological evidence of the science of 
qualitative opposition based on the transformation 
by mixing of the four states (hot, cold, wet, dry) 
into the four elements (earth, air, fire, water), is 
a task which goes beyond the limits of the current 
study.  That exploration must be carried out on the 
firm foundation of grasping the significance of the 
logic of disconnection of opposites.  The western 
scientific and philosophical tradition reduces all 
previous scientific and metaphysical endeavors to 
its own level of merely imaging ideational 
processes.  It is possible to see that mathematical 
precision, which is held up as the highest feature 
of western science is, in fact, crude in relation to 
the precision of the logic of disconnection and 
qualitative opposites, based on the binary harmonic. 
Here it is only possible to provide a transition 
between the logic of connection and the logic of 
disconnection, in terms of an understanding of the 
implications of both in relation to contemporary 
metaphysics.  Going beyond cancellation-experience, 
which is the furthest reach of ideational compre-
hension, depends on the understanding of the form of 
the ideational template, which underpins all 
ideational processes and on applying disconnection 
to it. 
The structure of theoretical systems, when temporal-
ized, gives rise to the phenomenon of emergence. 
This key phenomenon allows the ontological mould to 
be articulated into the ideational template which 
governs the deep structure of ideational processes. 
The recognition of the complete cycle of the working 
out of the ideational template's form leads to the 
possibility of disconnecting its shell. The shell 
is, in fact, the syllogism, which is recognized to 
be an artificial connection between qualitative 
opposites and between them and the image of the out-
of-time single source. The logic of disconnection 
shows how the opposites may be seen in 
disconnection, without the focus on form which is 
implied in Socrates' description.  From the logic of 
disconnection the science of qualitative opposition 
is glimpsed beyond the science of quantification. 
Ironically the science of qualities is based on a 
fundamental quantization in the temporal sense of 
quanta differentiated by the binary harmonic, with 
each permutational node qualitatively differentiat-
ed.  It is the development of a full appreciation of 
the science of qualities, which is the next natural 
step that would be based on an exploration of the 
archaeological remains of this science in the Greek 
texts.1  The thought that western science and 
philosophy may be a degeneration from a metaphysi-
cally superior, more ancient, scientific tradition 
will be startling to many. However, this is a very 
real possibility, which must be explored with the 
kind of openness which Feyeraband suggests in his 
book Science in a Free Society.  Genuine competition 
between alternative world views must be based on the 
recognition of the flaws inherent in their different 
metaphysical bases.  The science of primary causa-
tion is a hitherto unconsidered contender as a basis 
for a comprehensive scientific approach to existence, 
which is metaphysically more sophisticated than the 
approach to existence taken by the western 
scientific and philosophical tradition. 
FOOTNOTES 
FOOTNOTES - 
INTRODUCTION - 
1. This term is used, in the sense defined, by G. 
H. Mead in his works.  BIB 106, 540, 565, 224 
(p2, pp 14-15) 
2. The classic example of the appearance of 
something new, which called for a complete 
restructuring of the world, is the arrival in 
the Americas of the Spanish.  The Indians asked 
them where they came from and they pointed to 
the ships.  The Indians could not see the 
ships, which were in plain view, and maintained 
that the Spanish had come out of the water. 
The Indians' world view did not allow for the 
existence of sailing ships, so they could not 
perceive them. 
The appearance of men out of the sea who told 
them of sailing ships made necessary a whole 
new way of looking at the world.  Likewise, any 
newly discovered phenomena may change the whole 
view one has of the world.  By explaining the 
newly discovered phenomena it may be that the 
basis for explaining recognized phenomena may 
have to be radically re-evaluated.  G. H. Mead 
calls this 'rewriting history'.  At each 
emergent event all of history must be 
reconstructed to account for its appearance. 
3. The classic example of a change in theoretical 
perspective that changes what is seen of the 
world is the shift from Newtonian to 
Einsteinean Physics.  A change in the way of 
conceptualizing phenomena makes it possible to 
look at things hitherto not considered 
relevant, and allows hitherto unseen phenomena 
to appear.  Cf. Zahar (BIB 181). 
4. Theoretical perspective means the set of 
concepts one uses to understand the world, the 
way in which they are connected to each other, 
and the method by which they are applied to the 
world. 
>5.   This term is used in the sense that Heidegger 
discusses in Being & Time  (BIB 265) with 
reference to 'worldhood'.  
6.   By 'dynamic relation' is meant that Theoretical 
perspective and what is seen in the world are 
completely inter-embedded. Any change in one 
necessitates change in the other.  The point is 
that this has two directions and it takes time 
for the wave of change to move from perception to theory 
or from theory to perception. The reference here is to 
Feyerabend in Against   ^)  , ^ Method (BIB 288) where he 
shows that perception    ' is a micro-theoretical 
procedure. Concomitantly theory is a macro-perceptual 
procedure.  Where perceptual devices are operationalized 
theories, so too, theories operationalize conceptual 
perspectives. 
 7.   Transformative change means 
"        "Episteme changes" Foucault (BIB 187 
^        "Paradigm changes" Kuhn  (BIB 9) pp 
"Epochs of Being"  Heidegger (BIB 188)  These 
authors are all referring to the same phenomenon - the 
phenomenon of emergence - in different contexts.  Other 
examples, such as Whitehead's use of the term 'epoch' in 
Process    
  and Reality (BIB 190), could be cited. How this 
phenomenon could occur is the highest  meta-
physical problem in the western tradition. What 
seems to happen is that, in a tradition at a 
certain point, an emergent event occurs.  This 
emergent event indicates that a break in the 
continuity of the tradition has occurred.  The 
emergent event signals the advent of a new period 
in which the world will be conceptualized 
differently.  It takes time for the full 
significance of the new patterning of theoretical 
perspective/world to appear. This new patterning 
slowly appears as it is imaged in different works 
that are related as dialectical moments.  The new 
patterning lasts for a specific duration until a 
new emergent event occurs and the tradition 
undergoes another transformational change. 
Transformation indicates that the different 
durational periods are based on each other. The 
same elements are merely rearranged to make the 
new patterning appear.  The tradition displays 
what Monod (BIB 77) calls Teleological Filtering 
which means goal seeking, without a specific 
predefined goal, by narrowing down of 
alternatives. Heidegger calls this hermeneutics 
— see his detailed explanation of this process in 
Being & 
   Time. (BIB 265) 
8.   Theoretical-perspective/world is a single 
complex which, all of a sudden, appears 
repatterned.  It is as if this repatterning 
occurs at the centre of the complex and moves 
from being a vaguely understood difference, 
that cannot be quite pinned down, to a very 
specific representation which is clearly 
understood.  When it is vague then it is still 
covered over by representations of the last 
patterning of the complex, which are slowly 
patterning of the complex, which are slowly 
cleared away as representations of the present 
complex become more well defined and under-
stood. 
It appears as if emergence either comes from 
the world, or from the theoretical perspective. 
Either of these apparent sources only indicate 
a depth repatterning of the theoretical 
perspective/world complex. 
9. Politics here means a stratagem for 
intervention in existence whose purpose is to 
gain power. 
10. Stasis means the denial of the change which is 
endemic in existence.  Its denial causes it to 
build up and break whatever dam is constructed 
to hold it back.  Thus change appears in bursts 
(quanta). 
11. Connection means referencing, by oscillation, 
between two entities or concepts.  By 
repeated oscillation the illusion of continuity 
between the two is built up.  This illusion is 
the basis for conceptual connection which 
appears as a solid link that traverses from one 
entity to the other.  However, this apparent 
link is based on the illusion of continuity 
which is, in turn, based on the activity, of 
oscillating between the two entities, which is 
a method of dealing with discontinuity. 
12. The parts of the theoretical perspective are 
the concepts being used to understand 
particular phenomena which are, in turn, based 
on the categories which describe all phenomena. 
The Kantian categories are a description of the 
basis for the formal system.  The prototype of 
the formal system is advanced and things that 
fit it are considered while those that do not 
are ignored.  The categories are statements of 
ontological assumptions which determine the 
limits within which any specific concepts must 
function. 
13. 'States-of-affairs' mean situations which arise 
by the conjunction of beings in the world. 
These may be causal (diachronic) or 
simultaneously arising (synchronic). 
14. The duration of the epoch changes depending 
upon what level of the tradition one is looking 
at.  Heidegger sees epochs of Being; Foucault, 
at a level which is not so deep, sees 
Epistemes; and Kuhn, at an even more shallow 
level of analysis, sees paradigms.  There is. no 
doubt that the quantization of the tradition is 
different at different levels of analysis. 
This is what shows that it is a structural 
system.  The different levels of quantization 
is the means by which the continuity of the 
tradition is maintained in the face of change. 
However, whether these levels mentioned are the 
best, for conceiving the western tradition with 
respect to science and philosophy, must be 
studied further. 
15. FIGURE 9 
Each dialectical moment is like a fragment of 
a hologram which can reveal the whole picture.  
Each dialectical moment is like different 
fragments of the same picture, and the quantum 
is like the whole picture.  It is by making 
holograms of the different fragments that 
through time a representation of the whole 
photograph is produced.  This whole picture is 
like the structure of the Quanta, (cf. Chapter 
3, footnote 3) 
16. The burst occurs because, when theoretical 
perspective is held static, change builds up 
behind the dam of stasis being set up.  As 
change builds up its character it changes into 
random change which is the nihilistic opposite 
of stasis.  When the shift to holding the world 
static is made this randomized change is 
released all together. 
17. This is called the scientific method. 
18. This is because Quantization is at different 
intervals at different levels of the tradition 
so that there is, at some level, continuity 
when a discontinuity is occurring at another 
level.  An example of this is the micro 
movements of the human being in response to 
speech.  Different parts of the body move in 
relation to different quantizations of the 
speech.  The head moves to the tune of the 
sentence, the arm to the tune of the word, the 
shoulders to the tune of the paragraph etc.  So 
the body tracks the quantum patternings of 
speech with different parts of the body 
'    simultaneously, the wholeness of speech is the 
wholeness of the body.  Cf. Condon (BIB 104). 
  
19. Where change, without the structural system, 
would be a waterfall of difference, it is 
turned into a graduated series of locks in 
which change is only allowed to occur in one 
lock at a time as the ship is passed, from one 
to another down the stream. 
20. Mediation is the key term with respect to 
structuralism. Structuralism and semiotics are 
two aspects of the same thing.  In terms of 
z philosophy it is all based on Husserl's (BIB 325) 
introduction of 'essence' between noematic nucleus 
(particular) and idea (universal). Husserl said that one 
could recognize "chair-ness" or "lion-ness" without seeing 
lots of chairs but by only seeing one example. Between 
induction and deduction there was a third category of 
conceptual perception. Adorno calls this 'essence 
perception.'  By placing ,  this intermediate level between 
concept and its ^  cover concept (cf. Negative Dialectics BIB 
160) ( the foundation of the structural system was  
defined.  Structure results, as Rosen has pointed out (BIB 
297), from the diacritical marking of forms which 
otherwise would be indistinguishable repetitions. These 
diacritical marks indicate structure and are themselves 
signs. 
Idea(Form repeated until illusion of continuity is 
produced) 
= 
Form  
+ 
Sign(Structure)  
+ 
Trace(Interference; Sludge) 
+ 
No Trace(Absence of interference) 
[Note: This is propensity.] 
Heidegger took essence perception and gave it ontological 
foundation in Being & Time (BIB 265).  Dasein (Being-in-
the-World) became the sign.  It was at this point, by the 
shift from form to sign, that the different kinds of Being 
began to be recognized as underlying the process of 
ideation. 
IDEA      TYPES OF BEING 
= 
Form ------ Being as Pure Presence 
+ 
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Trace ----- Hyper Being(cancellation of Process 
Being + Nothingness) 
+         
No Trace---Wild Being 
IDEA      TYPES OF MODALITY 
Form ------ Present-at-Hand 
Sign ------ Ready-to-Hand 
+ 
Trace ----- In-Hand 
+  
No Trace -- Out-of-Hand 
What is called ideation in this essay is the 
process of producing Ideas in the meaning of the 
term used by Husserl in "Ideas" (BIB 325). What is 
meant by ideation is well explained in Descartes' 
Rules for the Direction of the Mind (BIB 285). 
21. That is we are trapped by it because it is 
embedded within us. We are completely saturated 
by the way of looking at the world which has 
been evolved within this tradition. 
22. Using Plato's distinction between knowledge and 
opinion as a standard, it is clearly seen that 
all truth within the western tradition is only 
of a kind which is accessible through opinion. 
The phenomenon of emergence characterizes the 
arising of semi-stable bases for constructing 
opinions.  By opinion some aspects of that 
which might be known to one by sure and direct 
knowledge may be grasped.  Thus, some aspects 
of the truth appear to the one engrossed in the 
process of constructing opinions and then, 
finding these opinions true in some aspects and 
false in others, having to construct other 
opinions in a process that approaches the limit 
of knowledge. 
23. There is no doubt that in the process of 
speculation, or positing opinions, there is 
some part of truth which is seen, but this is 
mixed, in unknown proportions, with falsehood. 
Given the recognition of the process of 
emergence, one must immediately ask whether 
what appears in that process is true or not. 
From the perspective of knowledge, if the truth 
is mixed with any falsehood at all, it is 
false. From the perspective of speculation 
different standards are applied which allow the 
consideration of the relative truth of 
descriptions. 
24.  Ontology concerns the truth of what is known, 
whereas epistemology concerns the means of 
knowing.  This essay concerns ontology because 
both the ontological form (i.e. standards of 
truth) and the ideational template (prototypes 
for modeling descriptions) are seen as divorced 
from man as knower.  They are the means of 
fabricating opinions with which men have 
identified.  The epistemology underlying this 
investigation is that man cannot know. Knowledge 
is 'being-known,' rather than knowing. Men can 
only opine from themselves and, as long as they 
are engaged in speculation, this cuts them off 
from the possibility of knowledge, cf. the Poem 
of Anarxagorus, Freeman (BIB 195) 
25. The truth, which exists unmixed with falsehood 
in knowledge, appears to opinion, and 
speculation, as it undergoes the process of 
emergence in terms of the limited standards of 
truth associated with the pre-construction of 
opinions.  Unmixed truth can only appear to the 
one engaged in opinion fabrication by way of 
the limitations that have been placed on truth 
by the engaging in that process. 
26. In the western tradition it is the categories, 
whether of Kant or Hegel, which define how the 
world is preconstructed. 
27. The noumena (i.e. proto-typical 
pre-construction of ideal 'object x') of Kant 
is the example which applies here.  Phenomena 
are the filling in of the ideal object with 
sensory differentiation.  The construction of 
the noumena is based on the categories which 
define the diacritical system the object must 
be preconstructed to fit. 
28. Man sees before him images of the process of 
description he uses.  Their reality is only as 
great as the reality of the process they come 
from, no more.  Reality means the relation 
between the truth seen through the process of 
speculation and the truth unmixed which is an 
   object of knowledge. 
29. Conceptual in the sense described by Kant in 
  The Critique of Pure Reason (BIB 365). Foucault 
gives a genealogy of this process in the Order 
 of Things (BIB 187). Conceptualization involves 
the production of representations and the 
generalization of representations through the 
process of making caricatures.  The roots of this 
process is described by Francis Yates in  the 
Art of Memory (BIB 397)  
30. By 'ontological mould' is meant the relations 
between different kinds of truth recognized in 
the western tradition. These give an image of 
ideation in depth because different components 
of ideation have different truth standards 
associated with them. 
[Note: This is precursor of the Schema.] 
31. A template is a model or prototype which is 
laid over something in order to produce a 
standardized image.  Ideation is based on an 
interlinked series of templates of different 
complexities.  They inform the mould of the 
ontological differentiation of acceptable 
truth. 
The process is as follows: 
a. Descriptions of the world are produced by 
ideation (i.e. by the production of 
representations). 
b. This means of producing representations, 
of a generalized sort from specific 
material, has specific rules of induction 
and deduction. 
c. The different layers of the ideational 
process give rise to different kinds of 
truth. 
d. These kinds of truth, taken together, form 
the ontological mould. 
e. Within the ontological mould appears the 
ideational template which is its 
differentiation. 
f. The application of various levels of the 
ideational template to the ontological 
mould produces the differentiation of the 
mechanism of description-production by 
means of ideation. 
Thus the ideational template is a means of 
internal differentiation of the mechanism of 
ideation itself. 
32.  The classic statement of this distinction 
'^ occurs in Being and Time (BIB 29?) as a whole 
but specifically in the Introduction and more 
specifically in Section I, paragraph 6 entitled 
The Task of Destroying the History of Ontology. 
Here Heidegger specifies his departure from 
Kant and Descartes in terms of their 
philosophies. 
Heidegger was the first to open up exploration, 
in depth, of the ontological mould, thereby 
permitting the discovery of the role of the 
ideational template which informs that mould. 
Before Heidegger the philosophers of the 
western tradition were only concerned with 
surface effects of ideational phenomena, not 
their depth. 
 
33.  Priority and originality are opposites and they 
correspond to another set of opposites 
cancellation and clarification. 
Priority means first in order of 
discovery. 
Original means first in order of genetic 
unfolding from the origin. 
The originality may not come first in order of 
discovery. 
Before Heidegger philosophy searched for firsts 
- for first principles which might serve as a 
firm foundation.  After Heidegger the search 
was for origins from which the whole of a 
formal system, from first to last, unfolds. 
The unfolding from an origin is based on 
antinomies which cancel.  Cancellation of 
antinomies takes time and results in 
clarification. 
Cancellation is last in order of collapse 
back into the origin. 
Clarification is last in order of discovery.  
It is the result of the whole process which 
would not be there if the process, which in 
itself is illusory, had not occurred. 
34. Another clear statement of this distinction 
j occurs in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics 
(BIB 378) where Heidegger advances the concept 
of dasein as a perspective from which to 
analyze Kant's work. 
35. This is the first principle of phenomenology 
enunciated by Husserl cf. Ideas  (BIB 325)   
36. Early Greek Thinking  Heidegger  (BIB 402) 
37. Categorical Frameworks,  Korner (BIB 111) 
38. Legitimation of Belief, Gellner  (BIB 287) 
39. Rules for Direction of Mind & Discourse on 
Method, Descartes on method (BIB 285) 
40. What is a Thing, Heidegger  (BIB 426)          
41. Take Witgenstein's Tractatus (BIB 574) as an 
example.  Language games result when the 
Linguistic Description pulls free of the 
verificational process --Philosophical 
Investigations (BIB 575). 
42. cf. Whitehead: Process & Reality (BIB 190f and 
Melhuish, G.: The Paradoxical Nature of Reality 
(BIB 575). 
43. cf. Sussare: Course in General Linguistics (BIB 
70). 
44. For an overview of what is mean by Structural 
System, see System & Structure, Wilden (BIB 57). 
45. cf. Being & Time p.30 (BIB 265) Heidegger. 
46. cf. Being & Time, The phenomenological method of 
investigation (BIB 2?5).  
47. A taste of the politics comes through in The 
End of Philosophy, Heidegger (BIB 188),  but 
becomes readily apparent through Adorno's 
critique of Heidegger in Negative Dialectics    
(BIB 160). 
48. An Introduction to Metaphysics,  Heidegger    
(BIB 174). 
49. Here it will be convenient to see the 
Structural System in its guise of 
Transformational Grammar as developed by Noam 
Chomsky. 
50.  That is language as a Proto-logico-mathematical 
System such as Transformational Grammar attempts to 
represent it. 
51.  cf. Gadamer, Truth & Method (BIB 406). 
52.  cf. Schutz, Reflection on the Problem of 
Relevance  (BIB 35). 
cf. Grafhoff, The Structure of Social 
Inconsistencies (BIB 109). 
53.  cf. Persig,  Zen & The Art of Motorcycle 
Maintenance (BIB 243): Castanada, Tales of 
Power (BIB 169). 
These are two popular accounts of what is Being 
described here. 
54.  Henry, Essence of Manifestation (BIB 266) 
Being & Nothingness, Sartre  (BIB 239).pd$3 
56.  Merleau-Ponty, The Visible & the Invisible   
(BIB 269).  
57.  Heidegger,  The Question of Being (BIB 180).  
58.  Mirroring of cancellation is here an analogy 
between enantiomorphic opposites and the Antinomic 
Opposition of the Concept of Being and the Concept 
of Nothingness.  Enantiomorphic opposites are the 
same thing rotated through the fourth dimension.  
Bragdon, A Primer of Higher Space.  (BIB 125) 
59.  By cancellation the analogy of cancelling two 
complex equations across an equality-sign, 
until only zero is left on both sides, is 
evoked to describe the seeming substantialness 
of two antinomic opposites, at one point in 
time, which disappear as illusory at a later 
point in time. 
60.  "Antinomic" is taken from Kant's Antinomies — 
Critique of Pure Reason (BIB 365) — specifying 
arguments which take opposite premises and 
which can both be proven independently by pure 
reason and not disproven. 
61  Reference to ontological monism, cf. Henry The 
Essence of Manifestation (BIB 266). 
  
62.  cf. Nagarjunas' Dialectical Logic, Verdu (BIB 
257) 
63.  cf. Verdu (BIB 257).  
64.  Merleau-Ponty, Visible and the Invisible r>;3  
(BIB 269). 
65.  cf. Footnote 33. chapter 1. 
66.  It is taken as axiomatic that everything has a 
shell, core, and core-of-the-core and by 
specifying these, in respect to any entity, one 
has adequately detailed that entity. This goes 
one step further than the standard Aristotelian 
delineation of entities as existing with essence 
and attributes.  It corresponds, in this case, to 
Husserl’s notion of differentiating Noematic 
Nucleus, Essence, and Idea.  The Shell is the 
changing attributes which have an external 
coherence.  The essence is the internal coherence 
of these attributes.  The Idea is  the relation 
between these two coherences that has a continuity 
or stability , between objects and 
intersubjectivity.  cf Husserl Ideas (BIB 325).    
67.  cf. Merleau-Ponty, The Visible & Invisible 
(BIB 269), for the opposition and cancellation of 
the ontological concepts of Being & Nothingness. 
68.  cf. M. Henry, Essence of Manifestation (BIB  
266). 
     cf. Heidegger, The Question of Being (BIB 180).  
     cf. Derrida, (BIB 414, 415). 
 
69. cf. M. Henry, Essence of Manifestation (BIB 
266). 
70. cf. My series of working papers called "Studies 
for the Structure of Theoretical Systems in 
Relation to Emergence" (Unpublished manuscript) 
to be referred to from this point forward in 
the footnotes as "Studies". For a detailed 
presentation of ontological monism see Studies 
Section 1, Part B, Subsections 2.7 to 2.26 
71. "Ontological Dualism" means that "Being" does 
not give rise to itself but is given rise to by 
something other than it which is unknown but 
utterly determines Being.  M. Henry appeals to 
the theology of Meister Eckhart as a basis of 
this view.  The concept of ontological dualism 
begins to pave the way to an understanding of 
primary causation, but it is not the correct 
ontological basis for a metaphysic of primary 
causation that must rise above both Ontological 
Monism and Dualism. 
72. Ontological Monism and Dualism. 
73. This discontinuity is the precise subject of 
any study of emergence whether explained in 
terms of the metaphysic of ontological dualism 
or ontological monism. 
  
74. /cf. Derrida (BIB 414, 415), for his term 
"Differance" which is the concept indicated 
here. 
75. cf. Studies Section 2, Part A, Subsections 2.1 
to 2.6 for relation of sameness to 
transcendence. 
76. It is not the explanatory frameworks of 
Ontological Monism and Ontological Dualism that 
is important but the elusive phenomena of 
discontinuity. 
77. The ontological mould is that which the 
explanatory frameworks of Ontological Monism 
and Dualism are fitted into, and fill up, in 
order to define the point of discontinuity that 
is really interesting.  Without the 
articulation of the mould by one explanatory 
metaphysical framework or the other, the point 
of discontinuity cannot be approached. 
78. Once this step has been made it is very 
difficult, in spite of slogans like Husserl's 
'Back to the Phenomena', to re-trace one's 
steps to re-approach the particular. 
FIGURE 10 
-79.  The threshold of Appearance is a horizon of 
Process-Being (i.e. Heidegger's mixture of Being 
& Time), it stands for the concept Being outside 
of the circle in which individual y beings 
appear.  As B. Fuller, Synergetics (BIB 431) 
points out beings must appear as "overlapping 
visibility durations" that are non-simultaneous 
and differentiated minimally into four units.  
Cf. Studies, Section 2, Part B, Subsection 2.15. 
The necessity of four units for minimal 
appearance to theoretical sight will not be 
emphasized in this essay as it was amply covered 
in the Studies. 
  
80.  Even though the beings that appear above the 
threshold of appearance are differentiated the 
interval between their appearance and pure 
undifferentiated appearance is itself not 
differentiated. Yet we know that this interval 
must have three parts: Shell, core, and core of 
core.  The differentiation of the space 
between the point at the center and the 
circumference can only occur by developing the 
concept of the Ideational Template soon to be 
introduced. 
81. For an attempt of Adorno,  Negative Dialectics  
(BIB 160).   
82.  cf. Jacob, The Logic of Living Systems (BIB 
177). 
Note how, in Jacob's description of evolution, he 
identifies as a crucial problem four changes in the 
patterning of organisms.  These changes of basic 
patterning are the quantal transformations of living 
organisms associated with the Episteme Changes 
described by ^ Foucault, Order of Things (BIB 187) 
and The Epochs of Being described by Heidegger in 
The 
End of Philosophy (BIB 188).  This example 
shows that the quantal transformation of 
entities is not just a theoretical phenomenon. 
Also cf. Waddington, Tools for Thought (BIB    466) 
for a description of the counter-intuitive 
results of complex systems which is another way of 
looking at the samething. 
  83.  This is to say the transformation, in discrete 
quanta of the basic patterning of organic ^ beings, 
such as that which Jacob (BIB 177) describes. 
84. FIGURE 11 
85. Internal articulation means an invisible 
structuring which lies beyond the threshold of 
appearance.  It is hypothesized on the basis of 
the Quantal transformations of what is seen. 
  86.  The suggestion that it is possible to specify 
the sub-structure beyond the threshold of 
Appearance on the basis of the phenomenon of 
emergence has, to my knowledge, never been made 
before.  This substructure will be known as 
the___ 
 Trace.  What Derrida (BIB 414) call 
traces are deteriorating signs and are not  
traces.  For a full exposition of the concept    
  
of trace see Studies, part 4, and also the 
outline of the argument presented in the 
Studies from this point further in the 
footnotes called The Outline (unpublished 
manuscript). 
87. Because the concept of the internal 
articulation of the Ontological mould has not 
been suggested before, the "Ideational 
Template" which represents the articulation of 
that mould is a theoretical metaphysical object 
that is presented in this essay for the first 
time. 
88. The idea here is basically that the 
hypothesized internal articulation of the 
ontological mould controls all quantization of 
pattern changes or transformations-of-being 
which appear beyond the threshold of 
appearance. 
89. The shell has the form of the syllogism by 
which the particular being, that appears above 
the threshold of appearance, is connected to 
the Cover Concept (cf. Adorno Negative 
Dialectics BIB 160) "Being" signified by the 
horizon of the threshold itself. This 
corresponds to what was defined in the Studies 
by the relation of the "Axiomatic Platform" to 
the "Manifold" cf. The Outline. 
90. The core of the Ideational Template corresponds 
to what was called the Icon of Dimensionality 
in the Studies.  cf. The Outline. 
91. The centre of the core of the Ideational 
Template corresponds to the four states of 
Being in the Studies (cf. Section 4). These 
were 
further articulated by their relation to four 
modalities that were contrasted to four types 
of transcendence defined by the Kantian 
Categories that appear in Pure Presence Being. 
The relation between the four kinds of 
transcendence of classical metaphysics, the 
four modalities that were discovered by 
contemporary metaphysics, and both of their 
relations to the Four States of Being formed 
the basis for the development of the Studies. 
The Four States of Being and their respective 
modalities are as follows. 
Pure Presence -- Present-at-hand 
(Four kinds of transcendence 
defined by Kantian categories 
included here) 
Process Being -- Ready-to-hand 
Hyper Being ---- In-hand 
Wild Being ----- Out-of-hand 
The addition of the modality "out of hand" is 
the author's own contribution which merely 
rounds out a clear and logically symmetrical 
schema.  Modalities will not be discussed in this 
essay.  For more detail, see the Studies. 
92. For a detailed picture of this process cf. 
Studies, Section 4. 
93. For a detailed look at the ontological relation 
between Being and Nothingness, cf. the end of 
Section 3 of the Studies.  Sartre's book Being 
  and Nothingness (BIB 239) begins to deal with 
the issues, and Merleau-Ponty in The Visible 
  and Invisible (BIB 269) squarely confronts the 
relation between these two ontological concepts. 
94. The concept of the arising of matter-antimatter 
particles which spontaneously appear for a 
certain duration and then vanish again 
canceling each other out is the primary model 
for the relation of all antinomic oppositions. 
 cf. Ridley Time Space & Things (BIB 447). 
95. /For this term cf. Heidegger,  Being & Time (BIB 
265). 
96. cf. my interpretation of the section 
"Perceptual Faith and Interrogation" (pp. 
95-104  in The Visible and the Invisible by    __ 
Merleau-Ponty) in Studies, at the end of 
Section 1, and also note what Vershoven-      
 (Philosophy as Wonder (BIB277)) and Muntz (The  
Mystery of Existence (BIB 254).) -have to say about 
philosophical experience.  I define the experience 
of cancellation as "Astonishment". 
97.  cf. Blum, Theories: (BIB 184) and McHugh, On the 
/Being of Social Inquiry (BIB 245).          
 
98.  cf. Gadamer, Truth & Method (BIB 406).   
99. For a critique of the concept movement in 
thought, see the Studies Section 2 where it is 
dealt with in relation to the concepts Sameness 
and Transcendence. 
100. By self-form is meant the source of one's own 
self as intersubjective entity that exists in 
Heidegger's sense.  The source of the self 
shows itself in the temporal transformations of 
any individual self as it lives and works 
through time. 
101. cf. Heidegger What is Called Thinking (BIB 
185)  
102. cf. Blum, (BIB 184), on Aristotle.  
103. This unified perspective regards emergence to 
occur in four distinct phases.  This is 
expressed by different authors in different 
ways, but a close look shows that all agree 
fundamentally. 
Stage 1  Beyond threshold of Clearing-in-Being 
(closed-space)  (un-imagined) 
Stage 2  At threshold of Clearing-in-Being (closed 
space) (un-noticed) 
Stage 3  Within threshold of Clearing-in-Being and 
first noticed. 
Stage 4  Secured and comprehended. 
It was this uniform model which made me start 
looking for examples of significant four-fold 
conceptual categorizations, and attempt to 
distinguish them from insignificant ones. 
Some examples are: 
 Gelven, Winter Friendship & Guilt   (BIB .; 
336): Risk/Ambivalence,/Hierarchy of       
Significance/Transcendence. 
Bateson, "A Theory of Play & Fantasy" (BIB 
61): Meta Communication/Meta Linguistics 
Explicit/Implicit, cf. Double Helix 
unpublished manuscript. 
Blum, Theorizing (BIB 184): Four stages of 
method Plato/Aristotle/Descartes/Hume. 
 Heidegger, Being & Time pp. 30-31 (BIB 265): 
Leap/Disclose/Arrive-at-structures/ Make 
available. 
 Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics 
(BIB 174): 
Becoming/Appearance/Thought/Ought. 
 Heidegger, Poetry, Language and Thought. 
(BIB 71).  
Castenada, Journey to Ixtlan, p. 97 Stages 
of Power (BIB 169). 
Steiner, After Babel (BIB 258), pp.296 & 
301: Trust/Agression/Incooporation/ 
Reciprocity. 
Mead, G.H., Philosophy of Present, 
pp. 16-18. 
McTaggart, p. 91 (BIB 225). 
 R. McKeon (BIB 205): Rhetoric/Logic/ 
Grammar/Dialectic. 
 K. Burke, Grammar of Motives (BIB 219) & 
Permanence and Change (BIB 218): Four /Tropes  Foucault, M. Archeology of Knowledge (BIB 
 214): Four discursive formations. Order of 
Things (BIB 187): Epistemes.   
 Plato, Phaedra  (BIB 227).   
Tymieniecka, p. 71  (BIB 215). 
 Aristotle, The Four Causes and Four kinds of 
Motion (BIB 578). 
Stenzel (BIB 231), pp.102-103 Reference to 
Sophist 253 D. 
Wilden, System & Structure (BIB 57), p. 
370  Figure 3. 
Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (BIB 365)    
Antimonies,  
V Schopenhauer (BIB 244).  
W. Watson (BIB 595).     
 Ingarden, Time & Modes of Being (BIB 253)   
C.K. Warriner (BIB 550).   [Note: My Kansas 
University Sociology Professor]
This list gives examples of what I felt to be 
significant four-fold category schemes 
relating, in different ways, to the four phases 
of emergence.  An example of an insignificant 
four-fold category scheme is Crews, Wm. Four 
Causes of Reality, (BIB 578). 
It was not until ^discovered that O'Malley in V 
The Sociology of Meaning (BIB 379) defined the 
study of the interstices between categories, 
rather than the categories themselves, that it 
was possible to move away from these different 
category schemes to their common ontological 
origin in the Four States of Being. 
Thus, in this essay, only the model of the four 
states of Being will be discussed.  The model 
of the four states of Being is the means of 
generating the interstices of any particular 
system of concepts such as those indicated 
above. 
104.cf. Heidegger, Question of Being (BIB 180). 
cf. Rosen, (BIB 236, BIB 299). 
cf. Magnus, (BIB 305). 
cf. Polanyi, (BIB 302). 
Cf. Aschenbrenner, (BIB 304). 
cf. Blocker, (BIB 294). 
cf. Nietzsche, (BIB 267). 
cf. Gouldsblom, (BIB 731) 
105. By "vanished" I mean that the argument which 
appears in The Outline did not, at first, admit 
the simple substitution of the word nihilism 
for the word emergence which would, I thought, 
be all that was necessary.  The impossibility 
of a simple substitution caused me to explore 
the difference between the connotations of the 
terms. This in turn led me to see that, instead 
of being able to substitute one for the other, 
it was necessary to turn the whole argument 
upside down to accommodate the change.  From my 
previous experience with conceptual twins -- 
explored in detail in the Studies — this made 
me recognize that these two concepts were 
antinomic opposites.  I had not appreciated 
this before.  Because Emergence & Nihilism are 
merely opposite explanatory frameworks it 
becomes obvious that, when the two frameworks 
are brought to bear on each other, the whole 
argument would vanish.  It is like trying to 
have parallel lines both intersecting and non-
intersecting simultaneously.  This option does 
not exist for human reason. 
106. Antinomic oposites are described by Kant in 
Critique of Pure Reason (BI3 365).    
107. The quick change from one antinomic opposite to 
the other as a theoretical experience is an 
interesting experience.  The line of argument 
which I had worked out in the Studies and 
simplified in the Outline vanished by this 
quick movement. In the experience of that 
movement in time it occurred to me that both 
opposites must arise from a single source.  I 
had articulated one argument and in a flash I 
saw the opposite of it become manifest.  I had 
not worked out the opposite argument but it was 
obvious when it was before me in my theoretical 
perception. 
108. Each separate antinomically opposite argument 
is a realm of secondary connection.  In one 
^   realm the causes flow in one direction, and in 
the other realm the causes flow in the other 
(Induction and deduction are examples). Between 
the two realms of secondary connection all that 
can exist is primary causation. 
109. As long as one is working out an argument with 
no reference to its antinomic opposite one is 
in the realm of secondary causation.  At the 
point where the two faces of the opposite 
arguments appear and cancel then primary 
causation is indicated. 
110. The evidence for this is that one must be in 
the operational mode of one antinomic opposite 
argument or the other.  If one attempts to 
withdraw to the pure argument, from these 
operational explanatory frameworks of practical 
argumentation, then the argument, or set of 
concepts, vanishes because it has no material 
or content. 
111. The form of the argument, either right side-up 
or inverted as its twin, is static.  This 
stasis of the empty concept is in contrast to 
the flow of material which informs the concept 
and distinguishes it from its opposite. 
112. The concept is broken when the opposite 
materials that inform it in its separate 
contexts of antinomically opposite arguments 
are brought together.  When this is done the 
concept must change.  It is this transformation 
 of concepts that leads to "Paradigm Changes" in 
Kuhn's sense (BIB 9).  The change of concepts 
points toward the threshold of appearance via 
the most general stable concept.  This is the 
concept of Being of Parmenides cf. Freeman (BIB 
195).  The relation between Static concept and 
informing material (Hyle. cf. Husserl, Ideas   
(BIB 325) in flux, the Static Hyle and the 
transforming concept points toward the essence 
of manifestation (Beyond the gates in Parmenides 
Poem). 
113. cf. Tart (BIB 580). 
114. cf. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, (BIB 365) 
pp. 315 - 326, "Transcendental Ideas". 
115. Causation is merely a static way of looking at 
the same phenomenon as emergence describes.  In 
the unfolding of causes, emergence appears as 
meta-causation. Another term which might be 
used, instead of causation, is learning, cf. 
Bateson (BIB 61) for different levels of 
learning.  By applying the terms causation, 
Emergence, or learning to the same phenomena, 
very different scenarios are seen.  This is an 
example of the application of different 
distinctions to the same matter. 
116. Cf. Blum (BIB 184) Who speaks of 'Firsts.     
117. Cf. Said (BIB 377).   
117. cf. Footnote, Introduction, 114. 
Cf. My paper, Double Helix (Unpublished 
manuscript). 
118. Cf. Footnote 114 above. 
119. Cf. Studies; Section 3, Part D. 
120. cf. Studies; Section 2, Part E, for a detailed 
treatment of the ontology of dialectics.  See 
also Baum, A.J. (BIB 126) and Bunge (BIB 467). 
121. cf. Monod (BIB 77).   
122. By single source is meant a non-numerical, as 
opposed to a numerical, oneness which is beyond 
the power of conceptualization to describe. 
Numerical oneness is opposed to Twoness and from 
these opposites the number series is produced.  
The primary cause is however, the non-numerical 
oneness beyond the "marriage" of one and two to 
produce the number series.  For one and two 
substitute the Chinese philosophical terms "Yang 
& Yin".  The single source is not, however, 
equivalent to the Great Ultimate (Tai Chi) or the 
Thagata Garbha (Womb of thus-come) which is the 
Buddhist equivalent. 
It is not the numerical oneness of all-there-Is 
which is the unification of Yin & Yang.  This 
merely places the One/two opposition at a 
higher logical type and does not approach at 
all non-conceptual oneness.  For analysis of 
conceptual oneness are the Studies section 3 
from subsection 102.  The Great Ultimate or the 
unification of Yin & Yang as all phenomenal 
Being will be dealt with under the rubric of 
the western concept of First in this essay, cf. 
Verdu (BIB 257). 
123. The Truth of Appearance. 
124. Correspondence truth.  
125. cf. Plato's Republic (BIB 279) and Sallis 
 Commentary,  Being & Logos (BIB 278).  
126. cf. my Paper Double Helix.  Designated-as-real 
means intersubjectively agreed upon reality. 
 127. cf. Studies, Section 3, Part D. 
 See also, BIB 568 de Nicolas p. 73. 
128. To an extent that this occurs in this text. The 
author does not pretend to be outside the realm 
of ideational discourse, but within it pointing 
towards an alternative. 
129. These two domains of discourse are not 
established here because this would mean giving 
this essay a radically different form not 
conducive to the execution of a dissertation. 
130. FIGURE 12 
 131. cf. Hofstadter, D. (BIB 498).   
 132. cf. Wilden (BIB 57) for definition of these 
terms, p^^ 
 133 cf. de Nicolas (BIB 558) p. 45. 
134. cf. Newton-Smith (BIB 581). 
 135. cf. Heidegger, M. (BIB 87)  
Spacetime = 3 dimensional space + linear time. 
Timespace = past, present & future + no-where. 
 136. cf. Grunbaum, A. (BIB 582).   
 137. cf. Blandshard (BIB 273).  What Blandshard does 
with space in the Poetics of Space might also 
be done with regard to time. 
 
 
 
138. cf. Sui (BIB 551)   
139. cf. Adorno (BIB 160).   
140. cf. The Outline (G4). 
141. cf. Derrida (BIB 415).  
 
142. cf. Sartre (BIB 389). Sartre calls this the  
deviation of instruments. 
143. See footnote 138. 
144. cf. Klapp (BIB 510). This book presents another 
way of looking at the issues. There is no doubt 
that Western Metaphysics, in its highest 
development and sophistication, is crude and 
even trivial when compared to Chinese, Indian 
or Buddhist metaphysics.  However, we cannot 
but start from where we are.  The attempt to 
jump out of the western tradition without 
recognizing that it is imprinted on us, at a 
biological level, merely leads to the 
misrepresentation of other traditions by 
unconsciously imposing the process of ideation 
on them.  It is necessary to deal with ideation 
on our own home ground so that we may move on 
to a mature metaphysical approach to existence, 
as the Chinese or Indians did centuries 
earlier. 
145. Western Metaphysics is a completely fictitious 
set of assumptions about the nature of 
existence that only seems to have substance 
 (cf.Burke, BIB 2^) because of the self-       
fulfilling nature of the presuppositions.       
146. You are not going to see anything other than 
what you hold up to a mirror. 
147. cf. O'Malley (BIB 379) with regard to insight,    
148. cf. de Nicolas (BIB 558) p. 50. 
149. For an analysis of the Western Tradition in 
terms of the concept of Sophistry see Studies, 
section 2. 
150. For the role of oblivion in western Philosophy 
see Studies section 3. 
151. cf. Blum (BIB 184).    
152. cf. Bateson (BIB 61). 
153. Feyerabend (BIB 288).   
154. cf. Outline, (G5). 
155. cf. Burke (BIB 218).      
156. cf. Kant, (BIB 365).     
157. For the difference between thought that moves 
and thought that does not, see Studies, Section 
2 on the relation between Sameness and 
Transcendence. 
158. No thing may be said to be related to the 
single source explicitly, all relations are 
simultaneously non-relations. 
159. The fundamental form of thought has four 
different concrete manifestations that each 
have geometrical icons.  These geometrical 
icons are Knot, Torus, Tetrahedron and Mobius 
strip.  For detailed explanation of this point 
see Studies and Outline. 
160. cf. Lacan (BIB 427, 428), and Wilden (BIB 57).   
See the discussion of the 
Imaginary/Symbolic/Real. 
161. This impossibility will be called, in Chapter 
5, an out-of-time interchange. 
162. cf. Hume, (BIB 515).  
163. cf. Lao Tzu (BIB 569): doctrine of inaction. 
164. cf. Bleibtreu (BIB 118): what is true of 
animals in terms of their experience of 
temporality being different is true of all 
things. 
165. cf. Gould, (BIB 522). 
166. cf. Derrida (BIB 415).   
167. cf. Heidegger (BIB 402). 
168. cf. Baudrillard (BIB 424). 
169. cf. Persig (BIB 243). 
170. See footnote 160.  See also my paper, Double 
Helix. 
FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER 1 
1. cf. Plato, (BIB 227). 
2. cf. Jung, (BIB 5g6). 
3. The nature of the relation between the One and 
Many was a key issue in Greek philosophy that 
became submerged in later western philosophy. 
cf. Plato's Parmenides (BIB 227); for what is 
left of Parmenides' work, see Freeman (BIB 
195).  Other authors dealing with this subject 
later are Plotinus (BIB 590), and Hermes 
Trismegistus (BIB 383). 
4. As background for this discussion, Sallis (BIB 
307), and Ballard (BIB 286) should be 
consulted. 
5.  cf. Bohm, (BIB 591). 
6. In terms of philosophy in the western tradition 
once Kant classified the soul, along with God 
and the world, as the domain of Metaphysica 
Specialis (Theology), as opposed to Metaphysica 
Generalis (concerned with epistemology and 
ontology), such problems as the immortality of 
the soul have been considered passe.  However, 
the problems of a philosophical nature that 
were phrased in this terminology have persisted 
only to be spoken about in other ways.  In this 
essay, the problematic of the immortality of 
the soul will be accepted in order to see what 
Plato has to say here, through Socrates, about 
the topic that this essay concerns. 
7. cf. Aristophanes The Clouds (BIB 592) 
8. BIB 227, p. 79. 
9. BIB 227, my insert, p. 80. 
10.  Jung's concept of synchronicity is the 
beginning of an appreciation of how this might 
be possible.  cf. BIB  542. 
11  Socrates has obviously undergone the 
transformation spoken of in the Republic in terms of 
the forcible release of the prisoner from the cave.  
cf. Plato, (RIB 279) for why this is the inverse of 
the ideational template, cf Studies, Section 4. 
12. cf. Descartes, (BIB 285). 
13. cf. Leibniz (BIB 448). 
14. cf. Plato (BIB 227), p. 84. 
15. cf. Blum (BIB 814 & 593) for relation of 
Socrates to his interlocutors. 
16. cf. Pepper (BIB 554). 
17. cf. Plato (BIB 227), p. 84. 
18. Movement is another of those concepts that has 
submerged in the western tradition. 
Philosophical treatments of movement are few. 
   However, one interesting treatment of what is 
being referred to here is Melhuish (BIB 189).   
cf. also Weiher, (BIB 311). 
19. cf. Ali al-Jamal, (BIB 576) for a similar 
treatment of opposites as that found in Plato. 
20. For a modern treatment of the relationship 
between Visible and Invisible, cf.   
Merleau-Ponty (BIB 260)*.  See also Fuchs (BIB 
  413). 
21. Plato, (BIB 227), p. 85  (my insert) 
22. Plato, (BIB 227), p. 85 
23. cf. Brown (BIB 476).  By form is meant outline-
of-object. This is abstracted from the contents 
or qualities. 
24. The analogy here is matter and anti-matter. 
25. cf. Harrison (BIB 316). 
26. The most precise analysis of this in modern 
philosophy is, of course, Husserl's (BIB 325). 
27.  In Husserl's terminology the noematic nucleus     
  (BIB 325).  See also Buckler (BIB 416).          
28. cf. Merleau-Ponty's analysis of pointing and 
grasping as opposite modes of perception in    
  Phenomenology of Perception (BIB 72).  This book 
is, of course, a re-writing of Being & Time from 
the point of view of abnormal psychology.  
Looking at quality instead of form is the visual 
equivalent to the two technological (praxis) 
oriented modalities Presence-at-hand and Ready-
to-hand. 
29.  cf. Denbigh, (BIB 259). 
30. cf. Adler, (BIB 251); Murphy, (BIB 247);Jameson,     
(BIB 138);Heller, (BIB 364);Gadamer, (BIB 
422);Perelman (BIB 467). 
31.^ cf. Levi-Strauss, (BIB168);Broekman, (BIB 453); 
^Katz, (BIB 454). 
32. The catastrophe theory of R. Thom is one means 
  recently used to model this process cf.         
Waddington (BIB 466), also Schulman, (BIB 479). 
33. The boundary of the form is pictured here as 
analogous to the dividing line between the 
opposite qualities which cannot meet. 
34. Plato, (BIB 279). 
35. Plato, (BIB 227), p. 66. 
36.  cf. Sallis (BIB 307).   
37. Plato, (BIB 227), p. 43. 
38. Plato, (BIB 227), p. 43. 
39. The concept referred to here is that the array 
of opposite qualities is constantly changing to 
indicate the single source.  Pleasure and pain 
are examples of qualitative opposites so that 
their alternation on Man is literally timed 
(i.e. the exact moment when the interchange 
will occur is determined) by the indicated 
single source one of whose names is Time. 
40. Thus the wheel of samsara (life and death) 
spoken about in Buddhist philosophy, is 
relevant here.  See the Buddaha's four noble 
truths and 8 principles. 
41. Brown pictures this possibility of contact as   
the crossing of the boundary between the      
opposites, this is one of the assumptions of 
his 'laws of form' (BIB 476). 
42. cf. Tao Te Ching for another example of this 
view of opposites. Lao Tzu, (BIB 569). 
43. Plato (BIB 227), pp. 41,42. 
44. Plato (BIB 227), p. 42. 
  45.  cf Plessner (BIB 124). 
46. cf. Kant (BIB 827). 
47. cf. Brown (BIB 476).    
48. I.e. the contents of the form (outline) is 
formalized by being given structure, cf. Rosen, 
(BIB 297). 
49. For definition of Sophist, cf. the dialogue The 
Sophist (BIB 227). 
50. The value of such an elucidation is shown in 
The Studies. 
51. cf. Heidegger On Time & Being (BIB 87) (Time f^ 
has nothing to do with 'times'). 
52. cf. Husserl Phenomenology of Internal Time    
Consciousness (BIB 594). 
53. Wm. James (BIB 628). 
54. FIGURE 13 
55. Plato, (BIB 227). 
56. cf. Studies, 3.83 to 3.88. 
57. Plato, (BIB 227), p. 90-91. 
' 58.  de Nicolas (BIB 558, p. 83): concerning the 
mirror of thought and Fleshlessness. 
59. cf. Witgenstein (BIB 574, 575). 
60. Plato (BIB 227), p. 92. 
61. cf.Bosserman (BIB 229), p. 91. 
62. cf. Pawley, (BIB 583)  
63. Plato, (BIB 227), p. 91. 
64. For the difference between Pattern and 
Structure, see Outline. 
65. cf. Outline, Prelude: Potency and diamond 
metaphysics. 
66. That is by way of out-of-time interchange.  See 
Chapter 5. 
67. Plato, (BIB 227), p. 81. 
  
68.  cf. Picard(BIB 588)  
 
 
 
FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER 2 
1. For the application of this model of sophistry 
applied to western philosophy, see the Studies. 
2. Kant, (BIB 365, p. 55). 
3. Hegel, (BIB 596).   
4. Hume, (BIB 515, p. 57). 
5. cf. Plato's distinction between Knowledge and 
Opinion (BIB 227).        
6. For the role of transcendence in Western   
philosophy, see the Studies, Section 2.      
7. Section VII. 
8. cf. de Nicolas' use of the term fleshless (BIB 
558).   
9. Hume, (BIB 515), p. 63. 
10. Camus, (BIB 598). 
11. cf. Studies: The nature of the mirage. 
12. cf. Studies, section 2, Subsection 24. Plato, 
(BIB 227). 
13. Theaetatos, Plato (BIB 227), the uninitiated 
(246), those who drag to earth (155-56), nb. 
the children of the dragon's tooth fought by 
Cadamus. 
14. Hume, (BIB 515). 
15. Hume, (BIB 515), p. 64. 
16. Hume, (BIB 515), p. 64. 
17. Hume, (BIB 515), p. 64. 
18. Hume, (BIB 515), p. 64-65, my italics. 
19. Hume, (BIB 515), p. 66. 
20. Berkeley, (BIB 627). 
21. Dallas, (BIB 567).   
22. Hume, (BIB 515), p. 76. 
23. Rosen, (BIB 236).   
24. cf. Naess (BIB 310) and Sextus Empiricus (BIB 
309).     (  
25. Kant (BIB 365). 
26. I follow Patton's exegesis completely in this 
regard (BIB 358). 
27. Kant (BIB 365).   
28. That is, the inner totality of soul connected 
to the outer totality of World by the Infinity 
of God, cf. Studies, Section 3. 
29. cf. the different disguises of the Sophist (BIB 
227). 
30. In the form of the auction is exemplified all 
the elements of the form of the ideational 
template's social manifestation. 
31. cf. Persig (BIB 243).  
32. Heidegger (BIB 188, Sec. XXVI). 
33. Hegel (BIB 597).  
34. nb. Difference; Derrida (BIB 414 & 415).   
35. Nietzsche (BIB 267)  
36. This is the fourth dimensional aspect of the 
system:  Bragdon (BIB 125). 
37. cf. analysis of the terms Limit and Boundary. 
Studies Section 3. 
38. cf. Smelt (BIB 323). 
39. cf. Sartre, Deviation of instruments (BIB 389)  
cf. the myth of Tantalus, Graves (BIB 282).   
40. cf. Wittgenstein (BIB 575).   
41. Watson (BIB 455).   
42. Rosen (BIB 297).   
43. Fuller (BIB 431, p. 254). 
44. Hughes   (BIB   450,   p.   27) 
45. Munz   (BIB   49). 
FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER 3 
1. By this I mean that Kant excludes the concepts 
of Metaphysica Specialis whereas Hegel deifies 
them in the form of the Absolute Idea which is 
the ultimate mixture.  i.e., Hegel says that 
metaphysica specialis is the way the world 
works.  In this concept there is an attempt to 
mix the concrete opposite particular and the 
absolute.  Finitude is infinitude!  Where Kant 
maintains a clear distinction between the realm 
of the finite and the infinite, Hegel mixes 
even these opposite concepts.  Hegel sets out 
to prove the opposite of Kant and takes the 
opposite premises to him.  These philosophies 
are antinomic opposites. 
2. If one looks carefully at the form of the 
Kantian categories, it is obvious that Kant 
built the dialectic into these categories. 
However, he did not use this aspect of their 
structuring to do anything.  Hegel's system 
sets the categories in motion and uses the 
dialectical structuring, that Kant built into 
the categories, to do this.  For instance: in 
the 'Table of the Categories' there are four 
sections — i.e. of quality, of quantity, of 
relation, and of modality.  Under each of these 
headings there are three major headings.  Some 
are paired concepts and some are not.  In any 
case, these three major headings are 
dialectically related such that, for instance, 
unity and plurality are synthesized in 
totality.  We can only deduce from this that 
Hegel was ultimately a Kantian who became lost 
in the categories. 
3. Referring to the footnote 15 of the 
Introduction, it is possible to elaborate on 
this diagram and point out that, unlike form 
that may be apprehended at a glance, it takes 
time for structure to manifest.  The time it 
takes is the appearance of successive 
dialectical moments.   When the dialectical 
moments are taken together, as a finished 
picture of what is manifesting through them, 
then the underlying structure is reconstructed. 
This picture may be shattered by the advent of 
another dialectical moment in which new quanta 
are defined, or merely made more precise by the 
shift in perspective. Dialectical moments that 
begin quanta are very different from those that 
elaborate on a quantum's motif. Kant's 
philosophy is an example of a dialectical 
moment that began a new quantum in the advance 
of the western philosophical tradition.  Hegel's 
.philosophy elaborates on Kant's and so lies 
within the quantum inaugurated by Kant giving a 
fundamentally different view of the same 
system. 
4. The western tradition has just passed into a 
new 
quantum.  The quantum of the structural- 
dialectical system has worked itself out and a 
new quantum has been inaugurated.  Foucault 
(BIB 187) called for this new age without  
realizing that M. Henry (BIB 266) had already 
ushered it in by the definition of the 
difference between Ontological Monism and 
Ontological Dualism.  With the appearance of 
the twin of Ontological Monism, it falls — 
they cancel and a new era, episteme, or epoch 
of being is positively entered.  This is the 
era of Trace as against the era of sign-
structure-dialectic.  Derrida attempts to 
approach the concept of trace and frames it in 
terms of the deterioration of signs using the 
concept of erasure.  This concept is not 
adequate but is a first dialectical moment in 
the new era where the Materials of the old era 
are used to model that which is manifesting in 
the new era.  Erasure is not the correct 
concept of trace which is better modeled in 
terms of the indentations on the next sheet of 
paper in a pad when writing occurs on the top 
pad.  cf Wilden (BIB 57, ch. 11) on Freud's 
mystic writing pad model of memory. 
5. An excellent exposition of these elements is 
" found in G. Spencer-Brown (BIB 476). 
6. It is with Husserl's philosophy that the 
specifically structural element emerged and 
overtly separated itself from the formal 
system.  This was by the definition of the 
essence as a halfway house between Idea and 
Noematic nucleus (The concept of probability 
wave in Quantum mechanics as half way between 
possibility and probability is a corresponding 
manifestation of the structural element as 
separate from the formal, cf. Zukav (BIB 621) 
This was the point of reversibility in the 
quantum of the structural episteme ended by 
Henry.  At the point of reversibility, the 
underlying structure of the quantum becomes 
manifest in its own right.  In the phase of the 
quantum the modeling of the dialectical moments 
is done entirely with material from previous 
quanta in the tradition, whereas after the 
point of reversibility the unique features of 
that which is being modeled are recognized and 
given their own definition. 
7. cf. Outline for a more precise delineation of 
this process. 
8. This is very similar to what has occurred in 
the structural-dialectical episteme of the 
western philosophical tradition.  Kant defined 
a way of thinking represented by metaphysica 
specialis and called it pure reason, excluding 
it from the realm of metaphysica generalis.  It 
was precisely what he defined out that Hegel 
used as the basis of his philosophy.  One might 
 refer to Lefevre's (BIB 468) experimental problem 
of how to drill two holes halfway through a wall 
from each side, without communicating between the 
two drilling parties, so that these two half 
holes join.  The transformation between the 
parties that must pass over the wall is the model 
for what Kant excluded and Hegel included. The 
problem is how to cross an uncrossable barrier 
without going through it.  Hegel appealed to the 
concrete Absolute.  Those who reject this 
possibility of thought to surpass itself by a 
surreptitious route, adhere to Kant's 
restrictions but have spent most of their efforts 
to locate a way of doing just what has been 
excluded while adhering to the rules of 
exclusion. Heidegger, / using Husserl's 
definition of essence, managed finally to do that 
in Being & Time. 
9. i.e. a system of argumentation that excludes 
the possibility of the thing it is set out to 
find beforehand so that the search is only an 
approach to an asymptotic limit which can, by 
definition, never be reached. 
10. This form of self-defeating argument is made, 
  by some, to appear particularly engaging.  cf. 
Hofstader (BIB 498).   
11. The way I went down is expressed in the Outline 
and my going down it is preserved in the 
Studies. 
12. This study is a metacommentary on the program 
of the Outline which rejects that program and 
attempts to give a view of what lies beyond it. 
13.  An excellent account of what is meant by 
nihilism and emergence is given by de Nicolas   
(BIB 558) in the chapters on Asat and Sat 
(Languages of Non-Existence and Existence) 
respectively. 
14. i.e. Nietzsche (esp. BIB 267, but also, 186, 
206, 312, 441). Heidegger (BIB 180). Rosen (BIB 236, 
299). 
15.  De Nicolas calls this phenomenon 'background' 
(BIB  558, p. 90). 
The phenomenon which I attempted to understand 
in terms of Nihilism was the figure-ground 
relation between the emergent event which is 
current and the antecedent emergent events 
which appeared before this one, which has been 
solidified into the history of the tradition, 
cf. Wilden (BIB 57, ch. 11) on emergent events 
turned into the trace structure. 
16. G. H. Mead used the term emergence to specify 
this figure-ground relation specified in fn. 
15.  When I recognized that the philosophers 
meant the same thing by nihilism as G. H. Mead 
meant by one of the senses of the term 
emergence, I began using the term nihilism to 
specify this sense of the term of emergence and 
separate it from other meanings of the term 
emergence.  When I attempted to use the term 
artificial emergence to specify this special 
sense of the term emergence I realized that 
this sense defined as nihilism was opposite the 
other sense of the term which specified genuine 
discontinuity that engendered novel emergences 
that were in some sense genuine.  This 
cancellation of artificial emergence and 
genuine emergence as conceptual markers made me 
realize that genuine emergence was neither of 
these, meaning that both were, in some sense, 
artificial. This led to the search for a firm 
basis for analyzing the new meaning of genuine 
emergence which the principle of a single 
source provides. 
17. I had never compared the two senses of the term 
emergence before to realize that they covered 
what were actually opposite ideas.  Artificial 
emergence, nihilism, is an attribute of the 
figure-ground relation between the novelty and 
past novelties which leads to boredom because 
of the constant presentation of 'novelties'. 
Emergence proper is the complete change in the 
patterning of this figure-ground relation in 
order to combat this boredom (which leads, of 
course, to meta-boredom in the one who expects 
scientific revolutions).  The two mechanisms 
entail each other and, in fact, are a 
restatement of the same mechanism from two 
points of view.  The second mechanism takes the 
first figure-ground relation as the figure in a 
second figure-ground relation where the ground 
is a structural substratum underlying the 
episteme changes.  The kind of change is 
symbolized in Carlos Castenada being pushed 
through a door by Don Juan and ending up in a 
different place on a different day.  There was 
a complete scene change.  The orientation to 
the new surroundings takes a while, even for 
one expecting such a scene change.  Moving from 
one episteme or quantum is much like this, only 
in intellectual terms.  The ground is the 
structural relation between all possible scene 
changes and the figure is the relation between 
the current novelty and past novelties coded as 
traces into history.  These two relations are a 
micro and macro-view of the same thing.  It is 
analogous to the mobius strip.  The two views 
appear to be different things but actually, 
when viewed globally, in relation to each 
other, are seen to be the same thing. 
18. Adorno (BIB 511) criticizes any philosophy that 
ends up as being composed of antinomic opposites.  
Antinomic opposites, when they appear in anyone's 
thought, mean that the thought path involved was 
merely going round in circles.  Only an immature 
thinker, or one who never follows up their own 
ideas thinks they are immune from this.  
Reaching this point is the first glimmer of 
philosophical maturity. Adorno avoids it by never 
constructing a system.  Different thinkers avoid 
it in different ways.  The experience is, 
however, the definitive philosophical experience.  
It is equivalent to actually traveling around the 
mobius strip and discovering that it is only one-
sided.  This is completely different from the 
information that it is one-sided.  It is looping 
the loop, as they say.  The travel through the 
paradoxical situation epitomized in /Hofstader's 
EGB (BIB 498) is different from standing outside 
and looking in at it.  It is the difference 
between information and tasting by experience. 
19. Adorno saw no way to go beyond the antinomies 
except by glimpses.  He accepted them and 
attempted to work through them.  Ultimately, the 
presence of the antinomies means that no philosopher 
has anything to say because none can escape them.  
Whatever one says, it is undermined by the approach 
of the opposite statement that ultimately must be 
resorted to unless one accepts silence.  Just as 
pleasure and pain alternate on man, so too any 
intellectual position calls up its opposite. If one 
holds onto a single position then, if one does not 
release it, one will eventually have to say its 
opposite in order to continue articulating that 
initial position.  At that point the position has 
cancelled with its ^ opposite.  As Rosen (BIB 236) 
says the saying ^^. of the position is then equal 
to silence and this is the point of the advent of 
endemic Nihilism: where nothing means anything 
anymore. 
20. There are very few clear elucidations of the 
antinomic process of the cancellation of 
  conceptual forms.  Adornos Negative Dialectics   
is the best contemporary example.   
21. This is because we have been through the 
structural quanta of the western tradition and 
are just entering the quanta of Traces (cf. 
footnote 4, chapter 3). 
22. FIGURE 14 
23. cf. Chapter 3, footnote 14. 
24. Kant (BIB 365).   
25. cf. Rose (BIB 511). 
26. cf. de Nicolas (BIB 558), p. 82. 
27. Simply the author experienced for himself this 
key philosophical experience that the whole 
western tradition is set up to describe   
avoid, and fails to do either adequately. 
28. In this experience it becomes quite obvious 
that the thought thinks the thinker.  In it the 
master-slave dialectic between thinker and his 
thought reverses. 
29. cf. Gadamer (BIB 406) reconstruction is the     
correspondence standard of truth. 
Understanding requires understanding more than 
the author did of his own work.  This means 
realizing Appearance as a standard of truth for 
  
understanding.  Since cancellation appears to 
the author as an experience, it is possible to 
go beyond that of reconstructions based on the 
reports of other. 
30. Gadamer (BIB 406), and  Hirsch  (BIB 587). 
31. Chapter 3, footnotes 16 & 17. 
32. Merleau-Ponty (BIB 24).   
33. Sartre (BIB 389-390).   
34. This is because it would exemplify pure process 
in which all reference marks were continually 
changing. 
35. Heidegger (BIB 71). 
36.   Eco (BIB 469) for definition of code. Also, 
 Wilden (BIB 57).    
  37.  Kant (BIB 365).   
38. Hegel's mixture of universal and particular in 
the concrete absolute is another example 
already cited. 
39. The mechanism has its roots in a mnemonic 
device.  This is not explained here but a 
detailed explanation is contained in the 
   Studies.  cf. Yates (BIB 397) for an 
explanation of the mnemonic device itself. 
40. de Nicolas (BIB 558) mentions a definition of   
structure from Ortega y Gasset (p. 124) being 
'elements plus order'.  This is the simplest 
definition of structure applicable to this 
description.  The contents of the form are 
specified by the elements of the binary code and 
ordered differently in the two twin images that 
completely bifurcate the code pool. 
41. This is because most theoreticians use twinning 
to pack the initial terms of their arguments so 
that they may be unfolded, as the argument 
proceeds, in such a way as to yield the results 
desired by the theoretician. 
42. For instance, one twin is held back as the 
underlying structure that does not manifest 
until the end of the quantum and the other twin 
appears in the dialectical moments within the 
moving quantum.  But a more precise definition 
of the difference between structure and 
dialectic follows. 
43. Levi-Strauss (BIB 168). 
44. cf. Catastrophe theory; Zeeman (BIB 599). 
45. This insight was provided by Chris Collinge, a 
fellow graduate student at the LSE, and has 
been a significant tool for the analysis of 
structure as the temporalization of form. 
46. It only appears at the end of the Quantum. 
47. cf. Saussure (BIB 70). 
48. cf. Francis (BIB 400) on relation of zero to 
infinity. 
49. cf. de Nicolas (BIB 558), p. 45. 
50. cf. Wilden (BIB 57), p. 404: origin = goal. 
51. Plato (BIB 227); (author's insert). 
 52. Lanigran (BIB 526), Miles (Bib 520), Rebbi (BIB 
518), Bullough (BIB 517). 
53. cf. Studies Section 4, for the way pictures of 
what is beyond ideation are only other pictures 
of ideation. 
54. Simulation of what will be called, in Chapter 
5, out-of-time interchange. 
55. cf. Plato (BIB 227). 
56. cf. Dallas (BIB 567).  
57. cf. May (BIB 333). 
58. cf. Studies, Section 2. 
 
59. In terms of modern western philosophy, Kant 
excludes this surreptitious route by excluding 
the model of metaphysica specialis in which 
'god' is the connection between Soul and world 
in a non-empirically provable way.  Except for 
those, like Hegel, who championed the use of 
metaphysica specialis type arguments involving 
surreptitious routes, most philosophers 
accepted 
Kant's limitations on thought.  However, 
Husserl opened the arena of different 
modalities by the definition of essence as a 
halfway house between Idea and noematic nucleus 
(particular), and Heidegger used this route to 
define precisely the kind of operation that Kant 
had forbidden within the arena delimited by 
Kant's rules and without breaking these rules.  
Heidegger does this in Being & Time. cf. 
Studies, section 3, on Heidegger's Illusion, cf. 
Being & Time (BIB 265) on the y 'Call of Guilt'. 
60. Applying this formulation of two cognitive 
modes to the mobius strip is interesting and 
leads to the extension offered in Chapter 5, 
the locally apparent opposite sides of the 
mobius strip are globally the same.  There are 
two ways to move between the opposites sides. 
One may either go around the surface 360 
degrees to end up on the opposite side or one 
may cross the single edge separating the sides. 
These respectively are the circular and 
oscillatory modes of cognition.  They are 
combined here in such a way that the circular 
route could be a surreptitious access to the 
other side.  Another means of access which will 
be offered as an alternative, in chapter 5 of 
this essay, is to realize that the mobius strip 
is, ideally, a sheet of points — it is only 
one point thick.  In this case, any point 'A' 
on one side is it's opposite point 'B' without 
moving at all.  The realization of this is 
analogous to that which will later, be called 
out-of-time interchange between opposites. 
[Note: Two mobius strips in a 4dimensional 
pentahedron.] 
61. Like longitude and latitude being laid over the 
globe.  cf. this model was first used in the 
Outline. 
62. Different metric systems give different views 
of the same landscape.  For instance, by 
changing metrics in physics certain physical 
constants actually disappear from the 
equations. 
63. cf. Studies, Section 2. 
  64.  cf. Hofstadler (BIB 498).  
  65.  cf. Heidegger (BIB 265).  
66.  cf. Outline. 
  67.  Sartre (BIB 389, 390).  
Adorno (BIB 160).   
  69.  Merleau-Ponty (BIB 72).     
   70.  Merleau-Ponty (BIB 269).  
71.  Pure presence, Process Being, Hyper-Being, Wild 
Being.  cf. Introduction, fn. 91. 
The four kinds of being refer to the 
ontological basis of the outward technological 
project.  They are the centre of the core of 
the ideational template. 
  72. Like Hume and Berkeley, Descartes and Leibniz,  or 
Kant and Hegel. 
 73. Like Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Henry, and 
Derrida. 
74. This is analyzed in detail in the Studies. 
75. An analysis of conceptual oneness, in terms of 
the concepts interpenetration and 
intrapenetration, appears in Sections 3 and 4 
of the Studies. 
76. Kant posits God as being beyond the bounds of 
the finitude which the ideational template 
models.  By God, Kant means infinity. 
Infinity/finitude is the basic distinction on 
which the whole of the structure of Kantian 
philosophy is built.  God-infinity is 
interpreted by the author as 'conceptual 
oneness'.  In the studies, a major motif is 
"what happens when conceptual oneness is 
brought inside the realm of finitude". 
77. Conceptual oneness provides the framework for 
understanding the connection between 
beginnings and ends posited by the structural 
underpinnings of the finite delay period. 
78. CANCELLATION < -------------- PRODUCTION OF 
  OPPOSITES | | 
IDEAL MERGER OF TWINS ------- CONCEPTUAL 
WITHOUT CANCELLATION        ONENESS 
        [Note: Could this be a proto Emergent Meta-system?] 
79. i.e. four kinds of Being. 
80. The two sets of four are twins, and cancel. 
81. Those trapped in the delay period do everything 
possible to avoid cancellation occurring.  The 
point is to let it occur. 
82. Nihilism exists already as a manifested       
  component of the world.  cf. de Nicolas (BIB 
  558): the language of  Sat. cf. Rosen (BIB 236) 
on the endemic nature of Nihilism. 
83. It, nihilism, manifests in man as antinomic 
opposition. 
84. The consequences in man are boredom and 
 indifference (cf. May, BIB 333) and in the 
world are the manifestations of Technosis. cf.   
Biram (BIB 623). 
85. This is to say that if nihilism is not looked 
at in terms of its disastrous effects but as a 
system then it takes on a different 
physiognomy. Seeing it as a system means 
noticing that, although it has many different 
concrete appearances, these appearances take on 
the same patterning in every case. 
86. For the coherent essence/of nihilism 
recognized by Heidegger (BIB 180); but not by 
Rosen (BIB 236) who sees it as pure incoherence 
because he refuses to look at it as a system. 
87. Systematics, i.e. the form of the structural 
system allows us to recognize that the 
systematic effects of nihilism are only the 
result of the movement of the structural 
system.  The structural system produces 
nihilism in order to be seen. 
88. Ontology is the underpinning of the structural 
system in its basis on the Four Kinds of Being. 
89. Conceptual oneness is an attempt to solve the 
fragmentation of the four types of being by 
bringing about the impossible merger of 
finitude and infinitude. 
90. As is shown in the Studies in detail, this 
whole system is only there to indicate the 
possibility of the non-nihilistic distinction 
that the mixture of the delay period is 
designed to preclude.  The camouflage, meant to 
hide this possibility, when read another way 
points directly to it. 
91. cf. Outline preface. 
92. The way to go beyond the camouflage is not to 
get rid of it but to use it as a means of 
purification. 
93.  cf. Elluel (BIB 624). 
94.  cf. Burke (BIB 218) sub-stance: that which   
stands below that which is a foundation. Ideation 
is baseless. 
95. The point is not to get rid of nihilism but to 
recognize its positive function in existence. 
96. Rosen (BIB 236).   
97. Rosen (BIB 236).   
98. Adorno (BIB 160).   
99. Heidegger (BIB 180)   
100. cf. Zukav (BIB 621).   
101. cf. Klapp (BIB 510). 
102. Op Art is an example of the kind of shifting 
meant here. 
103. Zusne (BIB 439).   
104. cf. Studies; Section 2. 
 105. Monod models the structural system in terms of 
biology (cf BIB 77) 
 106. Kant's categories are another definition of the 
minimal constituents of the structural system 
(cf. BIB 365).   
107. cf. Studies; Section 3, 'Heidegger's 
illusion'. 
108. cf. Heidegger (BIB 87).   
109. cf. Heidegger (BIB 188).  
110. cf. Heidegger (BIB 265).   
111. Singularity is called the Hiatus in the 
Studies. Here the space-time singularity, 
related to black holes in space, is used as the 
metaphor.  The black hole is an anomalous, 
theoretically possible natural form where the 
force of gravity is too strong for light to 
escape.  At the center of the black hole is the 
space-time singularity where the laws of 
physics are violated - what is there is not 
covered by the laws of physics, cf. Kaufmann 
(BIB 626).  Here the 'singularity' is a point 
in the structural system that is not bound by 
its rules although the system allows the 
singularity to be defined. 
112. In the Studies the Manifold and the openly- 
closed system are defined as opposites.  The 
manifold is the realm in which the unfolding of 
the axiomatic framework takes place.  The 
axiomatic framework defines the formal system 
which is transformed into the structural 
system.  The structural system may be defined 
as opened or closed.  There are certain 
specific circumstances where the structural 
system takes on a third form called 'openly- 
closed'.  This is when its boundaries are 
stable like a closed system but where 
singularities (hiatus) are defined by the 
structure which allows information to appear 
inside the system from outside the system 
without crossing the boundaries of the closed 
system.  The special circumstances of the 
appearing of an openly-closed system and the 
manifold are the same formation appearing in 
opposite forms.  Conceptual oneness is applied 
to the Manifold through the concept of 
dimensionality.  These higher dimensions, in 
the manifold, interact with the structural 
system making the openly-closed system 
possible.  An example of the openly-closed 
system is chess,  cf. my analysis of chess, 
Studies, Appendix 2. 
113. Kant's infinitude is interpreted here as 
conceptual oneness.  Conceptual oneness has two 
manifestations: Interpenetration (this is a 
standard term in Buddhist metaphysics meaning 
the inherent coalescence of forms), and 
Intrapenetration which means that all the forms 
must be already inside any one form.  Thus any 
form has access to the conceptual oneness of 
     the whole universe (modeled as the higher 
dimensions unfolding in the manifold) from 
within and outside itself. 
114. This bringing in of conceptual oneness into the 
realm of finitude is exemplified in the studies 
as the Novum.  The novum is the ultimate 
   emergent event. The coherence of the clearing-
in-being (cf. Castenada - 'Tonal') and the 
external coherence (cf. Castenada -'Nagual') 
are brought together and the Clearing-in-being 
vanishes via the appearance of the novum.  When 
this occurs the slate is erased completely, the 
entire realm of artificial delay periods is wiped 
away, leaving only the timing of Time. It is the 
definition of this possibility which allows the 
delay periods, and the illusions that appear 
within them, to be seen,  cf. Studies. 
115. cf. Wilden (BIB 57).   
116. cf. Studies; Appendix 2. 
117. cf. Heidegger's illusion, Studies; Section 3. 
118. For detailed explanation see Studies; Sec. 3. 
119. For a more thorough explication, cf. Outline. 
120. This question is posed more fully in Studies; 
Sections 3 & 4. 
121. This implication, that all forms conceptually 
unite beyond the delay period, is wrong.  It is 
propaganda,  cf. Elluel (BIB 624). 
122. cf. Outline; Preface. 
123. It is not at a meta-level or a higher logical 
type. 
124. Derrida would say difference, (cf. BIB 414,    
415).           
125. cf. Heidegger (BIB 146).   
FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER 4 
  
l. Epochs of Being, Heidegger (BIB 188).    
Epistemes, Foucault (BIB 187).    Periods of 
paradigm dominance between 
Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn (BIB 9) -
Synchronic Moments Between Diacritical Shifts, 
Saussure (BIB 70). 
2. A patterning principle is a source of a series 
of motifs each of which are again the source of 
many different patterns. 
3. The shell of the template is the means of 
connecting concepts into triads which is most 
clearly modeled in the axioms of logic, or in 
the traditional syllogism.  In the triad, two 
elements of the same level are connected to 
higher/lower level elements.  See my Double 
Helix paper.  The logic of disconnection 
inserts discontinuities between these three 
elements. 
4. Nb. footnote 3, chapter 4.  The discontinuities 
between the structurally related quanta (cf. 
chapter 4, footnote 1) are analogous to the 
discontinuities posited by the logic of 
disconnection. 
5. The discontinuous argument may be modeled on 
the form of quantum logic (cf. de Nicolas, BIB 
558 —Appendix 2) 
6. Nb. footnote 4, chapter 4.  Discontinuity in 
the logical process is at the beginning, and 
discontinuity between the periods that make up 
a tradition, or a chain of reasoning, is at the 
end. 
7. I.e. the thesis here is that the process of 
connection, carried out automatically by the 
shell of ideation, blocks the perception of 
genuinely emergent events.  This blocking is 
done by the production of a kind of camouflage 
or noise, called here artificial emergence. 
8. I.e. the changes of motifs from the same 
patterning principle that is the core of the 
template,  footnote 2, chapter 4. 
9. No one in the whole history of philosophy has 
ever questioned the logic of connection.  It is 
only with Henry's (BIB 266) unveiling of the     
presupposition of ontological monism that it 
presents itself as a necessity.  The kind of 
discontinuity that is suggested between elements 
of logic already appears in the discontinuity 
between segments of the tradition or segments of 
the chain of reasonings.  Even quantum logic, 
which rejects the distributive laws does not 
reject connection implied by logical sum and 
product.  It therefore gets disconnections in the 
lattice of sentences analogous to the breaks in 
traditions. 
10. Of its core, the patterning principle, and the 
center of its core — the fragmentation of the 
concept of Being. 
11. The idea here is that the logic of connection 
is a mechanism that continues spinning a web. 
In the first instance it is the mechanism 
itself that is the shell of the template but, 
by implication, the web which comes from it may 
be called the shell of the template as well. 
In the web cuts, gaps, or discontinuities appear 
that cannot be explained in terms of the logic of 
connection that is the mechanism that produces 
the web. Each of the parts of the web, like the 
moving geological tectonic plates on the earth, 
are based on a different motif.  By these motifs, 
similarly, a patterning principle is hypothesized 
that is called the core of the ideational 
template. 
12. This is a description of what happens, in the 
logic of disconnection, that makes the mixture 
of the opposites impossible. 
13. The point here is that the logic of 
disconnection ignores a fundamental component 
of the ideational template, this appears later 
in a counter-productive way as discontinuities 
in the web of connections in the template.  The 
logic of disconnection recognizes this 
fundamental component from the first and thus 
deals with its ill effects immediately. 
14. cf. the Outline. 
15.  cf. Manning (BIB 506). 
  cf. Schreier (BIB 484). 
  cf. Hurewicz (BIB 481). 
  cf. Kendall (BIB 480). 
cf. Section 2 & 3, Studies & Outline. 
  cf. White (BIB 456), p. 152-153. 
      cf. Coxeter (BIB 503). 
17. The tetrahedron, as Fuller (BIB 431)    
recognized is the minimal visible conceptual 
form.  Yet the actual geometrical form is not 
of that great an importance.  It is the form 
that thought takes of which it is one marker. 
There are four markers of a geometrical kind 
for this simplest thought-form. They are the 
tetrahedron, torus, Mobius strip, and knot. 
Each of these have 720 degrees of rotation in 
common.  It is as if the basic thought form 
appears in geometrical terms by this 
tetrahedron of forms. Each of the other 
geometrical forms are also merely markers for 
the harmonic thresholds of complexity of 
thought whereon the least interference is 
encountered to the motion of thought. 
18. Formlessness - No form - is the opposite of 
form.  It has the same relation to form as 
Appearance (Being) has to correspondences 
(beings). In the relation of Higher dimensional 
polytopes there is a clear analogy of the 
relation of no-form to form.  Only a certain 
portion of the unimaginable higher dimensional 
forms may be rotated into 3 dimensional space 
at one time and the rest is Nowhere.  The 
relation of nowhere to somewhere is another way 
of appreciating this which will appear again in 
Chapter 5. 
19. cf. footnote 18, chapter 4. 
20. That is, by seeing the series of higher 
dimensional spaces, with their corresponding 
regular and other polytopes, as a whole.  This 
is done by considering zero and 'N' 
dimensionality and their relation to zero and 
infinity.  cf. Studies, Section 3. 
21. cf. Studies, Sections 3 & 4. 
22. This is usually, imaged in mythological 
treatments, in terms of incest and murder of 
the parents.  cf. the Greek gods and 
descriptions in the Rig Veda: Graves (BIB 282) 
& de Nicolas (BIB 558).   
23. Nietzsche (BIB 267).   
24. In the Studies the genuinely emergent event 
that shatters the nets of correspondences in 
the Clearing-in-Being was called the Novum. 
cf. Studies, Section 1.   
25. cf. footnote 15, Chapter 1. 
26. This is the rationale behind the choices, in 
consumerism, between different products. 
 27.  In the Studies, the ultimate intensification 
was called the 'Clearing-of-Being' and this was 
identified as the opposite of the 'Clearing-in-
Being'.  They are related as Castenada's (BIB 169) 
'Nagual' and 'Tonal' respectively.   
 28.  This is the age of saturation of the human 
self-form by nihilism, cf. May (BIB 333). 
  29.  cf. Berger (BIB 8). 
30. The forms and opposites as they appear from the 
single source by genuine emergence. 
31. It makes them visible...like the move from 
atomic to sub-atomic physics does. 
32. This final genuine emergence that erased the 
artificial emergences' cumulative effects is 
called a Novum in the Studies.  It is the 
appearance of the external coherence of the 
Clearing-in-Being inside the Clearing in Being 
so that it re-aligns with the internal 
coherence of the Clearing-in-Being to produce 
its cancellation. Called the Clearing-of-Being. 
33. I.e. Wild Being. 
34. It freezes the motion of connective thought. 
35. Dialectical moment. 
36. Produces an illusory continuity. 
37. Look at any text book and see how essentially 
unrelated points in the argument are tied 
together to appear as a continuous argument. 
38. For the human being approximately 24 frames per 
second is the threshold for the appearance of 
the illusion of continuity.  Cinematic 
technique is based on this. 
39. Or motif, or scenario. 
, 40.  cf. Tiryakian (BIB 191).   
_41.  Presentation of one motif or gestalt pattern is 
the withdrawal of others, thus it is the 
manifestation of the ontological framework of 
presentation and withdrawal. Cf Heidegger (BIB 4   
52).     
42. cf. Studies, Section 4. 
43. This study began as an exploration of the 
sociology of creativity and, after reading all 
the literature on creativity which I found 
extremely barren, I turned to philosophy for 
inspiration.  My study of philosophy centered 
around ontology and my conclusion is that 
creativity, as it appears, is nothing other 
than the manifestation of artificial emergence 
if it is radically novel, and nihilism if it is 
only a variation of existing forms and 
processes already manifest. Creativity is 
merely the display of the ideational form in 
another manifestation and the truly creative 
act is that which breaks into the arena of 
genuine emergence so that the source of true 
creativity — the single source — is indicated 
or glimpsed. 
44. Mead (BIB 108, 540, 565).   
45. Foucault (BIB 187).   
-46.  Heidegger (BIB 188).   
47. Kuhn (BIB 9).     
48. cf. Zahar (BIB 181).   
49. cf. de Nicolas ( BIB 558), p. 82. 
 50.  Infinity is the doubling of mirroring — two 
mirrors placed opposite each other creating an 
infinity of images (Hughes, BIB 450).  Thought 
used to study itself produces the same effect. 
51.  Physis [phusis] is the mirror opposite to Logos 
in Greek thought.  The problem is to see what 
there was before Physos and Logos separated.  
That is genuine emergence.  The point is that 
they never did separate, we merely entered an 
artificial delay period in which the split 
seemed to be real. 
 52.  Spacetime-timespace, cf. Special theory of        
relativity in Zukav (BIB 621) and Heidegger   (BIB 
87), or Being, 'ether', may be taken as an 
interpretation of the medium.   
53.  cf. Studies for an in depth presentation.       
Kuznetsov (BIB 507). 
55. cf. Derridas' critique of Husserl (BIB 415). 
56. At this point the model of the mnemonic comes 
into play, cf. Yates (BIB 397), and the 
Studies.    
57. In mathematics this is group theory. 
58. This is done by placing the complexity of the 
system at exactly the complexity of one of the 
harmonic thresholds of complexity marked by the 
geometrical regular solids. 
59. In the Outline this is called the openspace. 
Openspace suggests its transparency and seeming 
openness.  However, here it is identified with 
the delay period which is closed. 
60. cf. Heidegger (BIB 265).    
61. See the use of the metaphor of the cave from 
Plato's Republic to describe the closed space 
in Studies, Sec. 4. 
62. This is the insight of C. Collinge in personal 
communication. 
63. cf. Studies, Section 4, for an in-depth 
analysis of the Clearing-in-Being using the 
cave metaphor of Plato as its basis. 
64. For an analysis of the walls of the 
Clearing-in-Being, cf. Studies, Sec. 3-4. 
65. cf. Galileo's analogy of a pen drawing on the 
sea after a boat.  Feyerabend (BIB 288) and 
Galileo's dialogues.   
66. The closed-space within the boundary of the 
'Clearing-in-Being' has the nature of 'Minimal 
Erratic Change' that makes the Formal System 
visible. 
67. The formal system (as open system or closed 
system) is constructed according to the plan  
laid out in Monod's Chance & Necessity (BIB 
77),of successive layers of random variance and 
invariance or stillness and motion. 
68. With respect to the formal system either 'what 
is processed by it' may change or the 
processing system may change.  Processing is 
the transformation of materials from outside 
the system.  Changes in the system itself are 
more rare and are part of the 'becoming of the 
system' according to teleonomic principles. 
Emergent events may occur with respect to 
either of these two processes of becoming. 
Transformation is the nature of discontinuous 
change and may be part of a Process, Becoming, 
or emergent event. 
FIGURE 15 
cf. Outline, F22-23. 
69. The erratic change makes visible the nihilistic 
opposites of motion/stillness or random change/ 
invariance. 
70. The filtering system's narrowing of the range 
of allowed change, in pseudo-goal-orientation, 
makes visible the emergent changes in processed 
materials and the becoming of the system. 
71. The whole system seems to be goal oriented in 
the sense, defined by Monod, of narrowing 
allowable changes (BIB 77).   
72. Husserl (BIB 320 & 325).   
73. cf. Outline. 
74. Tetrahedron/knot/torus/mobius strip. 
 [Note: 720 degrees of angular change in 
common.] 
75.  Cube-octahedron. 
76. Icosahedron-dodacahedron. 
77. Five cell polytope of 4 dimensional space. 
78. 16 cell - 8 cell polytopes. 
79. 24 cell polytope. 
80. 120 cell - 600 cell polytopes. 
81. 6 cell polytope of five dimensional space. 
82. The knot of paradox is the concentration of all 
the erratic change, generated by the structural 
system, into a single place which appears as a 
paradoxicality of the kind defined, by Russell, 
as a class being a member of itself in 
Principia Mathematica. 
  
83. cf. Merleau-Ponty (BIB 269).   
84. Process Being=Time + Being, cf. Heidegger (BIB 
265).   
 
85. cf. Sartre (BIB 239).   
86. cf. Merleau-Ponty (BIB 
87. Identity of form and no-form. 
88. That which is there before the formal grid is 
generated (before the split between Logos and 
physis). 
89. cf. Section 4, Studies. 
90. For the identity between zero & infinity see 4 
(BIB 400).        
91. cf. Section 4, Studies. 
92. Henry (BIB 266).  
93. cf. Fuller (BIB 431) on 'Indigs' and their      
eight-fold harmonic cycle.  This is the proof 
that the binary harmonic underlies the Number 
series because it can be converted into this 
cycle based on powers of 2. 
94. In this essay the higher dimensional spaces 
will be considered as the internal coherence of 
the numbers with which they are associated. 
95. In de Nicolas' book and its musical sequel by 
E. McClain (BIB 557 & 558), the binary harmonic 
is referred to specifically. They call the 
binary harmonic octave female and barren until 
fertilized by odd prime numbers.  It is 
precisely this barren octave structure that has 
the form of formlessness, i.e. the 
fertilization is the beginning of the delay 
period.  It is the generation of the rest of 
the number series that must be avoided if we 
are not to enter into the delay period. 
96. cf. Dallas (BIB 549). 
FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER 5 
1. Or the single source. 
2. cf. Heidegger (BIB 265).   
3. cf. Levi Strauss (BIB 168).   
4. Beckett (BIB 630). 
5. Vladimir and Estragon may be easily replaced by 
Rosencrantz & Gildenstern in T. Stoppards play 
(BIB 631). 
 6.   As Foucault has said the mythology of 'Man' is 
finished (BIB 187).   
7. cf. Merleau-Ponty (BIB 269).   
8. cf. O'Malley's distinction between 
Categorimatics and diagramatics for another 
approach to what is meant here by the 
distinction between A Priori Synthesis and 
Analysis.    
9. cf. Dallas (BIB 549).   
10. See also Ali al-Jamal (BIB 576) and Lao Tzu   
(BIB 569). 
11. cf. Gadamer on the Platonic dialogues (BIB 
422). 
12. An example of the out-of-time interchange may 
be found in the idea of the instantaton. cf. 
Rebbi (BIB 518). 
13. Brown, (BIB 476).   
14. cf. also Zukav (BIB 621), p. 216, 240, & 243 
-15.  Heidegger, On Time & Being (BIB 087).   
FOOTNOTES - CONCLUSION 
1.   In addition to Greek sources, traditional 
Chinese Philosophy would be an invaluable 
source of information concerning archaic 
qualitative sciences.  The eight trigrams and 
the 64 hexagrams of the I Ching constitute two 
specific descriptions of thresholds of 
     complexity of the binary harmonic. In Islam 
there is also the traditional Science of the 
Sands (Ilm al-Raml) in which another level of 
the binary harmonic is described.  A 
preliminary study of these three sources 
suggests that a coherent universal archaic 
science of qualitative states, based on the 
binary harmonic, once existed.  The scholastic 
problem is not just to archeologically 
reconstruct this archaic science, but to make 
it real, on a practical level, in our own time 
in terms which are accessible to those, at 
present, immersed in contemporary quantitative 
science.  A beginning toward this end has been 
made by T. & D. McKenna in The Invisible 
Landscape (BIB 667). 
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